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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EU immigration and asylum policies have to face two major challenges: on the
one hand the impending demographic crisis in Europe and on the other hand the
migration pressures coming from outside its borders, as the current migration and
refugee crises in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East exemplify. This makes
it indispensable to develop a strong EU external action able to combat smuggling of
migrants and trafficking of human beings, promote mobility and facilitate legal migration
opportunities to third-country nationals, maximise synergies between migration and
development of countries of origin, and enhance protection capacities towards persons in
need of international protection, in line with the pillars of the Global Approach to
Migration and Mobility (GAMM).
This study aimed at examining the overall strategy of EU cooperation with third
countries in the field of immigration and asylum and evaluating its contours and
outcomes, proceeds in three sections. Section 1 reviews the main forms of international
cooperation adopted by the EU to tackle the multiple dimensions of the migration
phenomenon, focusing on those covering enlargement and Eastern Partnership countries,
Southern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan countries, as well as the Greater Middle East.
The analysis includes a mapping of the diverse funding sources for EU cooperation with
third countries of origin and transit of migratory flows and a brief survey of the main
modalities of Member States’ own external cooperation in this field. Section 2 attempts to
undertake an assessment of the outcomes and impact of the instruments of EU external
cooperation on migration, from a triple perspective: the objectives pursued (substantive
dimension), the consequences of the nature of the instruments used (functional
dimension), and the challenges of coordination regarding their adoption and
implementation (institutional dimension). Case studies on Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia
seek to provide empirical insight into the topics examined. Finally, section 3 formulates
conclusions contributing to the debate on the configuration and impact of EU cooperation
with third countries in the field of migration, and proposes a set of concrete
recommendations for further action.
1. The toolbox of EU external cooperation with third countries in the field of
immigration and asylum
The EU has at its disposal a wide array of instruments devised to enable a
comprehensive cooperation with third countries of origin and transit of
migratory flows. Migration dialogues (both regional and bilateral), Mobility Partnerships
(MPs), Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs), EU Readmission
Agreements (EURAs), Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs), migration clauses in
association and cooperation agreements, Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) and
Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPPs), as well as Frontex and
EASO’s external tools have been progressively conceived to achieve the objectives
embodied in the GAMM, the overarching political framework inspiring EU external action
in this field.
However, an analysis of the features, priorities, institutional framing and
geographical scope of all these instruments reveals a scattered and sometimes
incoherent picture. Although the GAMM instruments – at least the comprehensive ones
such as migration dialogues, MPs and CAMMs – seem to be quite balanced in their
initially stated priorities, their concretisation shows that the different pillars of this
approach are not receiving equivalent degrees of attention. The second pillar of the
GAMM related to fighting irregular immigration, strengthening border controls
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
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and ensuring readmission is the most developed priority through global
instruments, EURAs, and Frontex cooperation, while EU action is still limited
and inconsistent with regard to maximising migration and development links,
and promoting international protection (among non-comprehensive instruments,
only RDPPs pursue these objectives, the EASO external action being still
underdeveloped). On legal migration, the added value of EU intervention is
questionable as no instrument of EU cooperation currently includes significant
facilitations on the admission of migrants at EU level, while association and cooperation
agreements are only being used to strengthen the integration of legal migrants
originating from partner countries.
The intricate distribution of external competences applicable to the field of
migration explains that most EU cooperation instruments with third countries
ensure the participation of both the Union and its Member States. However, a
lack of sufficient involvement of the latter is perceived in the follow-up and
implementation phases of tools such as migration dialogues, MPs and RPPs, usually due
to particular interests of certain Member States and the unavailability of funds to
facilitate regular participation. Significant similarities in the content of each instrument
concerning different countries also question the negotiated and “partnership” nature of
these tools. In sum, although the GAMM has been conceptually taken on board in the
discourse of EU institutions and Member States, there is still a significant margin for
improvement in ensuring a balanced, coordinated and coherent implementation of each
of its elements.
In terms of geographical priorities, the GAMM instruments have been clearly focused
on the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus countries, deeply involved
on cooperating with the EU on migration issues. In recent years, however, cooperation
with Southern Mediterranean countries is intensifying and attention is also beginning to
turn to Sub-Saharan and Eastern African countries.
For the adequate enforcement of these forms of international cooperation, the
EU has mobilised numerous financial instruments of diverse nature and origin.
EU external cooperation on immigration and asylum is the result of a long process of
accumulation in the framework of different EU policies (migration and asylum,
development cooperation, external relations, neighborhood policy and humanitarian aid).
Overall, between 2004 and 2014 the EU spent more than EUR 1 billion on more
than 400 projects worldwide. There is a clear growth trend in EU development
cooperation funds allocated to migration, which have stabilised at around EUR 100 million
per year jointly considering the thematic funds and the geographical funds, all of which
include immigration and asylum among their priorities. As a consequence of this
unplanned pattern, the implementation and the funding sources are institutionally
scattered among DG DEVCO, DG HOME, DG NEAR in the Commission as well as the
EEAS, with very different objectives and intervention formats. These funds do not
always complement internal funds for migration and asylum related
programmes, which for 2007-2013 amounted to EUR 4 billion.
Through international treaties or informal arrangements, Member States, for
their part, continue to develop a rather intense external action at the bilateral
level in those fields in which they preserve exclusive or concurrent powers with regard to
the EU. Migration cooperation agreements concluded by Spain and France with African
countries illustrate how the migration phenomenon can be comprehensively approached
at the national level, albeit they also evidence that the reluctance to offer legal migration
opportunities is not restricted to EU frameworks of cooperation. Concerning specific
projects of external cooperation, those involving several Member States, with
EU funding support, and in collaboration with EU agencies seems to be the most
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
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promising way to optimise resources, ensure added value, and pave the way for
increasing Union action.
2. Impact of EU cooperation instruments in the field of immigration and
asylum
The impact and even output assessment of EU external cooperation in the field
of immigration and asylum is complicated by the lack of available relevant
information. In relation to the strategic objectives of the GAMM, legal migration and
mobility, despite being one of the four key dimensions of external cooperation
in the field of migration, have been subordinated in policy terms, in particular in
relation to the control of irregular migration. Evidence shows that whereas VFAs and,
even more, visa exemptions boost mobility, MPs as such do not. Legal migration within
EU external cooperation, in turn, seems blocked for the time being. Paradoxically,
whereas the EU is investing heavily in institutional capacity building for better labor
migration management in developing third countries, the credibility of those efforts is
often undermined by the limited legal migration opportunities offered by EU Member
States.
At first sight, the value of cooperation with third countries can seem more
obvious in the field of irregular migration, having a direct impact on the number of
irregular border crossings detected from partner countries, for instance. Return and
reintegration support continues to be a major priority for EU development funding in the
field of migration. However, projects in this field often overlap in the same country of
origin, sustainability of initiatives seems to be in question, and return and reintegration
programmes tend to promote the creation of parallel training, funding or business
creation tracks instead of reinforcing public schemes already at work at national level.
Their cost-efficiency also seems to be low.
In relation to migration and development, a recent evaluation concluded that there
is a gap between the support provided to institutions and the concrete
outcomes for the migrants themselves, i.e., the focus on capacity building and
institutional strengthening may ultimately not translate into direct benefits for migrants.
The sub-topic of remittances has been the most successful area for external cooperation
in this field.
A major challenge in the near future for EU external cooperation in the field of migration,
and more generally of EU development cooperation over the next years, is a growing
confusion of development assistance objectives and migration policy (home
affairs) objectives, including for instance return and readmission of irregular migrants,
and the eventual subordination of the former to the latter through some form of
conditionality. This might further undermine EU credibility in this field.
The diverse nature and the multiplicity of the instruments employed to develop
the EU external action on migration has evident implications for their impact
and effectiveness. On the one hand, while they entail cumbersome and lengthy
procedures for their adoption, legal instruments constitute the appropriate tool to
regulate migrants’ rights related to social security entitlements, admission and
integration, visa facilitations and exemptions, or safeguards applicable to return or
interception, allowing for legal certainty, increased democratic legitimacy and judicial
monitoring. On the other hand, political instruments, responding more easily to flexibility
and sensitive public opinions in third countries opposing migration cooperation with the
EU, fail to secure a complete and coordinated EU offer to partner countries, hinder
monitoring of compliance with international human rights law and hamper the effective
enforcement of commitments and safeguards, among other disadvantages derived from
the non-binding nature of these instruments.
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From an operational perspective, a lack of balance between the different
components of the GAMM is also perceptible in favour of the control of irregular
migration, including integrated border management programmes and return and
reintegration. A second major issue concerns the dispersion of funds and funding
instruments, which translates into a lack of visibility for partner countries and
implementers, a frequent lack of coordination and coherence between
interventions in the same area as well as overlapping and duplication of efforts
and resources. In terms of implementation, EU Delegations often lack the specialised
staff required to plan, implement and monitor those projects. Besides that, programming
processes are often slow, and administrative procedures for the selection of service
providers, project funding and implementation are often too burdensome to be effective,
limiting to a large extent the flexibility of EU cooperation to respond to new
developments or contextual changes. Finally, information on project implementation
should be more systematically compiled and disseminated.
From an institutional perspective, strengthened coordination at different levels
is one of the most pressing challenges that must be tackled for the development of
an efficient EU external action on migration. Firstly, concerning EU-Member States
coordination, a systematic exchange of bilateral practices and instruments of cooperation
is lacking, despite the existence of institutional mechanisms and legal obligations in force
to that effect. Increased coordination between the supranational and national levels could
avoid, for instance, difficulties in EU negotiations with its partners, overlaps in the
cooperation initiatives offered to them or the use of EU instruments as mere umbrellas
for pursuing national agendas. Among EU institutions involved in the external dimension
of immigration and asylum policies, the difference in perspectives and priorities of the
Commission and the EEAS is evident. An increasing degree of the latter’s involvement in
this field should be matched with an increment of capacities, human resources and
technical expertise, starting with the secondment of EU migration liaison officers to EU
delegations abroad.
Also, the increasingly meaningful place occupied by political instruments
permits only very limited involvement of the European Parliament in the
scrutiny of the design and implementation of the GAMM, a shortcoming in need of
prompt responses. The same holds true as regards the tasks undertaken by EU agencies
such as Frontex or EASO. The external aspects of their mandates and responsibilities
should be clarified too. As far as the intra-institutional dimension is concerned,
coordination and rapprochement of priorities among the different European Commission
DGs involved is indispensable. If their variety of perspectives can contribute to a more
balanced EU external action on migration, the lack of coordination should not hinder its
effectiveness. In this regard, the role of the HR/VP in ensuring internal coherence is of
utmost importance, a responsibility that is starting to be put into practice. Similarly
within the Council, coordination should be ensured not only between the JHA and FAC
formations, but especially among the myriad working parties and structures charged with
tasks related to the external dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies.
3. Summary of policy recommendations
On the basis of the findings and conclusions emerging from the analysis in the study and
the case studies included in the annexes, it is possible to formulate the following policy
recommendations:
More balance between the different components of the GAMM:
 A strengthened EU external action on legal migration, that includes
facilitations of legal admission of migrants, recognition of diplomas and
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
_____________________________________________________________________
13
qualifications as well as portability of social rights, is needed. As a way of
increasing the balance of priorities contained therein, MPs should include
additional possibilities for legal migration. Advancing as much as possible in
the internal harmonisation of EU rules in these fields will help to achieve those
objectives. The possibility to present to partner countries a coordinated EU offer
on labour migration opportunities should be explored.
 The GAMM pillar on international protection is still insufficiently
developed. Capacity-building efforts and resettlement commitments, main
components of RPPs/RDPPS, should be stepped up and carried out in real dialogue
with countries hosting large refugee populations.
 The external activities of the EASO that are underdeveloped probably due to
budget limitations and lack of political will, should be reinforced.
 Further and more specific resources should be mobilised to attain the
GAMM objectives, a challenge that the upcoming MP Facility could face.
 Focus should be put on facilitating the progress assessment of the GAMM.
Reinforce the partnership approach:
 A greater involvement of third partner countries in the design and
negotiation of GAMM instruments should be secured so as to respond to the
partnership nature of these instruments, enhancing their local ownership and
efficiency.
 VFAs should include a higher degree of actual visa facilitations and be
concluded in view of an autonomous objective of promoting mobility from partner
countries. Mobility-related incentives in the field of trade in services could be
offered to EU partners once a visa-free regime has been granted in order to
ensure sustainability of reforms undertaken within a VLD.
 The EU should direct its readmission policy towards countries of origin
and include obligations on third-country nationals only in EURAs with important
neighbour countries of transit as well as strive to look for additional incentives
within other EU policies.
Rationalisation and increased coordination:
 A high number of EU funding instruments apply to external cooperation
on immigration and asylum, following at times conflicting approaches,
and often leading to overlaps. The funding framework should be simplified,
clearly distinguishing objectives and EU policies and the corresponding funding
possibilities.
 The multiplication of regional dialogues on migration in which many countries
take part simultaneously requires rationalisation efforts, while more attention
should be given to increasing their practical value and action-oriented approach.
 Coherence and complementarities among different instruments of the
GAMM directed to the same countries or regions or sharing similar
priorities must be ensured.
 The existing legal and institutional framework should be reinforced to
ensure a systematic exchange of information between the Commission
and Member States on agreements and projects carried out or planned by the
latter in the field of migration.
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 Increasing Member States’ involvement in GAMM instruments should be
explored as their contribution is indispensable due to the current distribution of
competences.
 EEAS capacities and human resources should be stepped up if an increased
involvement of the Service in the external dimension of migration appears
desirable. The secondment of migration liaison officers to EU delegations abroad
should start immediately.
 Modes of increasing coordination of priorities among DGs HOME, DEVCO
and NEAR within the Commission should be envisaged.
 In the Council, creating a single unit in charge of coordinating the
multiple existing working parties and structures involved in this external
dimension or empowering the HLWG on Asylum and Migration with a strong
coordinating role should also be explored.
 EU external action on migration should ensure added value with regard to
Member States’ bilateral external activities. While the compatibility clauses
included in EURAs, allowing for the application of bilateral readmission
agreements, should be avoided, EU funding should only be granted, within MPs, to
multilateral projects involving several Member States.
 Instruments of a political nature may be useful for initiating migration
cooperation with third countries, but suffer from shortcomings arising out
of their soft law nature. Migration cooperation should evolve towards greater
recourse to hard law in order to ensure stability and legal certainty of
engagements, specify further details of cooperation and safeguard migrants’
rights.
More transparency for better evaluation and scrutiny:
 Mandatory evaluations of implemented projects should not focus only on
outputs and outcomes, but also on impact in relation to the strategic
objectives of each project. More resources should be invested in follow-up and
evaluation of impact after the finalisation of projects.
 Periodic and comprehensive evaluation efforts should be undertaken for
each instrument of the GAMM, both cooperation tools and financial instruments.
 The production of a standard ex-post project fiche with data about the
allocation of a budget across different components of the project and elements for
assessment should be envisaged at least in the framework of large programmes.
 EU Member States should be compelled to provide accurate data on the
implementation of EU instruments of cooperation in order to allow for
comprehensive and detailed evaluation exercises.
 Assessment of the efficiency and of the human rights impact of Frontex’
external action should be reinforced.
 The European Parliament should search for ways of increasing its
capacities of scrutiny and monitoring in the design and implementation of the
GAMM, such as regular debates and consultations on the adoption and impact of
MPs, CAMMs, RDPPs and EU agencies’ external activities. Mechanisms of regularly
monitoring the implementation of formal agreements like EURAs and VFAs with
the involvement of the European Parliament should also be established.
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
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INTRODUCTION
1. Scope and content of the study
The development and consolidation of an intense cooperation with third countries
appears indispensable to adequately respond to the numerous challenges posed by the
migration phenomenon, as acknowledged by the EU political discourse since the
‘communautarisation’ of immigration and asylum issues. Since 2005, the Global Approach
to Migration (GAM)1, renamed as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)
in 20112, constitutes the overarching political framework for dialogue and cooperation
with third countries in these fields and is based on the following four pillars: prevention
and fight against irregular immigration, strengthening border management and return;
promotion of mobility and facilitation of legal migration opportunities and integration of
legal residents; maximisation of synergies between migration and development of
countries of origin; and the promotion of asylum and international protection. The
importance of reinforcing cooperation with countries of origin and transit of migratory
flows in line with these objectives has been constantly highlighted by EU institutions,
especially in recent years and, more particularly, in the context of the unprecedented
migratory and refugee crisis that the EU is facing nowadays. If the external dimension of
EU migration policy has clearly become one of the highest priorities of the European
integration process, work needs to be done on the design, implementation and
assessment of the wide variety of cooperation instruments put in place by the EU to this
effect.
In its Resolution of 17 December 2014, the European Parliament stressed once again the
need for a holistic approach to migration, calling for a thorough analysis of the overall
strategy on cooperation with third countries in this field3, a demand to which the present
study attempts to respond. For that purpose, this research examines and evaluates the
contours and outcomes of EU cooperation with third countries on immigration and
asylum. Section 1 reviews the main instruments of international cooperation adopted by
the EU to tackle the multiple dimensions of the migration phenomenon, focusing on those
covering enlargement and Eastern Partnership countries, Southern Mediterranean and
Sub-Saharan countries, as well as the Greater Middle East. The analysis includes a
mapping of the diverse and indispensable funding sources for EU cooperation with third
countries of origin and transit of migratory flows and a brief survey of the main
modalities of Member States’ own external cooperation in this field. Section 2 undertakes
an assessment of the outcomes and impact of the instruments of EU external cooperation
on migration, from a triple perspective: the objectives pursued (substantive dimension),
the consequences of the nature of the instruments used (functional dimension), and the
challenges of coordination regarding their adoption and implementation (institutional
dimension). Case studies on Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia seek to provide empirical
insight into the topics examined. Finally, section 3 formulates conclusions contributing to
the debate on the configuration and impact of EU cooperation with third countries in the
field of migration, and proposes a set of concrete recommendations for further action.
Having briefly introduced the scope and content of this study, further clarifications on the
challenges to which this external dimension is confronted, both in global terms as well as
from a specific migration policy perspective, are needed to understand the context of the
subject. In addition, any discussion on the development of an EU external action on
1 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 15–16 December 2005, point 4 and Annex I, “Global
Approach to Migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean”.
2 European Commission, “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, COM (2011) 743, 18.11.2011;
Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 3 May 2012, doc. nº 9417/12.
3 European Parliament, Resolution of 17 December 2014 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for
a holistic EU approach to migration, P8_TA(2014)0105.
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migration requires to trace the institutional and legal setting in which it is to be
elaborated. These aspects are developed in the following sub-sections 2 and 3.
2. Global and migration policy challenges
Any strategic analysis of cooperation with third countries in the field of immigration and
asylum must start by considering two key contextual and political issues which determine
the effectiveness and strategic scope of any action in this field, as well as the constraints
that frame it.
In the first place, the root causes of mixed migration flows, i.e. conflict and instability in
countries of origin, economic inequalities and poverty, overpopulation and demographic
dynamics, unemployment, lack of security, weak levels of democracy and natural
disasters as push factors of migration, are intensifying and will not probably cease to
create increasing migration pressures over the coming decades, in particular from Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Southern Mediterranean.
Secondly, the difficult political context in which migration policies operate in Europe, in
particular, but not only, as a consequence of the global economic crisis must be taken
into account. Whereas there is a wide consensus that the EU’s labour market requires
migrants in the medium, long and even short term due to demographic and labour
market dynamics and to enhance its global competitiveness, migrant integration issues
persist, and there is a growing anti-immigration sentiment in parts of the population. In
some Member States, migration policy has become a major cleavage line in national
politics, determining the outcome of elections4. Migration policy has thus become a very
sensitive political issue.
EU cooperation in the field of migration and asylum cannot directly tackle all these
challenges, but they have to be taken into account when formulating and assessing
concrete cooperation programmes and instruments with partner countries, as well as
when engaging with them through other relevant EU and Member State policies, to
ensure policy coherence.
From a more specific migration policy perspective, the European Commission appointed
in 2014 underlined EU migration policy as one of its ten political priorities for its five-year
mandate5. In accordance to this, the European Agenda on Migration, proposed by the
Commission in May 2015, aims to deal in a comprehensive way with all aspects of
migration: the development of a Common European Asylum System, a new European
policy on legal migration, the fight against irregular migration and human trafficking and
the securing of the EU’s external borders6. The European Agenda on Migration has so far
been largely dominated by short-term considerations and a focus on the response to the
ongoing migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Although it also refers to cooperation with
third countries in the field of migration, especially in fields more closely related to
security aspects, surprisingly the GAMM does not feature as one of the framework
approaches for the implementation of the new Agenda.
In this context, cooperation with third countries faces a number of challenges demanding
a clear response from the EU. All of them relate to the implementation of the GAMM but
although it has been conceptually taken on board by the discourse and general policy
approach of EU institutions and Member States, there is still room for improvement in
4 See I. Martín et al, Exploring New Avenues for Legislation for Labour Migration to the European Union,
European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, PE 536.452, 2015, p.58.
5 A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for
the next European Commission. Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg,
15 July 2014.
6 European Commission, “A European Agenda on Migration”, COM (2015) 240, 13.5.2015.
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
_____________________________________________________________________
17
ensuring a balanced, coordinated and coherent implementation of all its elements7, as
also with the internal dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies. The main
challenges related to the objectives of the GAMM are:
 Regarding legal migration and integration, the importance of attracting talent
and skills, while trying to meet the labour demand of specific sectors with relevant
shortages in Member States is acknowledged. However, for achieving this
purpose, facilitations on legal migration should be offered to EU partners, an
objective for which increasing internal EU harmonisation is crucial, exploiting the
decision-making advances in the Lisbon Treaty. The offer of real legal migration
opportunities should be accompanied by promoting the recognition of diplomas
and qualifications as well as by ensuring the transfer of social rights of immigrants
as means to foster integration and facilitate circular migration opportunities. To
this effect, real circular migration schemes should be devised by replicating
certain examples of good practices at national level, avoiding disguised forms of
temporary migration. Also, the promotion of cooperation between host Member
States and migrant diasporas is indispensable to the fight against discrimination,
racism and xenophobia.
 On the promotion of mobility, dissociating it from migration will allow the EU to
facilitate the short stays (for maximum 3 months) of certain categories of persons
from third countries who do not intend to settle in the EU. It is essential to
advance on ongoing visa liberalisation dialogues with partner countries and to
offer real visa facilitation opportunities to countries cooperating or willing to
cooperate with the EU on the prevention of irregular immigration, border controls
and readmission, striking the right geographical balance between Southern and
Eastern partners.
 As regards the fight against irregular immigration, the main focus is
strengthening cooperation with third countries in the prevention and fight against
smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, by reinforcing training, capacity
building actions and information sharing mechanisms, including an evaluation of
the impact of ILOs networks and the cooperation they establish with third
countries; by promoting cooperation on criminal matters; and by encouraging
ratification of the Palermo Protocols in this field8. Also, the EU and its Member
States should urgently respect and promote compliance with international
obligations on search and rescue in order to stop the tragic deaths of migrants at
sea, reinforce capacity building in this field, evaluate the impact on border
cooperation of Frontex working arrangements with third countries.
 On migration and development, there is a pressing need to ensure the added
value of programmes, projects and actions related to migration and asylum
undertaken or financed at EU level; as well as to make sure that development
assistance is not used for purely migration management purposes, but to mitigate
push factors of migration, provided this is in line with the main objective of EU
development policy, the eradication of poverty. This latter point is particularly
important because there is a clear trend to subordinate the EU’s international
development cooperation to the objectives of EU migration policy. Greater
attention should also be given to effective integration of migration and asylum
7 See European Commission, “Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
2012-2013”, COM(2014) 96, 21.2.14.
8 Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, and Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish
trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, both supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000.
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into national development plans in partner countries, to the effects of South-South
migration, to the role of diasporas in promoting economic growth in countries of
origin and, of course, to enhancing EU policy coherence in this field. Addressing
the links between environmental degradation and migration is also a priority.
 In the field of international protection, main challenges include enhancing
protection capacities of countries of origin and transit in order to improve refugee
protection; showing real and practical solidarity with third countries through the
improvement and implementation of resettlement commitments. However, the
recent Commission’s communication on the role of the EU external action to
address the current refugee crisis, the largest faced by the EU since the end of
WWII, fails to comprehensively acknowledge this set of responses9, especially by
omitting references to the need to devise legal avenues to secure access of
asylum seekers to European soil10 (these measures are nevertheless outside the
scope of the present study).
 Finally, human rights protection, a cross-cutting objective of the GAMM,
requires effectively monitoring the effects on the human rights of migrants and
asylum seekers of the implementation of existing instruments of EU cooperation
with third countries, mainly EU readmission agreements and joint border
operations, as well as the impact of the outsourcing efforts of the EU particularly
on border controls, return and international protection.
3. Institutional and legal setting
The essential legal question regarding the conception and development of EU external
action on immigration and asylum relates to the distribution of competences between the
EU and its Member States. The significance and complexity of the EU distribution of
external competences not only determines the feasibility of the Union agreeing to
establish cooperation with third countries in this field, but also conditions both the
efficiency and efficacy of the external dimension of the EU migration policy. This external
dimension relates, in general terms, to a field in which shared competences between the
EU and its Member States are the rule11, with only a few exceptions. That means that the
adjective “global” that characterises the approach to migration and mobility inspiring
cooperation with third countries refers to the need for balance among its material
objectives, as well as to the need – at least for now – of combining and coordinating both
decision levels of action at stake, EU and Member States. Respect for the distribution of
competences is also relevant both for the conclusion, by the EU and its Member States,
of legally binding agreements with third countries and for the adoption of political
instruments regarding external cooperation on migration. It would make no sense for the
Union or its Member States to commit, within political instruments, to further future
actions and initiatives that they would not be able to implement for lack of competences.
Starting with the question of the existence of EU external competences, the only explicit
external competence transferred to the EU in the migration field relates to the conclusion
9 See European Commission/ HRVP, Joint Communication on “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role
of EU External Action”, JOIN (2015) 40, 9.9.2015, which focuses on actions directed towards addressing the
root causes of the forced movement of people through humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.
Other measures included therein mainly refer to readmission and fight against smuggling and human
trafficking, with only passing references to capacity building through Regional Development and Protection
Programmes.
10 Such as humanitarian corridors, humanitarian visas, enhanced family reunification, private sponsorship
schemes and more flexible visa arrangements. See European Parliament, Resolution of 10 September 2015 on
migration and refugees in Europe, P8_TA-PROV (2015)0317, point 13.
11 According to Article 4.2(j) TFEU, shared competence between the Union and Member States applies to the
area of freedom, security and justice, of which immigration and asylum policies are part.
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of readmission agreements with third countries of origin and transit12. As this provision
was included in the Lisbon Treaty, after the GAMM had already been agreed, this shows
the greater political importance of the readmission objective in EU external cooperation.
For the rest of the migration fields, the absence of explicit external competences leads to
resort to the CJEU doctrine of implied external powers, codified - not very accurately - in
the Treaties since the Lisbon reform13. The application of this doctrine to fields such as
short-term visas, borders or legal migration requires an assessment of whether the
conclusion of an international agreement facilitates the achievement of the objectives of
the internal competence transferred to the Union in that field. As cooperation with
countries of origin and transit is essential to addressing migration challenges, the implied
powers reasoning can be easily applied to the different components of the GAMM14, with
the exception of decisions on volumes of admission of migrants from third countries for
labour purposes, preserved as an exclusive power by Member States15. Within the EU
policy on asylum, article 78.2.g) TFEU refers to “partnership and cooperation with third
countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary
or temporary protection”. However, this is not an external competence as such, but
rather an objective taking the form of an internal competence, from which an implied
external competence on asylum can be deduced. The contradiction between the relative
ease with which implied external powers can be affirmed in the field of immigration and
asylum and the almost complete absence of explicit external competences can be
explained by this external dimension being not considered an objective in itself but a
means to achieve the internal objectives of the EU policy on migration and to contribute,
more generally, to the creation of an internal area of freedom, security and justice16.
Concerning the nature of the EU competences, most of the objectives of the GAMM
correspond to areas of concurrent competence, such as readmission, legal admission of
migrants and socio-economic integration of legal residents. Facilitation and exemption of
short-term visas as well as the normative aspects of external border controls are the only
fields in which ERTA exclusivity currently applies17, since there are common internal rules
susceptible of being affected by Member States’ bilateral agreements18. The objective of
maximising the synergies between migration and development pertains to a field of
parallel competences as far as it concerns development cooperation policy19, while
actions focused on migration within this pillar of the GAMM would rely on the nature of
the respective competences within immigration policy. Some additional specifications are
however to be highlighted with regard to readmission and borders. On the one hand, the
qualification of readmission as a concurrent competence implies that this EU power may
become exclusive once exercised with regard to a particular country. In addition, the
12 Article 79.3 TFEU.
13 Article 216.1 TFEU. In this regard, see, for instance, M. Cremona, ‘Defining competence in EU external
relations: lessons from the Treaty reform process’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice
of EU External Relations. Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2008, pp. 34–69.
14 In particular, implied external competences of the EU can be deduced from article 77.2.a) (short-term visas);
77.2.b) and d) (external borders controls); 79.2.a) (admission of legal migrants); 79.2.b) (socio-economic
integration of legal residents); 79.2.c) (fight against irregular immigration); and 79.2.d) TFEU (combating
trafficking of human beings from a non-criminal perspective).
15 Article 79.5 TFEU.
16 See Report by the Presidency on “European Union priorities and policy objectives for external relations in the
field of justice and home affairs”, Council doc. no. 7653/00, 6.6.2000, p. 5; European Council, Presidency
Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16.10.1999, point 59; Hague Programme, point 4; and “A Strategy for the External
Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice”, Council doc. no. 14366/3/05, 30.11.2005, points 1
and 8.
17 Initiated with Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR/ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paras 17–18 and
consolidated in subsequent CJEU case-law. See its codification in article 3.2 TFEU.
18 Mainly contained in the Visa Code, the Visa lists Regulation and the Schengen Borders Code.
19 Article 209.2 TFEU and Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 26 March 2009, case C-13/07, Commission v.
Council.
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“mandate theory” developed by the CJEU on the basis of the loyal cooperation principle20
must be respected, requiring Member States to forego ongoing or future negotiations on
readmission once the Commission receives a mandate to negotiate with the same
country. On the other hand, the fact that the field of external border controls is
considered to pertain to an ERTA-exclusive competence of the EU because of the existing
exhaustive legislative acquis on borders is without prejudice to Member States preserving
the power to implement border controls under secondary law21. This is important as
subscribing arrangements on joint patrols deployed in third countries will correspond to a
Member State power.
In view of the intricate distribution of competences to implement the GAMM that has
been shortly described22, both the EU and its Member States need each other to
comprehensively achieve its objectives. Strengthened coordination efforts between the
two levels will therefore be indispensable23. At the same time, while Member States
should rest within the remit of their powers and respect EU competences, the Union
should further exploit the scope of its external competences on migration and exercise
them when the required conditions are met. Nevertheless, the development of a
strengthened EU external action in this field very much depends on the simultaneous
progress of internal harmonisation able to create more possibilities of ERTA exclusivity,
as the internal and external dimensions of migration policy are clearly intertwined.
From an institutional perspective, the multifaceted character of migration involves
multiple departments at both national Governments and EU institutions. Within the EU,
several institutions and units inside them share responsibilities for the design and
implementation of the external dimension of immigration and asylum policies.
Consequently, inter-institutional and intra-institutional coordination is imperative24.
Among the EU institutions, coordination is needed between the Council, the Commission
and the European Parliament; as well as between the Commission and the EEAS, the
participation of which in the external dimension of the EU migration policy should be
clarified and probably increased25. This affects the central structure of the Service (its
geographic directorates and specialised departments), but also EU delegations in third
countries. The role of the latter in the implementation of the GAMM instruments should
be deepened, in particular by providing EU migration liaison officers26. Coordination with
diplomatic missions of Member States is also indispensable, as both conform to the
institutional structures providing the political support for an effective implementation of
the GAMM on the ground.
Efforts at intra-institutional coordination must also be pursued. This is especially true of
the Directorates-General at the Commission involved in this field: DG HOME, responsible
for designing and developing this external dimension, and DG DEVCO and DG NEAR, in
20 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805 and Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany
[2005] ECR I-6985.
21 In addition to the uniform rules included in the Schengen Borders Code, note that Regulation (EC) No
1931/2006 establishes common rules on local border traffic to be implemented internationally through bilateral
agreements concluded by Member States as a delegation of an exclusive competence of the EU.
22 See H. Labayle, “La competence externe de l’Union européenne en matière migratoire”, M. Maes, M.C.
Foblets, P. De Bruycker (eds.), Dimensions Externes du droit et de la politique d’immigration et d’asile de l’UE,
Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011, pp. 175-201 and M. Cremona, “EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal
Perspective”, in M. Cremona, J. Monar, S. Poli (eds.), The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice, College of Europe Studies no. 13, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011, pp. 77-118.
For a more thorough analysis, see García Andrade, La acción exterior de la Unión Europea en materia
migratoria: un problema de reparto de competencias, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2015.
23 See section 2.1.3.1 of this study on EU-Member States coordination.
24 See sections 2.1.3.2 and 2.1.3.3 of this study.
25 See Council Conclusions on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 2.4.2014,
doc. nº 8443/14, point 6.
26 COM (2015) 240, 13.5.2015, p. 8.
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charge of several instruments of cooperation and assistance to third countries. Coherence
is necessary too among the different Council formations responsible for the external
dimension of immigration and asylum policies, JHA and FAC, as well as between Council
working structures with powers in this respect, such as the HLWG on Asylum and
Migration, the central forum for strategic discussions and initiatives regarding the GAMM,
and the SCIFA, in order to avoid overlapping efforts.
The participation of EU agencies in the external dimension of immigration and asylum
policies is more or less steadily increasing. Nevertheless, although this EU enhanced role
on policy implementation may be welcome and should be stepped up, the external
aspects of the mandates and responsibilities of Frontex, EASO, FRA or even EUROPOL
should be clarified. Monitoring the intra-EU activities these Agencies coordinate and
strengthening inter-agency coordination are necessary tasks to undertake before asking
third countries for cooperation. This study will address most of these institutional
challenges.
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1. THE TOOLBOX OF EU EXTERNAL COOPERATION IN THE
FIELD OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM
1.1. An overview of forms of EU cooperation with third countries
on migration and asylum
KEY FINDINGS
 Political instruments for EU external cooperation in the field of migration
and asylum, such as regional and bilateral migration policy dialogues, Mobility
Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility have proliferated in
the last few years. As far as regional dialogues are concerned, this
multiplication of fora in which many countries take part simultaneously creates a
clear risk of overlap that demands a rationalisation of the processes. As specific
bilateral dialogues, Visa Liberalisation Dialogues are an influential tool for
achieving the mobility objective of the GAMM and a strong incentive for partner
countries to adopt reforms and closely cooperate on migration with the EU. The 8
Mobility Partnerships signed so far suffer from a lack of balance among their
different components, with a focus on irregular migration, return and readmission
and little progress in terms of legal migration and mobility. However, they are
proving useful tools to align international cooperation in the fields of migration
and asylum and contribute to an increased coordination and coherence in national
migration policies.
 The main legal instruments in the field of cooperation on migration are
migration clauses in global agreements such as association agreements or
cooperation agreements and specific international agreements on migration, such
as readmission agreements, visa facilitation or visa exemption agreements. In
the case of the 17 EURAs signed until now, some problematic issues
regarding the design and implementation relate to the systematic EU demand to
include TCN clauses in these agreements. For these reasons, it would be wise, as
the Commission proposed in 2011, to focus the EU readmission policy on
countries of origin instead of transit and only include TCN clauses in readmission
negotiations with countries neighbouring the EU and with a significant risk of
transit migration to the EU, alongside appropriate incentives. As for Visa
Facilitation Agreements, despite their stated aim to facilitate the issuance of
Schengen visas, their real impact has proved limited. They do not solve the
problem with the intricate paperwork associated with the issuance of a Schengen
visa, the length of visa procedures and the issue of MEVs.
 In term of operational instruments, Regional Protection Programmes,
launched on a pilot basis ten years ago, have consolidated as the key tool within
the international protection pillar of the GAMM. They have strengthened their
development dimension in the new Regional Development and Protection
Programmes. Some weaknesses identified are: too broadly defined scope; lack of
sufficient coordination of RPPs with other EU policies in the countries concerned;
underdeveloped regional approach of the programmes; lack of local ownership;
insufficient involvement of Member States on the ground; very weak resettlement
component. Regarding the external activities of EU agencies, whose mandates
need clarification, a thorough evaluation of the design and efficiency of Frontex
cooperation with third countries is indispensable, while the external action of
EASO is still underdeveloped.
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Since the inception of the EU external action on migration in the 1990s and, mainly, after
the adoption in 2005 of the Global Approach to Migration as its political framework, the
modes and instruments used by the EU to cooperate with third countries of origin and
transit have greatly diversified and gradually refined in scope and purposes. An
assessment of the EU external cooperation in the field of migration needs to start with an
overview as complete as possible of the tools the Union has mobilised to attain the goals
of the GAMM, highlighting the main features of these instruments of cooperation,
comparing their priorities, clarifying their geographical scope and assessing the
perceptions of the main actors involved. Next, a benchmarking of each category of
instrument against the objectives of the GAMM will allow the evaluation of whether
current forms of cooperation respond to the ambitions and targets the EU and its Member
States have committed to achieve. This overview – like the rest of the study - pays
particular attention to instruments of cooperation adopted with enlargement countries,
Eastern Partnership countries, Southern Mediterranean countries, Sub-Saharan countries,
Greater Middle East countries and, to a lesser extent, other priority countries.
1.1.1. Instruments of the external dimension of EU policies of migration and asylum
This sub-section first introduces a general definition of each instrument and its aims, in
order to subsequently present how each instrument has been concluded, subscribed or
extended to different countries and its specific objectives, together with some references
to some significant implementing measures. Firstly, political instruments such as regional
and bilateral migration dialogues, Mobility Partnerships, and Common Agendas on
Migration and Mobility are examined. Legal instruments are analysed next, including
association and cooperation agreements containing migration clauses as well as
international agreements devoted to specific migration issues, such as EU readmission
agreements, visa facilitation agreements and visa waiver agreements. Finally, a
presentation of instruments devoted to foster operational cooperation focuses in
particular on Regional Protection Programmes and their renewed version, Regional
Development and Protection Programmes, Frontex working arrangements and EASO
external activities.
1.1.1.1. Political instruments
a. Regional dialogues
Regional dialogues on migration are conceived as multilateral frameworks for dialogue
and cooperation on immigration and asylum between the EU and targeted regions of
transit or origin. These dialogues serve to identify mutual interests and concerns in the
field of migration; to exchange good practices and facilitate data collection; to deepen
cooperation by transforming the GAMM objectives into specific priority actions; and to
explore and develop practical cooperation with regard to the agreed priorities.
These soft modes of cooperation cover the main regions of origin and transit of migration
flows towards the EU. Eastern countries are involved in the Prague Process (Western
Balkans, Central Asia, South Caucasus countries and Eastern Europe, except Belarus),
the Budapest Process and its Silk Routes Partnership for Migration (Western Balkans,
Central Asia, South Caucasus and Eastern Europe) and the Eastern Partnership Panel on
Migration and Asylum (South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, except Russia). Southern
Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan countries participate in the Rabat Process (North, West
and Central Africa), the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (African countries,
except Morocco), and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue (African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries), while the Khartoum Process comprises Eastern African countries. This
multiplication of fora in which many countries take part simultaneously creates a clear
risk of overlap that demands a rationalisation of the processes27; their material scope is
27 Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 3 May 2012, doc. nº 9417/12, point
37.
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
_______________________________________________________________
24
usually coincident too. Table 1 provides a comparative description of all of them,
including more details on participants, main texts, priorities and follow-up structures.
The priorities of these regional dialogues are balanced, at least on paper, as most of
them respond to the four pillars of the GAMM: prevention and fight against irregular
immigration, including border management and return; facilitation of mobility and
promotion of legal migration and integration of legal residents; maximisation of synergies
between migration and development; and – more recently - promotion of international
protection. In this regard, the Khartoum Process is an exception as it is initially focused
on tackling human trafficking and smuggling of migrants and protecting their victims,
although the participants intend to expand the process into a comprehensive regional
dialogue on migration. Also the Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum
currently refers mainly to the first two pillars of the GAMM, and more concretely to
mobility and the fight against irregular immigration, including readmission, border
controls and fighting organised crime. Other priority regions are also covered by these
frameworks of cooperation, such as the EU-CELAC Structured Dialogue on Migration
(Latin American and Caribbean region)28.
From an institutional perspective, regional dialogues on migration are normally launched
through a political declaration adopted at ministerial level, generally with the
participation of the European Commission29, and sometimes based on a previous
declaration made at the level of Heads of State and Government30. This ensures the
participation of both EU Member States and the Commission at the launching of the
dialogue and adoption of its terms of reference. In the exceptional case of the ACP-EU
Dialogue on Migration and Development, the Commission negotiated the establishment of
the regional dialogue directly, representing the EU and its Member States, as this
dialogue is based on a declaration annexed to the revised Cotonou agreement, a mixed
association agreement whose negotiations and implementation are ordinarily assigned,
for the European part, to the Commission.
Most of these regional dialogue processes are developed through regular meetings at
different levels such as expert meetings, focused on elaborating recommendations on
implementation, and senior officials’ meetings, in charge of monitoring implementation,
suggesting future actions and preparing for the Ministerial or Ambassadors’ conferences
which validate recommendations, evaluate impact and progress and define future policy
actions31. In some cases, the guidance of the dialogue is developed, additionally, by a
steering committee or core group of participants32. On the EU side, participation of the
Commission and Member States is ensured in all these structures, although the Member
States’ involvement varies depending on their circumstances and interests, as well as on
28 Launched in June 2009, after the engagement adopted in the EU-LAC Summit held in Lima in 2008. See
“Basis for structuring the EU-LAC Dialogue on Migration”, Council doc. no. 11617/09, 1.7.2009.
29 This is the case of the Prague Process, the Silk Routes Partnership for Migration under the Budapest Process,
the Rabat Process, the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (also with the participation
of the AU Commission) and the Khartoum Process (also with the participation of the HR/VP).
30 This is the case of the EaP Panel on Migration and Asylum, based on the Eastern Partnership, and the Africa-
EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, originated from the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, adopted at
the "Second EU-Africa Summit" held in Lisbon in December 2007.
31 See J. Köhler, “What government networks do in the field of migration. An analysis of selected Regional
Consultative Processes”, in R. Kunz, S. Lavenex, and M. Panizzon (eds.), Multilayered Migration Governance.
The Promise of Partnership, Routledge, London, 2011, p.84, for the positive implications of having ministerial-
level officials involved in regional migration processes.
32 The Rabat Process is guided by a Steering Committee composed of Belgium, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea,
France, Italy, Morocco, Senegal, Spain, European and ECOWAS Commissions) that ensures implementation and
strategic guidance. The Khartoum Process also has a Steering group of core EU and African countries, the
European Commission, the AU Commission and the EEAS. The Africa-EU Dialogue will also be directed by a joint
EU-Africa Core Group. The EaP Panel on Migration and Asylum is directly coordinated by the Commission,
organized and supported by the Swedish Migration Board and IOM Mission in Ukraine.
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the availability of funds to facilitate regular participation. Member States’ participation in
regional dialogues could be improved, according to the Commission, by organising fewer
and more targeted meetings33, and by increasing funding for their development.
According to the Council, regional dialogues have “significantly contributed to improving
overall political relations with the countries concerned”34. However, in view of the Council
and the Commission, participants should focus more vigorously on the operational and
action-oriented approach that characterises the official documentation setting of these
instruments35. As the Commission highlights, existing regional dialogues should be
streamlined, while the launch of targeted and temporal initiatives of practical cooperation
could substitute for establishing new onerous dialogues with old and new partners36. The
option of discontinuing certain dialogues, a suggested possibility when they do not bring
added value, may not be desirable from an external relations strategic perspective, as
certain stakeholders have highlighted. Nevertheless, the added value of regional
dialogues on migration varies according to their different levels of maturity, the degree of
unity inside the partner region and the number of participants, among other factors.
33 COM (2014) 96, p. 14
34 Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 3 May 2012, doc. nº 9417/12, point
17.
35 Ibid. COM (2014) 96, p. 13-14.
36 Ibid. COM (2014) 96, p. 14. See in this regard the organization of the ad hoc Summit in Valletta, convened
for November 2015, whose aim is to gather Heads of State and Government of EU Member States and of the
countries parties to the Khartoum Process and the Rabat Process, as well as the African Union Commission and
the ECOWAS Commission. It will prioritize capacity building on migration management; return and readmission;
legal migration and mobility; international protection; fight against smuggling and trafficking; as well as
investments and development cooperation addressing instability and conflict. Also the Western Balkan route
high-level conference, foreseen for October 2015, aims at addressing the root causes of migration; increasing
financial support to first asylum countries; reinforcing capacity-building on asylum in transit countries, and
enhancing cooperation against migrant smuggling. See Council, Presidency Note on “Migration: EU action, state
of play and next steps”, doc. No. 11782/1/15 REV 1, 11.9.2015, points 39 and 42.
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Table 1. EU regional dialogues on migration
Regional
frameworks
Participants Main texts Orientation and priorities Implementation/follow-up
structures
PRAGUE
PROCESS
(PP)
EU and its Member
States; Non-EU
Schengen States;
18 Eastern countries
(Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo,
Kyrgyzstan, FYROM,
Montenegro, Moldova,
Russia, Serbia,
Tajikistan, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan)
- Joint Declaration on “Building
Migration Partnerships”, Prague
Ministerial Conference, April 2009
- Action plan 2012-2016, 2nd
Ministerial Conference, Poznan,
November 2011
Explore and develop migration partnerships with a
comprehensive, balanced, pragmatic and operational
approach.
Specific objectives: prevention and fight against illegal
immigration; readmission, voluntary return and
reintegration; legal migration, especially labour
migration; promotion of integration of legal residents;
migration, mobility and development; strengthening
capacities on asylum and international protection
(since 2011)
- Network of national contact points to
facilitate daily cooperation at expert
level
- Ministerial Conferences (biennial) to
evaluate results and decide future
policy orientations
- Senior officials’ meetings (at least
once a year) to prepare Ministerial
Conferences, monitor implementation,
evaluate impact and prepare future
policy directions
- Expert meetings
- Core Group (15 partner States,
European Commission)
BUDAPEST
PROCESS
(BP)
More than 50 countries
and 10 IOs from Europe
and its Eastern
Neighbourhood
- Silk Routes Partnership for
Migration, Istanbul Ministerial
Declaration, 5th Ministerial
Conference, 19 April 2013
Dialogue and mutual cooperation in order to improve
legal migration and mobility; support integration and
counteract discrimination, racism and xenophobia;
strengthen migration impact on development; facilitate
return and readmission; smuggling and trafficking;
promote international protection
- Ministerial Conferences to evaluate
impact, progress and define future
actions
- Yearly Senior Officials meetings to
oversee implementation
- Platforms in sub-regions
- Thematic expert meetings
EASTERN
PARTNER-
SHIP PANEL
ON
MIGRATION
AND ASYLUM
(EaP)
EU and its Member
States; Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine
Launched in 2011 under platform 1
of the Eastern Partnership (Prague
Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague,
May 2009, followed by Summits in
Warsaw, 2011, Vilnius, 2013, and
Riga, 2015)
Cooperation and dialogue towards harmonization of
policies and practices on migration and asylum.
Objectives: supporting mobility through visa
facilitation and visa liberalisation; cooperating on
readmission, fight against illegal immigration;
alignment of border management structures to EU
acquis; fight against organised crime; capacity building
- Coordinated by the European
Commission; organized and supported
by Swedish Migration Board and IOM
Mission in Ukraine
- Panel meetings for policy discussion
(biannual)
- Expert workshops for practical
implementation (biannual)
RABAT
PROCESS
(RP)
EU and its Member
States; Norway, Iceland,
Switzerland; African
countries along migration
routes from and via
North, West and Central
Africa
-Rabat Declaration and Action Plan,
Euro-African Conference on
Migration and Development, Rabat,
July 2006
- Cooperation programme 2009-
2011, 2nd Euro-African Ministerial
Conference, Paris, November 2008
- Dakar Strategy 2012-2014, 3rd
Pragmatic and operational partnership on the
migration phenomenon in all its perspectives.
Objectives: organizing mobility and legal migration;
prevention and fight against irregular migration, with
particular attention to border management and return;
strengthening synergies between migration and
development; promoting international protection
- Steering Committee (Belgium, Burkina
Faso, Equatorial Guinea, France, Italy,
Morocco, Senegal, Spain, European and
ECOWAS Commissions) to ensure
implementation and strategic guidance
- Thematic meetings and ad hoc
working groups for examining specific
aspects
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Euro-African Ministerial Conference,
Dakar, November 2011
- Cooperation programme 2015-
2017, 4th Euro-African Ministerial
Conference, Rome, November 2014
- Support Project: launched by
European Commission in 2013 to
encourage implementation of concrete
measures. Implemented by ICMPD and
FIIAP, guided by the Steering
Committee.
AFRICA-EU
MIGRATION
AND
MOBILITY
DIALOGUE
(MMD)
EU and its Member
States; countries from
the African Union
- Tripoli Declaration on Migration
and Development, 2006;
Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat
Trafficking in Human Beings, 2006;
Ouagadougou Declaration and Action
Plan for Promotion of Employment
and Poverty Alleviation, 2004.
- First Action plan 2008-2010, 2nd
Africa-EU Summit, Lisbon, December
2007
- Second Action plan 2011-2013, 3rd
Africa-EU Summit, Tripoli, November
2010
-Third Action plan 2014-2017 +
Africa Declaration on Migration and
Mobility, 4th Africa-EU Summit,
Brussels, April 2014
Inter-regional, continental and inter-continental
dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration,
mobility, employment and higher education.
Priorities: trafficking of human beings, irregular
immigration, remittances, diaspora, mobility and
labour migration, including free movement, and
international protection
- EU-Africa Summits every three years
- Ministerial-level meetings
- Joint experts Group to monitor the
implementation of the action plan.
- Targeted policy seminars, research
and communication activities
- Direction under a joint EU-Africa Core
Group
ACP-EU
MIGRATION
DIALOGUE
EU and its Member
States; ACP countries
- Joint Declaration on Migration and
Development (article 13), annexed
to the revised Cotonou Association
Agreement, 2010.
Establishment of an intense dialogue on migration and
development, legal migration and illegal immigration.
Main themes: mobility of skilled persons, legal
migration, readmission, visas, smuggling of migrants
and trafficking in human beings, migrants' rights and
remittances.
- ACP-EU Joint Council to adopt
decisions and evaluate annual reports
on the progress of the dialogue
- Ambassadors’ meetings to validate
recommendations and evaluate
progress on implementation (once per
year)
- Experts’ meetings focused on
elaborating recommendations and on
their implementation (at least once per
year)
KHARTOUM
PROCESS
EU and its Member
States, Norway,
Switzerland, Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia,
AU Commission
- Declaration on the EU-Horn of
Africa Migration Route Initiative,
Ministerial Conference, Rome,
November 2014
Concrete actions of cooperation aimed at tackling
trafficking of human beings and smuggling of
migrants, supporting victims of trafficking, protecting
human rights of migrants and promoting sustainable
development in countries of origin and transit to
address its root causes.
Intention to expand it into a comprehensive regional
dialogue on all the elements of migration and asylum.
- Steering group of core EU and African
countries, European Commission, EEAS,
and AU Commission.
- Senior Officials’ meetings to ensure
follow-up.
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b. Bilateral dialogues
Several bilateral dialogues on Justice and Home Affairs issues, especially addressing
migration matters, are in place between the EU and its Member States and specific third
countries. These bilateral dialogues, qualified as “the drivers of the Global Approach”37,
are useful tools to identify specific fields of cooperation among the parties, having similar
purposes as regional dialogues, but presenting a more technical approach. These bilateral
dialogues are usually entertained through the joint association or cooperation councils
established to implement the association and cooperation agreements concluded with
these countries. This is true of the JHA dialogues based on the Stabilisation and
Association agreements (SAAs) with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia,
FYROM and Kosovo; with Turkey on the basis of the Ankara Association Agreement; and
the JLS Subcommittee of the Partnership and Cooperation agreements (PCAs) with
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine38. The Dialogue on Migration
launched in 2011 with Russia deserves special attention. After long discussions and legal
and political controversies within the EU on the respective role of the Commission and
the Member States with regard to the setting and development of this dialogue39, it was
finally established under the umbrella of the EU-Russia PCA40. In view of present political
relations with Russia, this Dialogue is currently active only at a technical level.
Concerning the Southern Mediterranean countries, the Social affairs and Migration
Working Group created under the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Association
agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan meets once a year. More recently, the EU
started Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and
Lebanon41. These bilateral dialogues, proposed by the Commission in May 2011 and
welcomed by the JHA Council and the European Council42, appear to constitute a long-
term response to the migration effects of the Arab Spring in contrast to the short term
and emergency actions undertaken in the wake of the conflicts in the region. Although
this initiative reflects the pillars of the GAMM, the terms used to define the Dialogue show
that priority would be given to the partners’ efforts on security aspects - migration
management, border controls and return, and protection in the region for those in need –
as a pre-condition to offer mobility and legal migration opportunities to these countries,
on a clear and strong conditionality basis. In addition, Dialogues on Migration, Mobility
and Security should be based, according to EU institutions, on the principles of
differentiation and bilateralism, and on effective monitoring. These Dialogues, to which
EU and Member States’ experts are associated, constitute a preliminary stage towards
the adoption of a Mobility Partnership (MP) with each partner. Once the MP is signed,
discussions are pursued within its structure. In general terms, bilateral dialogues and
37 Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 3 May 2012, doc. nº 9417/12, point
41.
38 Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have signed respective association agreements with the EU and its Member
States in 2014. Their entry into force is still pending.
39 See P. García Andrade, “La dimension externe de la politique migratoire de l’Union européenne: un bilan au
travers de ses instruments”, in M. Dony (ed.), La dimension externe de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de
justice au lendemain de Lisbonne et de Stockholm: un bilan à mi-parcours, Éd. de l’Université de Bruxelles,
Bruxelles, 2012, pp. 133-135.
40 The EU-Russia Dialogue on Migration excludes readmission and visas from its material scope as these issues
are addressed through the EU-Russia Joint Committees established under the Readmission and Visa Facilitation
agreements concluded between the EU and Russia.
41 On the 13.10.2011, 6.10.2011, 12.12.2012 and 10.12.2014, respectively. Algeria has expressed interest in
this Dialogue and Egypt has been approached by the Commission in May 2015.
42 European Commission, Communication on “A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern
Mediterranean countries”, COM (2011) 292, 24.5.2011; JHA Council, Conclusions 12 May 2011; European
Council Conclusions of 23-24 June 2011, point 28. See also the Joint communication by the Commission and
HR/VP, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, 8.3.2011 and
European Council Conclusions of 24 March 2011.
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MPs are clearly interlinked, as the former serves to prepare for the adoption of the latter.
This means that migration dialogues may end once the signature of a MP with that
country intervenes, except for dialogues based on migration clauses contained in
association and cooperation agreements and thus developed through the joint councils of
those agreements.
Concerning other African countries, bilateral dialogues on migration and development are
also entertained between the EU and ACP countries on the basis of article 13 of the
Cotonou Association Agreement, while the South Africa-EU Structured Dialogue on
migration, launched in 2008, is based on the Agreement on trade, development and
cooperation43. Additionally, bilateral dialogues on migration cooperation exist with other
priority countries such as the EU-China High Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility44;
the EU-India High Level Dialogue Meeting on Migration and Mobility, initiated in 2012,
and the EU-United States Cooperation Platform on Migration and Refugee Issues45.
Specific bilateral dialogues on technical cooperation on readmission and visas are also
taking place through the Joint Committees created by EU readmission agreements and
visa facilitation agreements in order to take charge of their implementation46. More
recently, the Commission announced the future launching of high-level political dialogues
on readmission, aimed at prioritising return and readmission in EU relations with specific
countries. The focus is to be put on countries “where political engagement or leverage
are needed, either for the implementation of existing commitments or for the conclusion
or launch of negotiations on readmission agreements”47. These bilateral dialogues will be
held by the HR/VP and relevant members of the Commission, depending on the concrete
policies to be used as incentives. EU delegations will play a crucial role in the preparation
and follow-up of these dialogues. According to the Commission, possible priority
countries will be Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gambia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka. In this regard, the question arises of what role is to be left to the Joint
Readmission Committees set up under existing EURAs or, in their absence, whether the
issue of readmission could not be tackled under existing bilateral dialogues instead of
creating new ones.
Other dialogue frameworks of utmost importance are Visa Liberalisation Dialogues (VLD)
developed by the EU in view of extending a visa-free regime to the citizens of certain
third countries. At present, VLDs are ongoing with Georgia (2012)48, Kosovo (2012)49,
Russia (2007)50, Turkey (2013)51, and Ukraine (2008)52. VLDs are organised around the
43 See EU Council-ZA docs. 4908/08, 24.11.2008, and 4908/09, 23.7.2009.
44 The first meeting took place on 14.10.2013, discussing on possible negotiations of a readmission agreement
and visa waiver agreement for diplomatic passports between the EU and China.
45 In 2010, its priorities were agreed and focused on return and reintegration, biometrics, resettlement,
trafficking in human beings, capacity building on migration and labour migration.
46 See section 1.1.1.2.b) of this study.
47 European Commission, “EU Action Plan on return”, COM (2015) 453, 9.9.2015, p. 12.
48 Three progress reports have been issued in November 2013 (COM (2013) 808, 15.11.2013), in October 2014
(COM (2014) 681, 29.10.2014) and in May 2015 (COM (2015) 199, 8.5.2015).
49 Two progress reports have been issued in February 2013 (COM (2013) 66, 8.2.2013) and in July 2014 (COM
(2014) 488, 24.7.2014)
50 See “Common steps towards Visa Free Short Term Travel of Russian and EU citizens”. The first progress
report was presented by the Commission in December 2013 (COM 2013 923). Bilateral talks on visas with
Russia remain suspended following the Statement of the Heads of State and Government on Ukraine of 6 March
2014, COM (2015) 236.
51 See Council Conclusions on developing cooperation with Turkey in Justice and Home Affairs, 21 June 2012,
doc. 11579/12. The first progress report has been issued in October 2014 (COM (2014) 646, 20.10.2014).
52 Five progress reports have been issued in September 2011 (SEC (2011) 1076, 16.9.2011); in February 2012
(SWD (2012) 10, 9.2.2012), in November 2013 (COM (2013) 809, 15.11.2013), in May 2014 (COM (2014)
336, 27.5.2014) and in May 2015 (COM (2015) 200, 8.5.2015).
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implementation of a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP), presented by the Commission
to the country in question. VLAPs consist of four blocks of benchmarks on document
security, including biometrics; border management, migration and asylum; public order
and security; and external relations and fundamental rights. During a VLAP’s first phase,
the country must adopt or improve its legislation and policy framework in these fields. In
a second phase, those measures must be effectively implemented in practice, a powerful
stimulus to advance in reforms if the country wishes to accelerate the process of
obtaining visa-free regime53. The progress of VLD is monitored at regular senior officials’
meetings between DG HOME and the partner country, as well as through expert missions
involving officials from the Commission and individual Member States. Once the country
has met the benchmarks, the Schengen visa obligation for citizens of that country is
abolished, through amending the list annexed to Regulation 539/2001.
Past VLDs were undertaken with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro
and Serbia in early 2008, until these Western Balkan countries were transferred to the
list in Annex II of Regulation 539/200154. A post-liberalisation monitoring mechanism has
been adopted to assess the sustainability of reforms these countries have undertaken in
the previous context of VLAPs55. A visa-free regime was also introduced for Moldova in
April 2014, as a successful outcome of the VLD initiated with this country in 201056. VLDs
are therefore an influential tool for achieving the mobility objective of the GAMM in its
highest degree and a significant tool for advancing reforms in all the fields covered by the
area of JHA57. Their degree of leverage is high, working in practice as mini-accession
processes. However, VLDs also present challenges such as ensuring the necessary
budget support for capacity building measures in EU partners, and pursuing these
dialogues with a focus on real and ascertainable technical progress on the relevant
benchmarks, and on the basis of equal treatment towards different partners in similar
situations58.
c. Mobility Partnerships
Mobility Partnerships are conceived as the main comprehensive and long-term bilateral
framework for facilitating policy dialogue and operational cooperation on migration
management with third countries. The Commission proposed this instrument in 2007 as a
53 See S. Mananashvili, “The Diffusion of the EU Asylum Acquis in the Eastern Neighbourhood: A Test for the
EU’s Normative Power”, European Foreign Affairs Review 20, nº 2, at 189 et seq., for the role of VLD in the
diffusion of the EU asylum acquis towards the East.
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 1244/2009 (OJ L 336, 18.12.2009, p. 1) as regards FYROM, Montenegro and
Serbia, and Regulation (EU) No 1091/2010 of the European Parliament and Council for Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (OJ L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 1), both amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose
nationals are exempt from that requirement (OJ L 81, 21.3.2001, p. 1).
55 The Fifth Report on the Post-Visa Liberalisation Monitoring for the Western Balkan countries was issued in
February 2015 (COM (2015) 58, 25.2.2015). A Steering Committee, chaired by the Commission and involving
representatives of the Council Presidency and EU agencies, is in charge of this mechanism. Reference shall also
be made to the visa temporary suspension mechanism introduced, by Regulation (EU) No 1289/2013 of the
European Parliament and Council (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 74) amending Council Regulation 539/2001, to be
activated in exceptional circumstances, and to the alert system operated by Frontex providing the Commission
with information on asylum flows, as the number of unfounded asylum requests from these countries
substantially increased in 2012.
56 Regulation (EU) No 259/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 amending
Council Regulation 539/2001 (OJ L 105, 8.4.2014, p. 9). In the period 2014-2016, Moldova would receive up to
EUR 20M of budget support from the EU for reforms going beyond the benchmarks of the VLAP on border
management, migration management and public order and security (Information Newsletter no. 10 on the EU-
Moldova Mobility Partnership, December 2014, p. 21, available at http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/MP-
Newsletter-X-edition.pdf [last access 18.8.2015]).
57 COM (2014) 96, p. 4.
58 Criticisms in Albania and Bosnia raised significantly because of their non-inclusion on the visa waiver at the
moment it was granted to Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM in December 2009: F. Trauner and E. Manigrassi,
“When Visa Free Travel Becomes Difficult to Achieve and Easy to Lose: The EU Visa Free Dialogues after the
EU’s Experience with the Western Balkans”, European Journal of Migration and Law 16/1, p. 137.
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way to introduce legal migration into EU cooperation with partner countries, offering
them mobility and legal migration opportunities, including circular migration projects, in
return for their cooperation on preventing irregular immigration, increasing border
management and accepting readmission commitments59.
Since 2008, eight MPs have been subscribed between the EU and a variable number of
interested Member States, on the one hand, and a third country, on the other. Joint
declarations establishing a MP have been signed with Moldova, Cape Verde (2008),
Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tunisia (2013) and Jordan
(2014)60. Discussions on a MP with Belarus are complete, pending the signature of the
corresponding joint declaration. MPs have also been offered to Senegal and Egypt. Both
countries have thus far refused to enter into negotiations of this instrument, while
conversations initiated with Ghana have been paralyzed61. Situations like these led EU
institutions to consider the need to set time limits for exploratory discussions and the
possibility of abandoning the discussions if they fail to achieve results62. Regarding the
geographical scope, this instrument has mainly been extended to the East, in particular
to five countries covered by the Prague Process and the Eastern Partnership. In addition
to Cape Verde, MPs have been more recently offered to African countries, specifically to
Southern Mediterranean countries as part of the new migration approach to this region.
Evaluation exercises regarding MPs are scarce compared to their political importance63.
Existing MPs follow the same structure. Their preamble refers to the existing relationship
between the EU and the third country, the GAMM and the regional or bilateral dialogues
that serve as frameworks of cooperation. Second, after a presentation of the general
objectives, every MP details the specific objectives to be attained around the following -
with slight variations- thematic priorities: mobility, legal migration and integration;
border management, fight against irregular immigration and human trafficking, and
readmission; migration and development; and, more recently, asylum and international
protection64. Clauses related to implementation follow. Finally, MPs are accompanied by
an annex of the initiatives and projects offered by the EU, participating Member States
and the third country65, with the exception of the MPs signed with Tunisia and Jordan.
Apart from the respective annexes, the high similarities in structure and content of
existing MPs suggest that this instrument is not subject to relevant discussions and
negotiations with the partner country, but rather that the text is already prepared by the
EU side asking for adherence66. The importance of the conditionality principle underlying
this instrument also raises a question regarding its partnership nature67.
59 European Commission, Communication on “circular migration and mobility partnerships between the
European Union and third countries”, COM (2007) 248, 16.5.2007; European Council Conclusions of 14.12.2007
and JHA Council Conclusions of June and December 2007.
60 See Table 2 on Mobility Partnerships and the References section on "EU documents”.
61 See in this regard N. Reslow, “The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The Mobility Partnerships”,
European Journal of Migration and Law 14, 2012, pp. 393–415.
62 European Commission, “Mobility partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration”, SEC (2009),
1240, 18.9.2009, p. 3. JHA Council Conclusions on Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to
Migration, 30.11 - 1-12-2009, nº 15811/09.
63 SEC (2009) 1240, 18.9.2009; The European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-2011:
Evaluation Report, 1.10.2012, available at http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-moldova-mobility-partnership-
evaluation.pdf; Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Analysis of the Mobility Partnership signed between
the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Union and nine Member States on 7 June 2013, February 2014.
64 See table under section 1.1.2 of the present study.
65 In contrast to other MPs, the one with Azerbaijan contains an annex of initiatives that does not specifically
refer to the party responsible for each proposed initiative.
66 See, particularly with regard to MPs with Morocco and Tunisia, P. De Bruycker, “L’approche globale des
migrations de l’Union européenne: quel progrès suite au partenariat de mobilité avec le Maroc?”, in R. Mehdi
(dir.), La Méditerranée, Espace Démocratique?, Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2014, p. 103. S.
Lavenex, R. Stucky, “Partnering for migration in EU external relations”, in Kunz, R., Lavenex, S., Panizzon, M.
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The specific objectives of cooperation included in all MPs reflect the four operational
priorities of the GAMM, with the exception of promoting the protection of refugees and
strengthening partners’ capacities on asylum, a goal which has only been explicitly
included in MPs with Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tunisia and Jordan, signed since the
renewal of the GAMM in 2012. The main criticism towards MPs refers to their limited
added value with regard to facilitating legal migration opportunities for citizens from the
partner countries68, observing that initiatives on the portability of social rights and
recognition of skills do not constitute concrete legal channels of labour migration69.
MPs are set up through the signature of a joint declaration between the EU, interested
Member States and the third country. Their political nature, as confirmed by the explicit
will of the parties, makes them inapt to engender legally-binding international
commitments. The inclusion of a clause in all MPs indicating that their provisions are not
intended to create obligations and rights under international law is well advised, since, in
the absence of the will of the parties, other signs such as formal elements, the structure
or the drafting could have led to an interpretation in favour of an international
agreement. Instead MPs can be qualified as non-conventional concerted acts or non-
normative agreements, which means that a priori they avoid CJEU jurisdiction and the
direct creation of rights on individuals. Nevertheless, the lack of legally-binding force
does not mean they lack legal value, as arguably their signatories may be bound, by the
good faith principle, at least not to act against their commitments and expectations they
have created in their partners70.
From an institutional perspective, MPs are negotiated, under political guidelines of the
Council similar to mandates of international agreements, mainly by the Commission,
together with the Presidency of the Council, representatives of Member States and the
third country, with the participation of EU agencies such as Frontex, the European
Training Foundation, EASO or EUROPOL. The text of MPs is also signed by the previous
authorities. This procedure does not greatly differ from the negotiation and signature of a
mixed agreement, with the exception of the lack of ratification by the EU and
participating States and thus the absence of involvement of the European Parliament.
Migration cooperation platforms, where Member States’ diplomatic missions, EU
delegations and third country authorities meet, are in charge of the local implementation
of MPs. These platforms serve as coordination tools between the EU side and the third
country, and also extend to other stakeholders such as International Organisations and
civil society representatives. National monitoring committees can also be created for
boosting internal coordination among the Ministries of the partner country involved in the
implementation of the MP. At the political level, the Commission is in charge of
organising senior official meetings and updating the scoreboard, document tracking the
progress of the projects of the MP. MPs are conceived as long-term frameworks
(eds.), Multilayered Migration Governance. The Promise of Partnership, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 131 refer
to a process of consultation rather than negotiation.
67 Regarding MPs with Southern Mediterranean countries, see S. Carrera, L. den Hertog, J. Parkin, “EU Migration
Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?”, MEDPRO
Technical Report nº 15, August 2012, available at www.medpro-foresight.eu, pp. 13-14.
68 See S. Carrera, R. Hernández i Sagrera, “The Externalisation of the EU’s Labour Immigration Policy Towards
Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships?”, CEPS Working Document nº. 321, October 2009, available at
www.ceps.eu See also, in particular, “The European Union-Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008-
2011: Evaluation Report”, 1.10.2012.
69 Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2012, op. cit.; A. Weimar, “Mobility Partnerships. What impact do they have
on legal migration and mobility?”, MPC policy brief, July 2012.
70 Ibid., p. 511. See also García Andrade, 2012, op. cit.
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susceptible to evolve, eventually adding new initiatives and proposals in the course of
time71.
Because of the flexibility that characterises MPs, Members States’ participation in them is
voluntary and open to new participant Member States72. Although it was envisioned that
the normative softness of the MP structure would decrease national reluctance to offer
concrete initiatives, especially in the field of legal migration73, Member States have yet to
display a real engagement in their configuration and development, as well as in the
financial contribution to their implementation74. In total, 16 Member States participate in
the MP with Georgia, 15 in the MP with Moldova, 12 in the MP with Jordan, 10 in the MP
with Armenia and Tunisia, 9 in the MP with Morocco, 8 in the MP with Azerbaijan, and
just 5 in the MP with Cape Verde. Austria and Croatia do not participate in any MPs.
France is the only Member State taking part in all of them. The degree of interest and
ownership of the partner countries in MPs also varies greatly.
Criticism of the reduced involvement of Member States in MPs is accompanied by a
negative assessment of the role of the EU in these instruments as mere coordinator of
national initiatives, limiting its leading position to readmission, Schengen visas and
funding of certain projects. Initiatives presented jointly by several Member States,
possibility encouraged by the nature of the instrument, are also limited, a situation that
could be remedied by increasing funding of multilateral projects. Finally, in some MPs,
Member States have included projects or actions with little added value, as they had
been already offered in other bilateral frameworks of cooperation75.
71 Regarding the MP with Moldova, its government prepares regular newsletters containing detailed information
on the progress of projects and initiatives developed under the MP. These information bulletins are available at
http://www.mfa.gov.md/information-bulletins-en/- Information on projects related to the MP with Georgia can
be found at the website of the Office of the State Ministry of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration: http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en/eu/mobility-partnership
72 To our knowledge, only the Netherlands decided to take part on the MP with Cape Verde after its signature.
73 See Carrera and Hernández I Sagrera, 2009, op. cit., p. 29.
74 COM (2014) 96, p. 20
75 As it is the case of certain Spanish and French initiatives included in the MP with Cape Verde and with
Morocco. Cfr. section 1.3 of the present study.
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Table 2: EU Mobility Partnerships
EU MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS
Country Joint
Declaration
signed
Participating
Member States
Other instruments of EU cooperation
Moldova 5.06.2008 BG, CY, CZ, FR,
EL, DE, HU, IT, LT,
PL, PT, RO, SI, SK,
SE (15)
VLD (2010-2014); AA (2014);
EURA (2007); VFA (2007+2012);
RPP Eastern Europe (2007); Frontex WA
Cape Verde 5.06.2008 ES, FR, LU, PT, +
NL (5)
AA (2000); EURA (2013); VFA (2012); Frontex WA
Georgia 30.11.2009 BE, BG, CZ, DK,
DE, EE, EL, FR, IT,
LT, LV, NL, PL, RO,
SE, UK (16)
VLD (2012-); AA (2014); EURA (2010);
VFA (2010); Frontex WA
Armenia 27.10.2011 BE, BG, CZ, DE,
FR, IT, NL, PL, RO,
SE (10)
PCA (1996); EURA (2013); VFA (2012)
Morocco 7.06.2013 BE, FR, DE, IT, NL,
PT, ES, SE, UK (9)
AA (2000); EURA (neg.); VFA (neg.)
Azerbaijan 27.10.2013 BG, CZ, FR, LT,
NL, PL, SI, SK (8)
PCA (1996); EURA (2014); VFA (2013); Frontex WA
Tunisia 3.03.2014 BE, DK, DE, FR, IT,
PL, PT, ES, SE, UK
(10)
AA (1998); EURA (neg.);
RPP North Africa (2011); VFA (neg.)
Jordan 9.10.2014 CY, DE, DK, EL,
ES, FR, IT, HU, PL,
PT, RO, SE (12)
AA (1997); VFA (neg.);
RDPP Middle East (2014)
Belarus ----------- EURA (neg.); VFA (neg.)
d. Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility
Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) are another soft law instrument of
the GAMM, recently designed as an alternative framework of cooperation to MPs76.
CAMMs will be offered when the EU and a third country wish to establish an advanced
cooperation on migration but one of the parties is not willing to undertake the
commitments associated with a MP77, specifically the signature of a readmission
agreement in exchange for a visa facilitation agreement. These non-binding programmes
shall contain recommendations and objectives for dialogue and cooperation, including
support measures offered by the EU and interested participating Member States. A CAMM
may evolve into a MP once the parties agree.
The establishment of this kind of cooperation framework has been discussed with Nigeria,
Ethiopia, South Africa78, Brazil79, Ghana80 and India81, although to date only a CAMM with
Nigeria has been adopted, in March 201582. The text of this CAMM demonstrates great
similarities in format and substance to a MP. The CAMM with Nigeria is also composed of
76 Proposed by the European Commission in its Communication on “The Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility”, COM (2011) 743, 18.11.2011, p. 11 and welcomed by the Council Conclusions on the Global
Approach to Migration and Mobility, 3 May 2012, doc. nº 9417/12, point 43.
77 COM (2011) 743, p. 12. Council Conclusions, 3 May 2012, point 43.
78 At the EU-South Africa Summit of 18.7.2013, agreement to explore the establishment of a CAMM.
79 Draft Joint Declaration presented by the EU on January 2015.
80 EU interest in establishing a CAMM with Ghana (COM (2014) 96, p. 7).
81 After the expression of interest from India, a draft CAMM was proposed by the EU in April 2013.
82 Joint Declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility between the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the European Union and its Member States, done at Brussels on 12th March 2015.
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a preamble with references to existing frameworks of cooperation between the EU and
Nigeria and to the general objectives of this instrument “based on partnership and
reciprocity”. After setting out the priority areas for cooperation, which replicate the four
pillars of the GAMM, the CAMM states that the signatories shall hold a dialogue, both at
high and working level, to exchange information on legislation, policies and best
practices, and to explore possibilities for concrete cooperation and policy
recommendations. The following sections include concrete issues in which this kind of
collaboration will be established.
In contrast to MPs, the cooperation set by this CAMM focuses on support measures
regarding research, data collection, exchange of best practices and capacity building of
the partner country in each of the priority issues. The CAMM makes few references to
concrete cooperation actions or projects, whose specification is deferred to an annex to
be drawn up and reviewed in the context of the EU-Nigeria Local Dialogue on Migration
and Mobility. Those actions may be undertaken either between Nigeria and the EU, or
between Nigeria and individual or groups of Member States, EU agencies or Member
States’ agencies. The Member States participating in the CAMM have not yet been
explicitly identified at this stage.
1.1.1.2. Legal instruments
a. Migration clauses in “global agreements”
The so-called “global agreements” establishing a privileged relationship between the EU,
its Member States and third countries, such as association agreements and cooperation
agreements, contain diverse clauses related to migration cooperation83. These clauses,
included in these international agreements since the 1990s, reflect the evolution of the
objectives of the EU cooperation with third countries on migration issues. The first ones
were focused on readmission of irregular migrants, following, to varying degrees, the
model readmission clauses set by the Council in 199584-199685 and 199986. Since 2002,
the model clause was replaced due to the need to integrate, in association and
cooperation agreements, clauses related more broadly to migration management and
readmission (the “post-Seville clauses”)87, including the following elements: an in-depth
dialogue on migration; commitment to support economic and social development of
regions of origin of migration flows; joint examination of efforts to combat illegal
immigration and trafficking in human beings; the return and readmission of irregular
migrants; and the promotion of fair treatment of legal residents on the territories of the
parties88.
Focusing first on readmission, migration clauses in “global agreements” include a
confirmation of the obligation to readmit nationals and the engagement to conclude
readmission agreements with the EU and, in the meantime, with the Member State which
so requests, with a view to both facilitating the implementation of this international
customary law rule and creating a readmission obligation with regard to third-country
83 See the annex on an inventory of EU agreements on migration for references to existing association and
cooperation agreements and the corresponding clauses on migration.
84 Council doc. nº 12509/95 and see, as an example, the Joint Declaration on readmission annexed to the
Cooperation Agreement with the Republic of Yemen, of 25 November 1997 (OJ L 72, 11.3.1998, p. 18-29).
85 Council doc. nº 4272/96 and see, as an example, article 72 of the PCA with the Republic of Armenia, of 22
April 1996 (OJ L 239, 9.9.1999, p. 1-50).
86 Council doc. nº 13409/99 and see, as an example, article 76 of the SAA with the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia of 9 April 2001 (OJ L 84, 20.3.2004, p. 3–12).
87 N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Leiden, 2009, p. 214.
88 GAER Council Conclusions on intensified cooperation on the management of migration flows with third
countries, doc. nº 13894/02, 14.11.2002. See, as an example, article 70 of the PCA with the Republic of
Tajikistan of 11 October 2004 (OJ L 350, 29.12.2009, p. 3-51).
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nationals and stateless persons. The Commission saw these clauses of material soft law
as “enabling clauses” only, since they defer operational arrangements and procedural
modalities to full readmission agreements89. These standardised clauses are therefore
intended to encourage future negotiations of readmission agreements with the EU on the
basis of the engagement contained in them, although their effects in this regard are
questionable90. A more recent approach adopted by the EU towards certain Western
Balkan countries and Georgia has been to negotiate an association agreement in parallel
with the negotiation and conclusion of a EURA, using therefore the association agreement
as a powerful leverage to achieve readmission objectives91.
Other issues included in migration clauses in association and cooperation agreements
since 2002 refer to vague engagements on cooperation in the field of visas, border
management, asylum and migration, as this cooperation shall be based on mutual
consultations and coordination between the Parties, including technical and
administrative assistance for exchange of best practices, drafting of legislation, capacity
building and training.
Finally, “global agreements” contain clauses on the treatment of workers, nationals from
the parties, who legally reside on their respective territories. The fact that they have
been inserted since the EC started to conclude association and cooperation agreements
shows that these clauses were not conceived as an element of the external dimension of
EU migration policy, although nowadays they do respond to one of the GAMM objectives,
the integration of legal residents. These provisions govern rights to equal treatment in
labour conditions, remuneration and dismissal, access to employment of workers and
their families legally residing in the parties, as well as social security coordination92.
Consequently, as these clauses do not create rights of entry and residence, association
and cooperation agreements have not been used, up to now, to facilitate legal migration,
although the EU external competence enshrined in article 217 TFEU could serve that
purpose93. In contrast to the provisions on readmission and migration management
cooperation, clauses on treatment of workers create enforceable individual rights, as the
CJEU has recognised in several occasions94. In this context, provisions of most of the
“global agreements” related to social security coordination need that association and joint
cooperation councils, created by these agreements, adopt decisions in order to
implement the principles these clauses set, such as equal treatment on social security,
accumulation of insurance and employment periods, payment of family allowances and
89 European Commission, Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents, COM (2002) 175,
10.4.2002, p. 24. At the occasion of the revision of the Cotonou Association Agreement in 2010 the EU
intended to negotiate the terms of article 13 of this agreement with a view to clarifying and specifying
operational obligations on readmission, making this migration clause directly enforceable. The solution to the
rejection of this request was the inclusion of the Declaration on a migration and development dialogue annexed
to the Cotonou Agreement and serving as basis of the ACP-EU Dialogue, mentioned above.
90 Coleman, 2009, op. cit., p. 218 et seq. See, for instance, the case of Algeria, whose Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreement with the EU - signed in 2002 and in force since 2005 - contains a readmission clause, in
article 84, that has not produced any effect on the negotiations of an EU readmission agreement. These
negotiations have not even started since the negotiating mandate adopted by the Council in 2002.
91 See, for instance, references included in article 83 of the SAA with the Republic of Serbia of 29 April 2008 (OJ
L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16–473).
92 Surprisingly, association agreements signed in June 2014 with Georgia and Moldova do not include this kind
of clause on equal treatment for workers.
93 As the competence to conclude an association agreement allows the EU to deal with all the fields covered by
the Treaties (Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9), therefore enabling the EU to overcome legal
limitations to develop an external action on legal migration, save for the exclusive power of Member States
preserved by article 79.5 TFEU. See P. García Andrade, “The legal feasibility of the EU's external action on legal
migration: the internal and the external intertwined”, European Journal of Migration and Law 15/3, 2013, p.
274.
94 See S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 417-427
for details on the content of clauses regarding legal migration in these agreements and the CJEU case-law
related to them.
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transfer of pensions to countries of origin95. The Council adopted, in 2010, the EU
position to be defended at the Association Councils with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Israel
and FYROM, and, in 2012, with Turkey, Montenegro, San Marino and Albania, in order to
adopt implementing decisions of the social security coordination principles96. In this
regard, the EU should try to avoid the elapse of such large time periods since the
adoption of international commitments and their actual implementation97. In some
cooperation agreements, however, this issue is not to be developed by the joint council
established by the agreement, but will be the object of future international agreements98.
In sum, AAs and PCAs represent an interesting formula for improving the status of third-
country nationals in the EU. However, the migrant workers’ provisions inserted in these
agreements have also contributed to the creation of different and preferential regimes of
legal residents99, as it is the case, for instance, of the Turkish and Moroccan workers in
the EU, accepting thus a discrimination on the basis of nationality.
b. Specific international agreements on migration
Readmission agreements
EU readmission agreements (EURAs) constitute the primary instrument of the external
dimension of EU immigration policy and are still the principal tool on which the GAMM is
focused. Readmission agreements set out apparently reciprocal obligations between the
EU and a third country, in particular detailed administrative and operational procedures
to facilitate the return of irregularly staying migrants and thus implement return
decisions adopted by Member States’ authorities following the procedures and safeguards
provided in Directive 2008/115.
Out of 22 negotiating mandates, the EU has concluded so far 17 readmission agreements
with Hong Kong (2002), Macao (2003), Sri Lanka (2004), Albania (2005), Russia (2006),
Ukraine, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova (2007), Pakistan
(2009), Georgia (2010), Cape Verde, Armenia, Turkey (2013) and Azerbaijan (2014)100.
Mandates are yet unexploited with Algeria (2002) and China (2002), suggesting that the
EU should evaluate the willingness of the third country before adopting the corresponding
negotiating mandate. Negotiations are ongoing or blocked with Morocco (2000), Belarus
(2011), and Tunisia (2014), probably due in part to the lack of appropriate incentives.
Visa Facilitation agreements are systematically - and exclusively - offered in exchange for
concluding a EURA, an incentive that countries such as Algeria and China have not
received, and that was extended to Morocco 10 years after the EURA negotiations started
95 The exception would be the recognition, by the CJEU, of direct effect to the provision on equal treatment on
social security in Cooperation Agreements concluded with Southern Mediterranean countries (e.g. Case 18/90
Kziber, [1991] ECR 199 on the former Cooperation Agreement with Morocco or Case C-103/94 Krid [1995] ECR
719, on the former Cooperation Agreement with Algeria). Those provisions in future agreements were
differently drafted, except for the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements replacing the Cooperation
Agreements just mentioned.
96 See the annex on the inventory of agreements for references to these Council decisions (III).
97 See in this regard, see K. Eisele and A. Wiesbrock, “Enhancing Mobility in the European Neighborhood Policy?
The Cases of Moldova and Georgia”, Review of Central and East European Law 36, 2, 2011, p. 139. For
instance, some of the Council decisions on the EU position to be defended at the respective Association Councils
were adopted in 2010, around 15 years after the signature of AAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria or Israel, or 9
years after the signature of the SAA with FYROM. In 2015, the respective Association Council decisions have not
been formally adopted yet.
98 See, for an example, article 24 of the PCA with the Russian Federation of 24 June 1994 (OJ L 327,
28.11.1997, p. 1–69). See in this regard European Commission, Communication on “The External Dimension of
EU Social Security Coordination”, COM (2012) 153, 30.3.2012.
99 See S. Iglesias, “¿Hay lugar para la acción exterior de la Unión Europea en materia de inmigración legal?
Acuerdos internacionales, asociaciones de movilidad e intereses estatales”, in J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares
(coord.), La dimensión exterior del espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia de la Unión Europea, Madrid, Iustel,
2012, p. 184 and 192.
100 See annex on the inventory of international agreements for complete references (II.2).
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(2003), as also with Turkey which started a visa liberalisation dialogue with the EU 7
years after readmission negotiations began (2005)101. The Commission published an
evaluation of existing EURAs in 2011102.
In their content, existing EURAs follow a standardised approach with slight variations. All
EURAs include readmission obligations with regard to nationals as well as third-country
nationals who have transited through the requested party (TCN clause); exceptions to
these obligations; rules to determine the Member State responsible for applying an EURA
as the requested State; detailed rules on the readmission procedure, including means of
evidence and presumption of nationality and transit; deadlines for requesting, responding
to and implementing readmission obligations; accelerated readmission procedures; the
modalities of transportation and their costs; data protection obligations; and transit
operations. All EURAs foresee the establishment of a Joint Readmission Committee,
composed of EU and third country representatives - the Union being represented by the
Commission with the assistance of Member State experts – and which supervises
implementation of the agreement, adopts decisions necessary for its uniform application,
and proposes and decides on amendments. Finally, “compatibility clauses” indicating that
the application of the agreement shall not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of
the parties arising from international law have been inserted in all EURAs103. These
clauses refer, in particular, to the respect of international conventions on the protection
of human rights and refugees, whose implementation should be ensured through
appropriate post-return monitoring mechanisms, such as the pilot project suggested by
the Commission to monitor the situation of persons readmitted under an EURA104,
initiated in 2014 regarding Ukraine and Pakistan and implemented by IOM in partnership
with UNHCR. Concerning human rights protection, it is unfortunate that the EU Action
Plan on return, adopted by the Commission in September, does not refer to the need to
enhance the implementation of EURAs from the perspective of its compliance with human
rights obligations, or to the indispensable efforts to be undertaken in the field of post-
return monitoring105.
Some problematic issues regarding the design and implementation of EURAs relate to the
systematic EU demand to include TCN clauses in these agreements, which is received
with aversion by most partner countries and creates onerous difficulties and delays in
negotiating EURAs106. Paradoxically, although they always demand it at EU level, Member
States do not usually include this clause in their bilateral readmission agreements, and
those included in EURAs seem to be rarely applied in practice107. For these reasons, it
would be wise, as the Commission proposed in 2011, to focus the EU readmission policy
on countries of origin instead of transit and only include TCN clauses in readmission
negotiations with countries neighbouring the EU and with a significant risk of transit
migration to the EU, alongside appropriate incentives108. For the time being, this new
101 See S. Wolff, “The Politics of Negotiating EU Readmission Agreements: Insights from Morocco and Turkey”,
European Journal of Migration and Law 16, 2014, pp. 69-95.
102 European Commission, Communication on “Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements”, COM (2011) 76,
23.02.2011.
103 On the content of EURAs, see, among others, Coleman, 2009, op. cit. or S. Peers et al (eds.), EU
Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revisited Edition, Vol. 2: EU Immigration Law,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012, pp. 553-589.
104 Included in COM (2011) 76, rec. 15, and recalled in European Commission, Communication on EU Return
Policy, COM (2014) 199, 28.3.2014, p. 10.
105 See COM (2015) 453.
106 COM (2011) 76, pp. 8-9.
107 The same criticism can be made towards provisions on accelerated readmission procedures and transit
operations, whose implementation in practice is also limited: COM (2011) 76, p. 5.
108 COM (2011) 76, 8-9.
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avenue does not seem to be exploited109, although the Commission recently indicated
that the opening of negotiations on readmission with main countries of origin will be
proposed110, and that increased leverage to help partner countries to fulfil readmission
obligations and support negotiations should be sought111, both within migration policy –
through enhanced facilitation of visas and legal migration opportunities – and outside the
home affairs area – including development assistance, neighbourhood policy, trade
agreements, trade preferences, education and culture112.
In view of these difficulties, EU institutions have proposed some new approaches. One
would transform standard migration clauses inserted in association and cooperation
agreements into more elaborated and directly enforceable clauses113. This would be
especially true of the relations between the EU and ACP countries discussed above. More
recently, the Commission has stated that it will focus on the swift implementation of the
readmission commitment in art. 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. Regular bilateral
meetings will be organised with key countries of origin in Sub-Saharan Africa to
operationalise this provision114. Another option would be to negotiate EURAs in parallel
with the negotiations of an association agreement, a strategy followed, as highlighted
above, with some Western Balkan countries and Georgia115.
A questionable issue emerges also from the relationship between EURAs and Member
States’ bilateral readmission agreements. EURAs take precedence over any previous
bilateral readmission agreement or arrangement concluded between an individual
Member State and the third country in question, insofar as the latter are incompatible
with, or cover issues already addressed by, the EU agreement. The power to conclude
future bilateral readmission agreements at national level is clearly discarded because of
the pre-emptive effect of the EU’s exercise of this concurrent external competence, with
the exception of implementing protocols to be subscribed between the partner country
and individual Member States to regulate certain concrete issues in view of the correct
implementation of the EURA116. The problem arises when the above-mentioned
compatibility clauses specify that “nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the return of a
person under other formal or informal arrangements”, reducing the described priority
rules and, more important, limiting the added value of the EU external action, as this
would be meaningful only for those Member States lacking agreements or arrangements
with that specific country. The correct and uniform application of EURAs cannot be
109 See JHA Council conclusions defining the EU strategy on readmission, 9 and 10 June 2011, JHA Council
conclusions on EU Return Policy, 5-6 June 2014, in which the Council recognizes the role of countries of transit
and request efforts to facilitate returns of migrants readmitted by these countries to the countries of origin
(point 3) as well as JHA Council conclusions on the future of the return policy, 8 October 2015.
110 European Commission, “EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020)”, COM (2015) 285,
27.05.2015, p. 8. See also COM (2015) 453, p. 11-12. The Commission expects that the conclusion of EURAs
with countries of origin and the operationalization of readmission commitments contained in the Cotonou
Agreement with Sub-Saharan countries (see below) will facilitate the conclusion of EURAs with transit countries
in North Africa, as the main stumbling block of negotiations is associated to the TCN clause: COM (2015) 453,
p. 11.
111 See also European Council, Conclusions of 25-26 June 2015.
112 COM (2015) 453, p. 14. Regarding trade in particular, the Commission suggests to explore the possibility to
link the conclusion of free trade agreements or the granting of preferential treatment in parallel to the
conclusion of a EURA.
113 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
114 COM (2015) 453, p. 11. Priority countries for organising such meetings, in which the Commission, the EEAS,
Member States and Frontex will participate, should include, according to the Commission, Nigeria, Senegal,
Mali, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Gambia.
115 Ibid., p. 8.
116 García Andrade, 2015, op. cit., pp. 343 et seq.
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ensured117, in addition to the evident lack of legal certainty and monitoring of safeguards
applicable to returnees under informal arrangements.
Visa Facilitation Agreements
Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs) are among the most important tools within the first
pillar of the GAMM. Their expected aim is to foster well-managed mobility. As their title
suggests, they are supposed to facilitate the issuance of Schengen visas for the citizens
of third countries. The first set of VFAs were concluded with Russia, Ukraine, Serbia,
Montenegro, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Moldova (2007), followed by
Georgia (2010), Armenia, Cape Verde (2012) and Azerbaijan (2013)118. The EU-Ukraine
and EU-Moldova VFAs were amended in 2012. Negotiations on the conclusion of further
VFAs are either ongoing or in the phase of preparation with Belarus, Morocco, Tunisia and
Jordan. The Commission issued an evaluation of VFAs in 2009119.
The main characteristics of the VFAs are the simplification and the clear determination of
the documentary evidence regarding the purpose of the journey for certain categories of
travellers; the attempt to facilitate the issuance of multiple-entry visas (MEVs) for
different categories of persons; the general reduction of the visa fee from EUR 60 to EUR
35 and the full visa fee waiver for different categories of persons; and finally, the
reduction of the duration of the visa application procedure from 15 to 10 calendar days
and the possibility of further reducing the processing time to 2 working days or less in
urgent cases120.
Despite their stated aim to facilitate the issuance of Schengen visas, the real impact of
the VFAs is limited121. They do not entirely solve the problem with the intricate
paperwork associated with the issuance of a Schengen visa, the length of visa procedures
and the issue of MEVs. The only facilitation in terms of providing supporting documents is
a clear definition of what documentary evidence (in the majority of cases, a written
invitation or a request from a host) shall be presented to justify the purpose of certain
types of visits122. Yet, the documentary evidence relating to conditions of stay and the
intention to return to the country of origin, which is more difficult to procure, is entirely
excluded from the subject matter of all VFAs. Similarly, the length of visa application
procedures is only shortened by five calendar days, from the fifteen calendar days which
the consulates have to decide on visa applications according to the Visa Code (VC)123, to
ten days according to the VFAs. Also, consulates of the Member States may extend this
period for up to thirty calendar days “when further scrutiny of the application is
117 For requests on the need to foresee information and monitoring mechanisms on the practical implementation
of EURAs, see J.P. Cassarino, Study on Readmission Policy in the European Union, European Parliament, DG for
Internal Policies, Policy Department C, PE 425.632, 2010, p. 19-21.
118 See annex on the inventory of international agreements for complete references (I.2). In practice, the first
agreement on visa facilitations concluded by the EU is the MoU between the European Community and the
National Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic of China, on visa issues concerning tourist groups
travelling to the EU (ADS) of 2004. This agreement also contains a readmission clause.
119 Commission Staff Working Document, “Evaluation of the implementation of the European Community's visa
facilitation agreements with third countries”, SEC (2009) 1401, 15.10.2009.
120 On the content of VFAs, see, for instance, F. Trauner and I. Kruse, “EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission
Agreements: A New Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10, 2008,
especially pp. 421-425.
121 See in more detail S. Mananashvili, "The EU’s (Un)Common Visa Policy: Lost in Aspirations", in Sousa (ed.),
O espaço de liberdade, segurança e justiça da UE: desenvolvimentos recentes = The EU area of freedom,
security and justice: recent developments, Lisboa, Ediual, 2014, pp. 61-96; and A. Weinar, O. Korneev, S.
Makaryan and S. Mananashvili, “Consequences of Schengen Visa Liberalisation for the Citizens of Ukraine and
the Republic of Moldova”, MPC Research Report 2012/01.
122 The documentary evidence for journeys undertaken for tourism or for “private reasons” (except for visits of
close relatives is not covered by any VFAs.
123 Art. 27 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1–58.
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needed”124. Since modalities for lodging an application are not subject to the VFAs either,
the relevant rules of the VC apply in every case, which means that consulates may add a
further two weeks by requiring applicants to obtain an appointment to lodge their
applications125. Finally, issues relating to the facilitation of the mobility of bona fide
travellers such as business people, students and researchers have not been entirely
resolved either by the first-generation VFAs, as the latter leave broad discretion to
Member State consulates to issue MEVs for “up to 5 years”126 or “up to 1 year”127, which
can be (and has often been) restrictively used.
The amended EU-UA and EU-MD VFAs, the second-generation VFAs, try to solve these
problems with MEVs by limiting the discretion of Schengen Member States: the formulas
“up to five years” and “up to one year” have been replaced by “five years” and “one
year”. Another positive result of renegotiating the existing agreements is the extension of
their respective personal scopes. Otherwise, there is little innovative about the new
agreements, which could for example have attempted to address the concerns relating to
the documentary evidence as a main source of the intricate visa procedures. All this
raises the question of whether more should be done “to explore the possibilities created
by the conclusion of visa facilitation agreements” - as advocated in the Stockholm
Programme, especially in the context where the VFAs are offered as a counterbalance of
(and as a carrot for) Readmission Agreements128. At the EU Action plan on return, the
Commission encourages further exploiting VFAs as leverage for readmission cooperation,
by improving facilitations included in the agreements, taking into account that current
VFAs might not be sufficiently attractive compared to the horizontal facilitations provided
by the VC129.
Visa exemption agreements
In the field of Schengen visas, the EU also concludes Visa Exemption or Visa Waiver
Agreements with certain third countries, by which the parties allow visa-free travel for
each other’s citizens when travelling to their territory for a maximum period of three
months during a six month period of stay. The conclusion of these agreements aimed at
promoting mobility is exceptional, as the exemption of Schengen visas in the EU is
normally granted through an amendment to Regulation 539/2001, subsequent, in some
cases, to a VLD. In some situations, however, the EU has been obliged to proceed
through the negotiation of international agreements on visa waiver. This is the case with
agreements signed in 2009 with five Caribbean States, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, as well as the Seychelles130, as the
liberalisation of visas to these countries was conditioned upon the conclusion of the
agreements in order to avoid the repetition of non-reciprocity situations with these
countries131. Although a legislative exemption seems to be preferred by EU institutions
and third countries for reasons of celerity, the signature of an international treaty can
provide with more legal guarantees to ensure reciprocity. While these six agreements
124 See for instance Art. 7(2) of the EU Georgia VFA.
125 Art. 9(2) VC.
126 See e.g. Art. 5(1) of the EU GE VFA.
127 See e.g. Art. 5(2) of the EU GE VFA.
128 A mandate for an ‘upgraded’ VFA with Russia was adopted in April 2011, although negotiations are
suspended since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.
129 COM (2015) 453, p. 14. The Commission also makes clear that the EU is unlikely to offer VFAs to third
countries which generate high numbers of irregular migrants.
130 OJ L 169, 30.6.2009. See annex on the inventory of international agreements for complete references (I.1).
131 Council Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006 amending Council Regulation 539/2001 transferred these six
Caribbean countries to the list of annex II, stating that the exemption from the visa requirement will only apply
from the date of entry into force of the respective visa exemption agreements to be concluded with the EU. See
also COM (2009) 48, 49, 50, 52, 53 and 55, 12.2.2009, p. 2.
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cover holders of diplomatic or service passports, persons travelling for the purpose of
carrying out a remunerated activity as an employee or service provider are excluded
from their scope132.
Two visa waiver agreements, one concerning holders of ordinary passports and a second
on holders of diplomatic, service or official passports, were also concluded in 2010
between the EU and Brazil with a view to ending the non-reciprocity situation with regard
to EU citizens from certain Member States133. In this case, the signing of an international
agreement was required by the Brazilian Constitution imposing the need of parliamentary
ratification because of the loss of revenues. In contrast to other agreements and EU
legislation, the scope of application of the visa waiver agreement for holders of ordinary
passports with Brazil is quite restrictive, excluding citizens wishing to carry out
remunerated activities, engage in research, traineeships, studies, social work, or
undertake technical assistance, missionary, religious and artistic activities134. This has
been accepted by the EU as a compromise of Brazil to maintain in force bilateral
agreements previously concluded with certain Member States which include these
categories of persons not covered by the EU agreement. This perpetuates a clear
discrimination among EU citizens, especially towards those nationals of Member States
not having a bilateral agreement with Brazil135. Assuming that the exclusive external
competence of the EU in this field could have allowed the Commission to hold previous
bilateral Member States agreements inapplicable136, this situation reflects the greater
negotiating power of Brazil and the lack of solidarity among Member States.
Mandates for new Visa Waiver agreements were adopted in October 2014 with regard to
Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and the United Arab Emirates137.
1.1.1.3. Operational instruments
a. Regional Protection Programmes and Regional Development and Protection
Programmes
Contrary to the idea of externalising the processing of asylum applications on the
territory of third countries that has not been pursued to date, the EU encourages third
countries to develop their own asylum system in order to be able to protect themselves
refugees. While this kind of support is obviously motivated by the hope to have less
asylum seekers coming to the EU or even the possibility to send them back to third
countries that could be considered as safe precisely because of their efforts in the field of
asylum, these developments can also be considered positively from the point of view of
refugees as they may represent more easier possibilities to find asylum. The action plan
that has been agreed between the EU and Turkey on 15 October 2015138 provides an
example of this kind of deal between the EU and a third country that has obviously also
to be analysed in terms of fair burden sharing between both parties.
The Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) are also among that kind of tools developed
within the fourth pillar on international protection of the GAMM. Their initial conceptual
132 In October 2014, mandates for negotiating amendments to these Visa Exemption agreements were adopted.
133 Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
134 Article 3.2 of the Agreement.
135 Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta.
136 See B. Martenczuk, "Visa Policy and EU External Relations", in Martenczuk, B., Van Thiel, S. (eds.), Justice,
Liberty and Security. New challenges for EU External Relations, VUBPress, Brussels, 2008, p. 47.
137 Agreements with Trinidad and Tobago, Samoa, Vanuatu, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada,
Dominica, Saint Lucia, Timor Leste and United Arab Emirates have been already signed in May 2015.
138 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration/docs/20151016-eu-revised-draft-action-plan_en.pdf
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framework was developed 10 years ago. By following up its own ideas from 2004 on the
need for establishing Regional Protection Programmes and a subsequent invitation of the
Council to present an action plan for one or more pilot RPPs, the Commission laid down
the detailed conceptual framework of such programmes in September 2005139. As their
title suggests, the RPPs purport to enhance the protection capacity of third countries.
Conceptually, they consist of seven types of activities to be implemented mainly in the
form of projects aiming at improving general protection situation as well as reception
conditions of refugees; establishing effective refugee status determination procedures;
providing training to relevant stakeholders; and bringing the benefits for the hosting
communities by addressing wider environmental concerns and by disseminating
information on the positive impact of refugees. Registration and resettlement
components are two further constituent elements of RPPs140.
The first two pilot RPPs were launched in the Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova and
Ukraine), considered a region of transit, and in the African Great Lakes Region,
particularly Tanzania, hosting a large refugee population (mostly from Burundi and the
DRC). Despite their limited impact on achieving the ambitious goals pursued by the RPPs
which in practice have taken the form of a multitude of the EU-funded (through AENEAS
and Thematic Programme Migration and Asylum) projects, implemented by UNHCR and
its partner NGOs on the ground141, both programmes were renewed in 2010 and two new
programmes were launched in 2011 in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti) and
North Africa (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia)142.
As one of the tools to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, a new model of the RPPs has
been developed since 2012, called Regional Development and Protection Programmes,
with the aim to integrate in the existing concept a strong development component. In
this regard two sets of new activities have been added: (i) research on the impact of the
presence of a refugee population on the host community143, and (ii) practical measures
aimed at job-creation, education and improved infrastructure144. These additional
objectives of RDPPs have the potential to more actively engage third countries’
authorities145. The first such programme was launched in 2014 in the Middle East, namely
in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, while RPPs in North Africa and the Horn of Africa will be
transformed into the renewed RDPPs.
Finally, the European Agenda on Migration foresees the setting up of new or deepening of
the existing RDPPs. To this end, it envisages making EUR 30 million available in
2015/2016, to be complemented by additional – and necessary - contributions from
Member States146.
While it is too early to judge the impact of the new model of RPPs, the insight gained
from the implementation of the previous programmes points out the following
139 European Commission, Communication on regional protection programmes, COM (2005) 388, 1.9.2005.
140 Ibid., p. 4.
141 Cf. GHK, Evaluation of pilot Regional Protection Programmes, Final Report, DG JFS, European Commission,
2009.
142 The GAMM Communication from 2011 declared the RPPs as one of the four priorities in the framework of the
external dimension of the EU’s asylum policy (p. 18)
143 i.e. conducting analyses, assessments and studies in order to gain a sound understanding concerning the
impact of the presence of refugees on host communities with a view to proposing opportunities for development
for both refugees and their hosts alike. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1253_en.htm
144 Ibid. referring to creating employment opportunities, providing micro-enterprise finance, skills development
training, and vocational training, as well as appropriate social infrastructure development, including education,
water and sanitation and improved energy supply.
145 P. De Bruycker and L. Tsourdi, “Building the CEAS beyond legislative harmonization: practical cooperation,
solidarity and external dimension”, in Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European
Refugee Law, Brill, Leiden, (forthcoming), p. 22.
146 COM (2015) 240, p. 5.
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weaknesses of the existing RPPs: (i) too broadly defined in scope, making impossible not
only specific planning but also measuring the impact of the programmes; (ii) lack of
sufficient coordination of the RPPs with other EU policies in the country concerned; (iii)
underdeveloped regional approach of the programmes as well as lack of clarity on what a
region is; (iv) lack of local ownership and insufficient involvement of the Member States
on the ground (at least until recently), which together with the fact that RPP-labelled
projects implemented by the UNHCR often fade in the overall UNHCR activities, leads to
the lack of visibility of the RPPs; (v) very weak resettlement component (or its actual
implementation), despite the fact that the EU’s 2012 Joint Resettlement Scheme
provided for the possibility of some financial aid for resettling the refugees from the RPP
countries147.
b. Frontex working arrangements
The Frontex Agency also develops its own external action in the field of border
management and has signed so far, on the basis of article 14 of its founding Regulation,
working arrangements (WA) with the authorities of 17 third countries, a clear majority of
them from the East: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, FYROM, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the United States, Montenegro, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Nigeria,
Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan148. Negotiating mandates have been adopted with regard
to Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil and Tunisia149. Existing WAs focus
on the establishment of operational cooperation in several fields of action covered by the
mandate of the Agency: information exchange; risk analysis; training; as well as
participating in joint operations and return operations coordinated by the Agency150.
Regulation 2007/2004, after its 2011 amendment, also enables Frontex to set up and
finance technical assistance projects in third countries151; to invite observers from third
countries to participate in the Agency’s activities on joint operations, risk analysis and
training152; and to deploy and receive liaison officers to maintain contacts with third
countries’ competent authorities dealing with irregular immigration and return153. The
deployment of Frontex liaison officers shall only be authorised to third countries “in which
border management practices comply with minimum human rights standards”, a caution
that, surprisingly, does not accompany those provisions related to the remaining actions
of cooperation between the Agency and third countries154. Frontex also takes part in
other GAMM instruments such as MPs, CAMMs and migration dialogues.
One important question to clarify at this point is that these instruments are operational
or technical arrangements subscribed between an EU agency and the law enforcement
147 See A. Papadopoulou, Regional Protection Programmes: an effective policy tool?, ECRE, January 2015, pp.
15-17. See section 2.1.1.4 for a detailed analysis of the impact of RPPs.
148 WA have also been subscribed with the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council and the MARRI Regional
Centre in the Western Balkans. Frontex also cooperates with the following international organisations: DCAF,
ICAO, ICMPD, IGC, ILO, Interpol, IOM, OSCE, UNHCR and UNODC.
http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/international-organisations/
149 http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries/
150 For several years, Frontex WAs were not publicly available, but the Agency pursued a passive publicity
policy, only releasing their text upon concrete requests, which contrasted with some Frontex partners
publishing those WA. Their texts are currently available on the Agency website:
http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries/. See the References section for complete references.
151 Art. 14.5 of Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
(Frontex Regulation). The insertion of this provision has ended with the situation in which the Agency could not
benefit from Union funding corresponding to EU external relations financial instruments.
152 Art. 14.6 of Frontex Regulation.
153 Art. 14.3 and 4 of Frontex Regulation.
154 On the place of fundamental rights in Frontex mandate, see V. Moreno Lax, “Frontex as a global actor:
external relations with third countries and international organisations”, in M. Dony (ed.), La dimension externe
de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice au lendemain de Lisbonne et de Stockholm: un bilan à mi-
parcours, Éd. de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2012, p. 181-182.
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authorities of third countries, not international agreements. Taking into account that both
authorities lack international legal personality, that the Agency is independent only in
relation to technical matters155, and that the EU exclusively takes on international legally-
binding commitments when the procedure of article 218 TFEU is followed, their nature as
non-normative agreements seems well-established. Another characteristic of WAs is that
they may promote operational cooperation on border management with third countries,
but cannot serve as founding bases for the joint surveillance operations that certain
Member States deploy in the territorial waters of third countries. For the moment the
power to implement border controls remains in the hands of Member States156. Although
a priori this would not be relevant since EU conventional powers normally derive from its
normative powers, cooperation with third countries in this case, and joint patrols at sea
in particular, relate to execution powers. Frontex therefore lacks the competence to
obtain, in its WAs, the consent of the third country in question, making agreements
signed by Member States indispensable, at least for now157.
Official external evaluation of the Agency's activities is limited. A first evaluation report
was issued in 2009 for the period from January 2006 to June 2008158, which simply
acknowledged the preference of Member States for the Agency to concentrate on
practical cooperation with third countries, limiting its influence on political issues related
to that cooperation, and highlighting the importance of Frontex cooperation with third
countries for the success of joint operations159. The second evaluation, covering July
2008 to July 2014, has been finalised but is not yet publicly available160. Further
independent assessment should seek to thoroughly analyse the design and efficiency of
Frontex forms of cooperation with third countries, as well as their impact on the rights of
immigrants and asylum seekers161.
c. EASO cooperation with third countries
The mandate of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) envisages cooperation with
third countries although its external dimension has not yet been extensively developed in
practice. EASO should support the external dimension of the CEAS162, by coordinating the
exchange of information and other actions within the EU, enabling technical cooperation
with competent authorities of third countries, in particular in order to assist capacity-
building measures, implement RPP/RDPPs or participate in resettlement actions163. As the
155 Art. 15 of Frontex Regulation.
156 On the basis of secondary law only, once the exclusivity of this national power has been suppressed by the
Treaty of Lisbon when the drafting of former article 62(2)(a) TEC was amended in order to eliminate the terms
related to standards and procedures “to be followed by Member States in carrying out checks on persons”.
157 See P. García Andrade, “Initiatives of EU Member States in managing mixed flows in the Mediterranean and
the EU distribution of competences”, in C. Matera and A. Taylor, Common European Asylum System and human
rights: enhancing protection on times of emergencies, CLEER Working Papers, 2014/7, pp. 54-55.
158 COWI, External evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Final Report, January 2009, available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/may/frontex-eval-report-2009.pdf
159 Ibid., p. 63.
160 The final report for this second evaluation awaits the endorsement of Frontex Management Board: Council,
Presidency Note on “Migration: EU Action, state of play and next steps”, doc. no. 11782/1/15 REV 1,
11.9.2015, point 26.
161 See, among others, P. De Bruycker et al., Setting up a Common European Asylum System, European
Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, PE 425.622, 2010. Regarding the need to report on
how human rights obligations are being respected in extraterritorial settings, see E. Guild and V. Moreno Lax,
Current Challenges for International Refugee Law, with a focus on EU Policies and EU Co-operation with UNHCR,
European Parliament, DG for External Policies, PE 433.711, 2013, especially p. 26.
162 See L. Tsourdi, “What role for the EU as an international protection actor? Assessing the external dimension
of the European asylum policy”, in M. Dony (ed.), La dimension externe de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de
justice au lendemain de Lisbonne et de Stockholm: un bilan à mi-parcours, Éd. de l’Université de Bruxelles,
Bruxelles, 2012, pp. 147-160.
163 Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010
establishing a European Asylum Support Office, OJ L 132, 29.5.2010, p. 11–28 (EASO Regulation).
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main aim of EASO is to support Member States in the implementation of the CEAS and
strengthening practical cooperation, the Office is mandated to facilitate operational
cooperation between Member States and third countries and may also cooperate with the
latter’s authorities by subscribing, like Frontex, working arrangements with them164.
On 29 November 2013, the EASO Management Board adopted the EASO External Action
Strategy that defines the approach and role of the Office with regard to the external
dimension of the CEAS, its underlying principles, the implementation methodology to
follow, geographical priorities, and as the forms that EASO external action will take165.
Geographic priorities of EASO are enlargement countries and the Western Balkans,
European Neighbourhood partners, Russia, countries included in RPPs, countries with
which the EU is negotiating or has concluded a MP, as well as countries of the Prague
Process, Rabat Process and Budapest Process166. EASO external activities can take the
followings forms: supporting implementation of RPP/RDPPs; providing training to
competent authorities in third countries; coordinating the development of practical
cooperation actions on resettlement activities undertaken by Member States; and
supporting capacity building measures in third countries with regard to their asylum and
reception systems167. Partners that will facilitate EASO external action in third countries
are the Commission (DG Home, DG DEVCO and ECHO), Member States, other JHA
agencies, International Organisations, the EEAS and EU delegations in third countries.
In practice, the first specific project of cooperation undertaken by EASO relates to
‘Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work of EASO as well as the participation of
Tunisia and Morocco in the work of EASO and Frontex’, which started in 2014168. EASO
has not to date focused significantly on resettlement169. No working arrangement has
been signed by EASO with third countries for the time being170, showing the weakness of
the external action of the Agency due to the limited budget it can devote to this area171.
Nevertheless, the Office can also work under general agreements between the EU and a
third country such as an association agreement, a MP or a CAMM172.
1.1.2. Comparative analysis of EU instruments
The above overview allows making some considerations regarding the benchmarking of
existing instruments of EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration with
the general objectives of the GAMM, the political framework of this external cooperation.
First, all the four pillars of the GAMM are covered, to a certain extent, by the different
instruments of EU cooperation with third countries analysed above (see Table 3 below).
Among them, only regional and bilateral dialogues, MPs and CAMMs present a
comprehensive nature, by which the distinct priorities of the GAMM are tackled
simultaneously under a single instrument. Migration clauses inserted into association and
cooperation agreements address the first pillar of the GAMM, only as far as the
integration of legal residing migrants is concerned, and the second pillar of the GAMM,
mainly regarding readmission of irregular migrants. Also RDPPs, in their renewed version,
164 EASO WA must have the agreement of the Commission and rest within the limits of its mandate. Art. 49 of
EASO Regulation.
165 EASO External Action Strategy, available at https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-External-
Action-Strategy.pdf
166 Ibid., point 5.
167 Ibid., point 6.
168 EASO Annual Report, 2014, p. 81. The Office is also involved, since 2012, in the Prague Process Pilot Project
‘Quality and training in the asylum processes’. See EASO Annual report, 2013.
169 De Bruycker and Tsourdi, forthcoming, op. cit., p. 14.
170 EASO has only subscribed working arrangements with UNHCR and other agencies of the EU (Frontex, FRA,
EU-Lisa), in accordance with article 50 and 52 of EASO Regulation.
171 De Bruycker and Tsourdi, forthcoming, op. cit., p. 14.
172 EASO External Action Strategy, point 11.
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are conceived to achieve the third pillar on development and the fourth on promoting
international protection. Other instruments such as EURAs, VFAs, and Frontex working
arrangements are focused on the fulfilment of one specific priority of the GAMM,
combating irregular immigration, facilitating mobility and reinforcing border controls,
respectively. Unfortunately, no instrument of EU cooperation currently includes
significant facilitations of admission of migrants or labour migration opportunities for
third partners, at least at EU level173. Also, the second pillar of the GAMM is the most
integrated priority into these instruments of the external dimension of the EU migration
policy, while the third and the fourth pillars on the maximisation of migration impact on
development and the promotion of international protection are the objectives that receive
less attention in terms of number of instruments. Among non-comprehensive
instruments, only RDPPs are indeed pursuing the objectives of these two pillars. The
external action led by EASO has not developed sufficiently in practice yet and has not
materialised in specific operational instruments that could have been integrated in this
comparative analysis.
By way of comparing the various instruments of EU cooperation to each other, MPs and
CAMMs are conceived as similar frameworks of cooperation with partner countries. Apart
from the fact that a CAMM does not include the commitment to negotiate a readmission
agreement and a visa facilitation agreement with the EU, the CAMM is more focused,
through recommendations and orientations, on supporting research and data collection,
and on building the partner country’s capacity for migration management. References to
specific actions of cooperation on concrete fields between the EU and the third country
which are, in most cases, drafted as exploratory contacts for future cooperation, are
quite limited.
Interesting links can also be found between MPs and association and cooperation
agreements that include migration clauses. The “global agreements” constitute
international legally binding agreements, although post-Seville clauses on migration
management cooperation can be qualified as material soft law, sharing this soft law
character with MPs. However, regarding the objective related to legal migration, while
association and cooperation agreements include enforceable rights for migrant workers
on equal treatment in labour conditions and, in some cases, on social security
coordination, joint declarations establishing MPs rather deal with forms of political
cooperation among the parties, such as the organisation of information campaigns;
capacity building; pre-departure training actions, and the promotion to cooperate in
recognition of qualifications and portability of social rights (the latter objective can only
be operationalised, according to the concrete initiatives contained in MPs, through the
signing of bilateral agreements on social security).
As far as framework dialogues are concerned, regional dialogues and bilateral dialogues
pursue similar purposes and are launched and developed on the basis of the same kind of
institutional setting which involves both the Commission and Member States, although
bilateral dialogues are usually linked to more formal structures such as joint councils of
association or cooperation agreements. Both kinds of dialogues risk receiving the same
criticism for lack of sufficient involvement of Member States and for their limited
operational results in achieving GAMM objectives. However, these political frameworks
should probably be judged for their contribution to the discussion of politically sensitive
issues among countries of origin, transit and destination and their input to mutual
knowledge and exchange of best practices, although some of these dialogues also pursue
173 Some initiatives of Member States included in MPs may refer to specific offers to this effect, but they are
exceptional.
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pragmatic and operational cooperation that should produce results, at least in the
medium-term. Bilateral dialogues have not been included in the table below, since their
number and variety made difficult to summarise their specific objectives.
Regarding their nature, GAMM comprehensive instruments, that is regional dialogues,
bilateral dialogues, MPs and CAMMs, are all political instruments, while more specific
instruments focused on one of the GAMM priorities such as VFAs, EURAs, RPPs and
Frontex working arrangements are either legally binding or operational instruments.
“Global agreements” constitute international legally binding instruments, although the
nature of their migration clauses may vary from hard (clauses on equal treatment of
workers) to soft law (clauses on migration cooperation and readmission). The material
soft law nature of the latter matches the political character of the instrument of the MP
as such, which makes it challenging to compel the parties to comply with their
engagements and necessitates the adoption of further actions in order to attain the
objectives of the instruments. All comprehensive instruments also ensure the
participation of the Union and its Member States, either in the dialogues or joint
declarations of MPs, or at the formal conclusion of association and cooperation
agreements, reflecting the shared nature of EU external competences in the field of
migration. However, more specific agreements such as EURAs, VFAs and visa waiver
agreements are concluded by the EU alone, either because they constitute the exercise of
a concurrent competence (readmission), or because they pertain to an ERTA-exclusive
competence of the EU (Schengen visas).
From a geographical perspective, an imbalance to the detriment of the South is
noticeable on the coverage of the GAMM instruments in general, and particularly of
EURAs, VFAs and MPs. The reasons why deepening migration cooperation with Eastern
neighbours is easier than with Southern countries seem to be linked to enlargement.
Accession perspectives entail an enormous incentive lacking in Africa for the signature of
EURAs, and the EU feels less concerned in extending visa facilitations to countries that, in
a medium or long-term perspective, will have possibilities to join the EU174, or at least to
enjoy visa-free regimes as a consequence of ongoing VLD. Another factor lies in the
concerns of Eastern EU Member States about limiting the negative impact of their
Schengen accession on their neighbourhood relations. As a result, the selection of some
Eastern countries for extending instruments such as MPs, like Georgia or Armenia, has
been more symbolic than migration-driven175.
In sum, the GAMM has been equipped, since its adoption until its consolidation, with
instruments capable of addressing all the objectives set by this political framework.
However, EU institutions and Member States should strive to work on every objective of
each of the pillars of the GAMM with a similar degree of intensity, especially on the less
pursued objectives related to migration and development, international protection and
legal migration opportunities. The impact assessment corresponding to chapter 2 of this
study will support this finding.
174 De Bruycker, 2014, op. cit., p. 98.
175 Ibid.
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
_______________________________________________________________________
49
176 Source: Elaborated by the authors using information from official documents setting the instruments in question.
177 The information contained in this table on MPs is based on the specific objectives set with each partner and not on annexes, as the latter evolve with time. The fact that a specific
objective is not explicit in the text of a MP is without prejudice of their respective annexes having included concrete initiatives to pursue those objectives.
Table 3: Benchmarking of EU cooperation instruments with GAMM objectives176
Organising legal migration and fostering
mobility
Preventing and combating irregular
immigration and trafficking in human
beings
Maximising development impact of
migration and mobility
Promoting international
protection
Regional
dialogues
- management of legal migration and improvement
of conditions for legal migration and mobility (SR,
MMD, RP)
promotion of integration of legal residents (PP; SR)
- counteracting discrimination, racism and
xenophobia (SR)
- facilitating mobility through visa liberalisation
(EaP) and visa facilitation partnerships between
technical and scientific institutions; cooperation on
professional training; facilitation of circulation of
workers and people (RP, MMD)
- facilitating circular migration (RP)
- preventing and fighting illegal
immigration; readmission, voluntary
return and sustainable reintegration (PP;
SR, EaP, RP)
- prevent and combat smuggling of
migrants and trafficking of human beings,
supporting its victims (SR, EaP, MMD, KP,
RP)
- reinforcement of national border control
capacities of transit and departure
countries (RP)
- strengthening positive impact of
migration on development (PP; SR; ACP)
- promoting development (RP, KP) and
co-development through financial
instruments (RB)
- remittances and diaspora (MMD)
promoting sustainable development
- strengthening capacities in the
area of asylum and promoting
international protection (PP; SR;
RP, MMD)
MPs177 - promote better framework for mobility (MD, CV,GE, AM, AZ)
- simplifying procedures for legal stays (MA, TU, JO)
- information on legal channels and employment
(all)
- circular migration (MD, CV, AM, AZ, GE, TU)
- pre-departure training (MD, CV, GE, AM, AZ)
- exchange programmes on education (GE, AM, AZ)
- recognition of academic and professional
qualifications (GE, AM, MA, TU, JO)
- social protection of migrants (MD, CV, AR, MA, TU,
AZ)
- migration data collection
- dialogue and cooperation on visas to facilitate
mobility (ALL), including negotiations of VFA (CV,
AZ, MA, TU, JO)
- capacity building on legal migration (MD, CV, GE,
AM, AZ, MA)
- integration of legal residents (MA, TU)
- reception and adaptation of asylum seekers (GE)
- improve migration of students and researchers
(TU, MA)
- border management cooperation (ALL)
- operational cooperation with Frontex
(MD, CV, GE, AM, AZ, MA)
- negotiation and implementation of EU
readmission agreements (GE, AM, MA, TU,
AZ, JO, CV)
- voluntary return and reintegration (MA,
TU)
- security of identity documents (GE, AM,
MA, AZ, TU, JO)
- campaigns against irregular immigration
and trafficking (, GE, AM, MA, AZ, JO)
- reinforced capacities on search and
rescue (CV, TU)
- cooperation on victims of human
trafficking (MA)
- unaccompanied minors (MA, TU)
- assistance to detainees (TU)
- capacity building in fight against irregular
immigration and trafficking (MA, TU, JO)
- reference to regularisations (GE)
- integration of legal residents and fight
- voluntary return and reintegration
(MD, CV, GE, AM, AZ, JO?)
- socio-economic development (MA, TU,
JO)
- return of highly -skilled migrants (MD,
CV, GE, AZ, MA)
- bilateral agreements on migration and
development (TU)
- recognition of skills and qualifications
(MD, CV, GE, AM, AZ)
- exchange of students, researchers and
specialists (MD, CV, GE, AM, AZ)
- cooperation regarding diaspora and
remittances (ALL)
- prevent brain drain and brain waste
(MD, GE, AM, MA, AZ, JO)
- circular migration (MA, JO)
- capacity building on asylum
(GE, AM, MA, AZ, TU, JO)
- strengthening legislative and
institutional framework of asylum
(MD, CV, MA, TU, JO)
- facilitating reception of asylum
seekers and simplified procedures
on asylum for those with special
needs (GE, AM, AZ)
- application of non-refoulement
principle to TCN detained in the
country (TU)
- cooperation within the RPP (MD,
TU, JO)
- support to manage inflows of
refugees under UNHCR mandate
(JO)
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against xenophobia (JO)
CAMM - research- capacity building on collection and analysis of
information and statistics on legal migration
- efficiency and security of legal migration
procedures
- best practices between competent services
- mutual recognition of qualifications
- supporting integration of legal residents in the EU
- exploring enhanced mobility opportunities of
students and researchers
- exploring improvement of visa procedures
- research
- capacity building on collection and
analysis of information and statistics on
irregular migration
- improving legislation and implementation
- capacity building on border
management, prevention and fight against
smuggling of migrants
- reducing visa overstay
- support on combating trafficking in
human beings
- supporting protection to THB victims and
reintegration
- strengthening interagency cooperation
within the partner country and with the EU
- improving travel document security
- exploring cooperation on return and
increasing efficiency of procedures
- research
- harnessing migrants’ contribution to
the economies of destination and origin
countries
- facilitating remittances and their
development effect
- supporting diaspora networks and
integration of legal migrants
- mitigating social consequences of
migration (circular migration, brain
drain)
- optimising benefits from return
migration
- supporting the partner’s asylum
system
- supporting effective
implementation of international
conventions
- capacity building on reception
and identification of asylum
seekers
- capacity building on collection
and analysis of information and
statistics
- promoting mutual knowledge of
practices and implementation
- strengthening cooperation with
UNHCR
- meeting needs of
unaccompanied minors and other
vulnerable groups internally
displaced.
Migration
clauses in
“global
agreements”
- right to equal treatment in labour conditions,
salary and dismissal for workers of the parties
- access to employment for workers and their
families legally residing in the parties
- coordination on social security
- confirm readmission obligations with
regard to nationals
- engagement to conclude readmission
agreements
EURAs - facilitate the implementation ofreadmission obligations regarding
nationals
- create readmission obligations regarding
third-country nationals
- detailed administrative and operational
procedures for ensuring return
VFAs - promoting mobility, by facilitating the issuance ofshort-stay visas for citizens of the parties
- exempting visas to holders of diplomatic passports
RPP / RDPP - research on the impact of refugees onhost communities (RDPP)
- practical measures aimed at job
creation, education and infrastructure
(RDPP)
- enhancing protection capacity
of third countries
- improving reception conditions
- establishing effective refugee
status determination
- provision of training
- registration and resettlement
Frontex WA - operational cooperation on border controlin order to counter irregular migration and
other related cross-border crime, as well
as strengthening security at borders
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1.2. Mapping of funding sources for EU cooperation with third
countries on migration and asylum
KEY FINDINGS
 Funding instruments applicable to EU external cooperation in the field of
migration and asylum are the result of a long process of accumulation in the
framework of different EU policies: migration and asylum policy, international
development cooperation, external policy, neighbourhood policy, humanitarian
aid. Migration has made its way into the main thematic priorities of most EU
external cooperation funding instruments and regional programmes. Therefore,
there is a high number of relevant instruments responding to sometimes different
logics and often leading to overlaps. Visibility and coherence are difficult under
these conditions and hinder evaluation of a cooperation portfolio that, between
2004 and 2014, exceeded EUR 1 billion on more than 400 projects.
 For 2014-2020, the former TPMA has been merged with four other former
thematic programmes into the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC)
Programme. This new integrated thematic programme has an earmarked budget
of EUR 344 million for migration and asylum.
 In terms of geographical distribution of these funds among partner countries,
there is a clear focus on Neighbourhood countries (more than half of all funds)
and the Sub-Saharan Africa. The distribution of funds across the priorities of
the GAMM since 2004 shows a clear prevalence of the fight against irregular
migration, whereas legal migration only attracts 14% of all funds. The launching
of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa bringing together EUR 1.8 billion in
development cooperation funds to promote stability and address the root causes
of irregular migration in Africa will facilitate and accelerate the disbursement of
this budget.
 The new Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund has substantially increased
the possibility of funding external cooperation actions in third countries in line
with Home Affairs priorities. This is a positive step from the perspective of policy
coherence, as long as purely migration-driven objectives will not anymore be
pursued through development cooperation, as it was the case with the AENEAS
and the TPMA.
EU external cooperation on migration and asylum is the result of a long process of
accumulation in the framework of different EU policies: EU migration policy, EU
international development cooperation, EU external policy, EU Neighbourhood Policy, and
EU humanitarian aid. Overall, between 2004 and 2014 it spent more than EUR 1 billion
on more than 400 projects. To a large extent, it has responded to emerging needs, both
by EU policies and by partner countries as migration and asylum have gradually
consolidated as key issues of the international agenda. As a consequence of this
unplanned pattern, the implementation and the funding sources are institutionally
scattered between DG DEVCO, DG HOME, DG NEAR and the EEAS, with very different
objectives and intervention formats. This makes it very difficult to collect comprehensive
data on EU cooperation in the fields of asylum and migration. Additionally, these funds do
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not always complement internal funds for migration-related programmes178, which for the
2007-2013 period amounted to EUR 4 billion.
1.2.1. Funding sources of EU external cooperation on migration and asylum
1.2.1.1. DG DEVCO funds
EU development cooperation in the field of asylum and migration is channeled through
both horizontal/thematic and geographical funding instruments. For the 2014-2020
budgetary period, the resulting matrix of funding instruments is shown in Figure 1.
Migration and asylum actions can be funded with all of them, since they feature as
priorities in the respective regulations. Geographical instruments fund development
cooperation in pre-accession countries (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, IPA179),
neighbourhood countries (ENI180), and ACP countries (European Development Fund,
EDF181). The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) covers all of them and the rest
of developing countries182. Thematic instruments (such as the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights183, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace184 or
the Partnership Instrument185) are subsidiary and complementary to geographical
instruments and intended to fund innovative and pilot actions, multi-regional or cross-
cutting interventions.
The result is a proliferation of funding instrument “envelopes” available to fund projects
in this area in each partner country: depending on the regions, this can amount from six
to 15 different funds and programmes. As a consequence, there is a multiplicity of
projects in each country, with different legal and institutional frameworks, not always
aligned and often overlapping with each other. In many countries there is not even a
comprehensive list of such EU-funded programmes. In Morocco, for instance, there are
currently at least 25 on-going projects in this domain, and the MP Scoreboards for
Moldova and Tunisia include more than 100 projects186. The consequence of this
dispersion of funding sources is a lack of visibility of total funds allocated to this area, in
particular for the coming years: funds are committed for 2014-2020 to different funding
instruments, but which thematic priorities they will be allocated to within each of the
instruments is not predetermined. On the other hand, funds allocated for different areas
and policy instruments are often confused, leading to very different visions of EU
cooperation. For Moldova, for instance, estimates of amount of funds mobilised to
178 See P. Hausemer et al., EU funds for Migration policies: Analysis of Efficiency and best practice for the
future, European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department D, PE 552.298, 2015.
179 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ L 77, 15.3.2014.
180 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a
European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014.
181 The international conventional legal base of the EDF is the Cotonou Association Agreement between the EU
and its Member States, on the one hand, and ACP countries, on the other. For complete references, see
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/where-does-money-come/european-
development-fund_en.
182 See Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014.
This Regulation is the legal basis as well for the Pan-African Instrument and the civil society and local
authorities and the GPGC programmes.
183 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a
financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014.
184 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing
an instrument contributing to stability and peace, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014. This instrument will fund, for instance,
the new Polivalent Centre announced by the Commission in Niger.
185 Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a
Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014.
186 See case studies in Annex I.
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support the implementation of the MP vary between EUR 25 and 50 million, depending on
the perspective187.
Figure 1. Main instruments for EU external cooperation 2014-2020
Source: Concord (2014)
In any case, a clear pattern is a constant increase of total expenditure on migration
programmes over the last ten years. Figure 2 shows the total funds spent for each year.
Overall, it shows a steep increase in funds between 2004 and 2008, a peak in 2010-2011
due to some large integrated border management operations in Eastern Europe and a
stabilisation over 2013-2014 at a level of around EUR 100 million a year. Roughly half of
that corresponds to thematic funds (AENEAS for 2004-2006 and the Thematic
Programme on Migration and Asylum –TPMA- on 2007-2013) and the other half to
geographical funds. Migration features are one of the thematic priorities in most Regional
Indicative Programmes, but only rarely as focal points in National Indicative
Programmes, in particular in Morocco, Ukraine and Pakistan.
The dedicated thematic programme was first created in 2004 as AENEAS to respond to
the increasing need for action in this field188. Under this programme, EUR 250 million was
allocated to promote more efficient management of migration flows in co-operation with
third countries, in particular those engaged in preparing or implementing a readmission
agreement, this link being already explicitly made at the time. For 2007-2013 it became
the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum (TPMA189), with a total budget of EUR
384 million for the period. The TPMA was implemented through four calls for proposals
that allowed for a large variety of projects, implementing actors and interventions
throughout the world (65% of total funds for more than 180 projects) and through
187 See case study in 2.2.3 of Annex I.
188 Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing a
programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum
(AENEAS), OJ L 80, 18.3.2004.
189 Art. 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December
2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ L 378, 27.12.2006.
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targeted initiatives contracted through direct agreements for the rest, such as funding
the Rabat Process or MPs (25 projects).
For 2014-2020, the TPMA has been merged with four other former thematic programmes
into the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) Programme in the framework of the
DCI190. This new integrated thematic programme, however, keeps a preset distribution of
funds across thematic priorities, so that immigration and asylum have a total budget
allocation of EUR 344 million191. In contrast to the former TPMA, the GPGC has to focus,
according to its legal basis, on global and multi-regional initiatives so as to ensure
complementarity with regional and bilateral funds, and only in exceptional cases on
national projects (for instance to support the launching of Mobility Partnerships). Instead
of the multiplicity of projects of the TPMA, the GPGC will be implemented through large
global projects directly assigned by DG DEVCO. However, in order to keep some scope
for the participation of small scale actors, a limited call for proposals is being prepared
for 2015 in the amount of EUR 15 million.
Thematic programmes in the field of immigration and asylum are complemented by a
demand-driven technical assistance facility (Migration EU Expertise, MIEUX) mobilised
upon request of partner countries. MIEUX has a global scope and is based on peer-to-
peer assistance (i.e. technical assistance is provided by experts from Member States
administrations)192. It was launched in 2009 exclusively in the field of irregular migration
(EUR 3 million until 2011), and subsequently extended to all areas of migration (EUR 4.5
million for 2011-2014 and EUR 8 million for 2015-2018). Other technical assistance
facilities have been set up in the framework of regional programmes, such as the
Demand Driven Facility in the framework of the Free Movement and Mobility in ECOWAS
countries or the ACP-EU Action for Migrations, providing technical assistance on visas,
readmission and transfer of remittances. The neighbourhood countries can also benefit
from the TAIEX programme.
Figure 2. Funding for external cooperation programmes on migration and
asylum (2004-2013)
Source: DG DEVCO
190 See art. 7 and Part A of Annex II of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
191 This is less than in the former budgetary period, but it refers only to thematic actions, not to the overall
funds on immigration and asylum, which are poised to grow as these issues become increasingly relevant.
192 For a review of actions and lessons learnt, see ICMPD, Migration EU Expertise 2009-2015. Advancing
migration cooperation through demand-driven peer-to-peer expertise. Lessons learnt and good practices, 2015.
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In terms of geographical distribution of these funds among partner countries, there is a
clear focus on Neighbourhood countries (more than half of all funds) and the Sub-
Saharan Africa. Figure 3 below shows the geographical distribution of the funds of the
Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum in 2004-2011 (between 40% and 50% of
total expenditure on migration and asylum cooperation).
Figure 3. AENEAS and Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum.
Expenditures / Geographic priorities 2004-2011 (in euros)
Source: DG DEVCO
Figure 4 shows the distribution of funds across the priorities of the GAMM of the more
than 400 projects registered by DG DEVCO since 2004 in its database of projects. There
is a clear prevalence of the fight against irregular migration, whereas legal migration only
attracts 14% of all funds.
Figure 4. AENEAS and Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum.
Expenditures / Thematic priorities 2004-2011 (in euros)
Source: DG DEVCO
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The most important operational areas are integrated border management, asylum and
regional protection programmes, migration and development (including, in particular,
remittances projects and diaspora mobilisation), labour migration management, free
movement of persons in regional integration processes, anti-trafficking, irregular
migration prevention programmes, support for return and reintegration and for policy
dialogues in the field of migration. Data collection and research is another expanding
area, as a crucial basis for evidence-based policies. In contrast, skills development and
recognition to date absorbs a very small proportion of resources, despite the recurrent
reference to reduction or compensation of “brain drain” in the legal basis and
programming instruments, in particular under the heading of Migration and Development
(see Table 4 below). Increasingly, the European Commission tends to fund larger
integrated migration management programmes comprising several of these elements,
which complicates their evaluation.
In terms of modalities of intervention, capacity building, including technical assistance,
policy development, training and sometimes even equipment, absorbs a large share of
total funds. Another standard type of intervention is the implementation of migrant
support, assistance or protection measures, including information campaigns. There are
also numerous pilot projects and exchanges of good practices. Budget support has seen
little use in the field of migration and asylum, with only two specific operations of
migration sectoral budget support programmes (in Ukraine on border management and
migration, including readmission related issues, for EUR 106.1 million for 2004-2010, and
in Morocco for EUR 67.6 million for 2007-2010 for an integrated border management
programme). Additionally, some migration top-up funds and indicators have been added
recently to ongoing sectoral budget support programmes (in education and health, for
instance) in Morocco. This “mainstreaming” of migration into sectoral budget support
programmes is a priority for the future.
An innovation in this area is the launching of a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for
Africa, recently announced by the European Commission. This will bring together EUR 1.8
billion in development cooperation funds to promote stability and address the root causes
of irregular migration in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and North Africa193. Funds come
from approved budgets for the EDF, the ENI, the DCI, the ISP, the AMIF and other funds
such as humanitarian assistance (ECHO). The aim is to complement them with
contributions from Member States. Although it is conceived to cover a wide spectrum of
development and emergency actions194, the Trust Fund is increasingly seen as an
instrument focused on migration-related issues. It is planned that the Fund will be signed
at the Valletta EU-Africa Summit on 11-12 November 2015. Because of the emergency
nature of this Trust Fund, it will allow for much faster, simpler and more flexible
procedures for the disbursement of aid.
1.2.1.2. DG HOME funds
For the 2014-2020 budgetary period, the DG HOME funds in the field of migration and
asylum (the European Refugee Fund, the European Return Fund and the European Fund
for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals) have been merged into a single
193 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/2_factsheet_emergency_trust_fund_africa_en.pdf.
194 Including economic programmes to create employment, basic services for local populations, migration
management and promoting conflict prevention and enforcing the rule of law through capacity building in
support of security and development as well as law enforcement, including border management and migration-
related aspects.
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instrument, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)195, with total resources of
EUR 3,137 million. Its main objectives include, among others: efficient management of
migration flows; the implementation, strengthening and development of a common policy
on asylum and a common immigration strategy; supporting legal migration in accordance
with Member Sates’ economic and social needs, such as labour market needs; promoting
effective integration of migrants; enhancing fair and effective return strategies, to
contribute to combating illegal immigration; and enhancing solidarity and responsibility-
sharing among Member States, in particular towards those most affected by asylum and
migration flows. This new fund has substantially increased the possibility of funding
external cooperation actions “to ensure that the EU has the means to pursue its Home
Affairs policy priorities and uphold its interests in relations with non-EU countries”196,
which has been very limited so far. However, measures on and in relation to third
countries should not be directly oriented towards development, but should complement,
when appropriate, the financial assistance provided through external aid instruments197.
This is a positive step from the perspective of policy coherence and respect for EU
primary law, since external cooperation actions aimed at achieving purely migration-
driven objectives in the interest of the Union and its Member States will now be financed
by the AMIF, an instrument founded on legal bases of Title V TFEU, and not in those
corresponding to development cooperation as it was the case with AENEAS and the
TPMA198. Reinforcing capacities of third countries in migration management might
contribute to their development, but indirectly at best. Therefore the previous
programmes could have implied a diversion of development funds from their main
objective, in contradiction with EU Treaties199. The distribution of the funds within AMIF
can be summarised as:
Global resources EUR 3,137 million, of which:
 EUR 2,392 million for national programmes of Member States (minimum 20% for
asylum, minimum 20% for legal migration/integration). Under national
programmes, Member States can fund external actions, and support measures to
implement MPs, which need to cohere with measures supported through the EU
external cooperation instruments and with the objectives and principles of EU
external action. As a consequence, measures supporting the implementation of
MPs, in particular those of a bilateral nature that align with national objectives and
priorities, can be included in the respective national programmes of the EU
Member States. Such measures could inter alia cover:
195 See Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014
establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and Regulation (EU) No 514/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 laying down general provisions on the Asylum, Migration and
Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating
crime, and crisis management, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014.
196 See presentation by European Commission, Directorate General for Home Affairs, Funding Home Affairs
beyond 2013 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/funding-home-affairs-beyond-
2013/index_en.htm.
197 See point 35 of the Preamble of Regulation No. 516/2014, as well as its art. 24.
198 Both AENEAS Regulation No. 491/2004 and Regulation No. 1905/2006 on which the TPMA was based were
founded on former art. 179 ECT on development cooperation.
199 As indicated in art. 208 TFEU, Union development policy “shall have as its primary objective the reduction
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty”. However, the CJEU follows a broad notion of development
and does not appear to be against using development instruments to reinforce third countries’ policies on
migration, including in the field of readmission: see Case C-403/05 Parliament v. Council [2007] ECR I-9045,
and especially Case C-377/12 Commission v. Council [2014] ECR (not yet published). An opposing view by
which an indirect link to development is insufficient can be found in Case C-403/05, Opinion of Advocate
General Kokott [2007] ECR I-9045.
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- providing information to potential migrants about labour market opportunities
and conditions of entry and stay in the Member State;
- providing language training to facilitate integration of migrants, as well as
translations of relevant national documents in appropriate languages;
- organising information campaigns about national asylum policies or risks of
irregular migration;
- organising university cooperation and exchange of students;
- providing support to the return and readmission of migrants from the Member
State to relevant third countries.
 EUR 360 million for specific Member State actions (resettlement and relocation
beneficiaries), some of which are relevant for the implementation of MPs, in
particular:
- joint reintegration projects in countries of origin with a view to sustainable
return, as well as joint actions to strengthen third countries’ capacities to
implement EU readmission agreements;
- joint return operations, including joint actions on implementation of Union
readmission agreements;
- joint initiatives among Member States in the field of legal migration, including
the setting up of joint migration centres in third countries, as well as joint
projects to promote cooperation between Member States with a view to
encouraging the use of exclusively legal migration channels and providing
information about the risks of illegal immigration;
- new approaches, in cooperation with UNHCR, concerning access to asylum
procedures targeting main countries of transit, such as protection
programmes for particular groups or certain procedures for examining
applications for asylum;
 EUR 385 million for Union actions, the European Migration Network (minimum
30% between the two), emergency assistance and technical assistance. Union
actions are transnational actions or actions of particular interest for the Union. The
Commission may also finance Union actions in or relating to third countries.
National programmes are still under elaboration, so that the actual allocation of AMIF
funds cannot yet be analysed.
The other new DG HOME fund in this field is the Internal Security Fund (ISF), composed
of two instruments: the ISF-Borders and Visa200, which replaces the former External
Borders Fund with global resources of EUR 2.76 billion (at least 30% for Union actions)
and covers most aspects related to border management and visa policy, and the ISF-
police201, with global resources of EUR 1.004 billion, which mainly covers aspects related
to law enforcement cooperation and the fight against organised crime activities such as
human trafficking and migrant smuggling, including a part reserved for emergency
assistance. These external cooperation actions can include capacity-building and training
activities of Member States in third countries on issues such as migrant smuggling,
200 Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 April 2014, establishing,
as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa and
repealing Decision No 574/2007/EC, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014.
201 Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 April 2014, establishing,
as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and
combating crime, and crisis management and repealing Council Decision 2007/125/JHA, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014.
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human trafficking, or law enforcement cooperation. In the framework of Union actions,
they can fund, for instance, the setting up of consular cooperation mechanisms between
at least two Member States, resulting in economies of scale as regards the processing of
applications and the issuing of visas at consulates in accordance with the principles on
cooperation laid down in the VC, including common visa application centres.
In the AMIF work programme for 2014202, a EUR 3 million Mobility Partnership Facility
(MPF)203 was created for an initial period of two years to fund actions which represent a
high priority for the EU and its Member States and have a direct impact on the EU
migration agenda. In particular the following actions are to receive funding: (i) support to
partner countries’ policy and legal frameworks for migration and mobility, including
through circular and temporary migration schemes as well as better information and
protection of migrants, including pre-departure training; (ii) information of potential
migrants on opportunities for legal migration and requirements for legal stay, as well as
on the risks of irregular migration; (iii) capacity-building of partner countries’ authorities
in legal migration management, including migration monitoring; (iv) support to partner
countries’ policy and legal frameworks as well as capacity-building on asylum policy and
protection in line with international standards; (v) support to the migration dialogue with
relevant partner countries.
1.2.1.3. DG NEAR funds
Since the end of 2014, DG NEAR has absorbed the geographical units in charge of
managing the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), with a total budget of EUR
15.4 billion for 2014-2020. Those units were formerly under DG DEVCO, so that
development cooperation funds in the field of migration and asylum are now split. In this
framework, a small “Centre of Expertise” on Migration and Border Management (B4) has
been created within DG NEAR.
Amounts devoted to migration in this framework are not predetermined. They depend on
the inclusion of migration and asylum among the priorities identified and of the actual
programming of bilateral and regional cooperation in the framework of the different
instruments, a process which is being finalised. The specific objectives of EU support
under ENI make explicit reference to “creating conditions for the better organization of
legal migration and the fostering of well managed mobility of people, for the
implementation of existing or future agreements concluded in line with the Global
Approach to Migration and Mobility”, thus also enabling support for existing or future
MPs.
1.2.1.4. EEAS funds
Finally, the EEAS also has an instrument, the Partnership Instrument (PI), which can
fund migration related actions for strategic partner countries, including developed and
developing countries. Amounts devoted to migration in this framework are not
predetermined. They depend on the inclusion of migration and asylum among the
priorities and of the actual programming of the different instruments. In the First Multi-
annual Indicative Programme for 2014-2017, one of the main objectives is “to support
EU and mutual strategic interests in the fields of data protection, international civil law,
judicial cooperation, migration, equality, and the fight against drugs, organized crime and
202 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-
integration-fund/union-actions/docs/awp_2014_amif_en.pdf.
203 See Action Document for ‘Support to new Mobility Partnerships with Azerbaijan, Tunisia and Jordan, 22
October 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap_gpgc_migration_and_asylum_
c_2014_7585_action_fiche1_20141022_en.pdf.
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corruption”, and it is a priority to “[support] the implementation of comprehensive EU
dialogues and co-operation agendas with key partner countries and regional or global
initiatives on mobility and migration matters”, among other issues.
1.2.2. Comparative analysis of EU funding sources
Migration has made its way into the main thematic priorities of most EU external
cooperation funding instruments and regional programmes. Table 4 provides an overview
of the migration related objectives and priorities in each of the instruments, which builds
the basis for funding actions in this field. Only the migration-related envelope within the
GPGC is specifically earmarked for migration-related projects. The remaining funds are
distributed over a seven-year period according to the specific priorities of each
programme. In any case, there is not necessarily a correlation between the weight of
each area of operation according to the funding instrument’s legal basis and the actual
implementation in terms of the number of projects and resources allocated. Brain drain
mitigation and compensation, and more generally labour migration, tend to be
underrepresented in the portfolio of actions, whereas integrated border management,
return and reintegration and control of irregular migration play a bigger role in actual
cooperation than in the programming instruments.
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Table 4: Migration, asylum and mobility in the thematic priorities of EU external cooperation funding instruments
Instrument Objectives Total
resources
2014-2020
DCI Geographic programmes shall be drawn from the following areas of cooperation: migration and asylum (among many others)
(i) supporting targeted efforts to fully exploit the interrelationship between migration, mobility, employment and poverty
reduction, so as to make migration a positive force for development and reducing ‘brain drain’; (ii) supporting developing
countries in adopting long-term policies for managing migratory flows which respect the human rights of migrants and their
families and enhance their social protection.
EUR 19.7 billion
for 47 countries
in LAC, Asia,
Gulf and South
Africa
EDF The Parties agree to strengthen and deepen their dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, building on the following
three pillars of a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration: 1. Migration and Development, including issues
relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; 2. Legal migration including admission, mobility and movement of skills
and services; and 3. Illegal migration, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border management, as well
as readmission
EUR 30.5 billion
–ACP
ENI Support to creating conditions for the better organisation of legal migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility of
people, for the implementation of existing or future agreements concluded in line with the GAMM, and for the promotion of
people-to-people contacts, in particular in relation to cultural, educational, professional and sporting activities;
Bilateral support to mobility and migration management, including the protection of migrants; Support at multi-country level
to mobility and migration management; Support through cross-border cooperation to the mobility of persons, goods and
capital.
EUR 15.4 billion
-Neighbourhood
countries
GPGC To support actions in areas to be drawn from: migration and asylum (out of five areas)
(a) promoting migration governance at all levels, with a particular focus on the social and economic consequences of
migration, and recognizing the key role of civil society organizations, including diaspora, and local authorities in addressing
migration as an essential component of the development strategy; (b) ensuring better management of migratory flows in all
their dimensions, including through enhancing capacities of governments and other relevant stakeholders in partner
countries in areas such as: legal migration and mobility; preventing irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and
trafficking in human beings; facilitating sustainable return of irregular migrants and supporting voluntary return and
reintegration; integrated border management capacities; and international protection and asylum; (c) maximizing the
development impact of the increased regional and global mobility of people, and in particular of well-managed labour
migration, improving integration of migrants in countries of destination, promoting and protecting the rights of migrants and
their families, through support to the formulation and implementation of sound regional and national migration and asylum
policies, through integration of the migration dimension into other regional and national policies and through support for the
participation of migrants' organizations and local authorities in policy formulation and in the monitoring of policy
implementation processes; (d) improving a common understanding of the migration and development nexus, including social
and economic consequences of government policies, be they in migration, asylum or in other sectors; (e) enhancing asylum
and reception capacities in partner countries
EUR 5.1 billion
(of which EUR
344 million
earmarked for
migration
Civil Society
and Local
Authorities
Civil society organizations include migrants’ organizations in partner countries. EUR 1.9 billion
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Pan-African
Partnership
Instrument
Areas of cooperation: migration, mobility and employment (out of nine) EUR 845 million
EIDHR Cooperation and partnership with civil society on sensitive human rights and democracy issues, including migrants'
enjoyment of human rights and the rights of asylum seekers and internally displaced persons
EUR 1.3 billion
ISP With regard to assistance to authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, priority shall be given to supporting measures
concerning the development and strengthening of counter-terrorism legislation, the implementation and practice of financial
law, of customs law and of immigration law
EUR 2.3 billion
Partnership
Instrument
Support objectives relating to global issues such as mobility
Learning mobility (higher education)
EUR 954.8
million
IPA II Specific objectives: capacity-building measures for improving law enforcement, border management and implementation of
migration policy, including the management of migration flows. Thematic priorities for assistance: […] establishing and
promoting from an early stage the proper functioning of the institutions necessary in order to secure the rule of law, aiming
at ensuring the establishment of robust systems to protect the borders, manage migration flows and provide asylum to those
in need;
EUR 11.7 billion
AMIF General objective to contribute to the efficient management of migration flows and to the implementation, strengthening and
development of the common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection and the common immigration
policy. Specific objectives: a) to strengthen and develop all aspects of the Common European Asylum System, including its
external dimension; b) to support legal migration to the Member States in accordance with their economic and social needs,
such as labour market needs, while safeguarding the integrity of the immigration systems of Member States, and to promote
the effective integration of third-country nationals; c) to enhance fair and effective return strategies in the Member States
which contribute to combating illegal immigration, with an emphasis on sustainability of return and effective readmission in
the countries of origin and transit; d) to enhance solidarity and responsibility-sharing between the Member States, in
particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum flows, including through practical cooperation.
EUR 3.137
billion
ISF-Borders
and visa
General objective to ensuring a high level of security in the Union while facilitating legitimate travel, through a uniform and
high level of control of the external borders and the effective processing of Schengen visas. Specific objectives: a) supporting
a common visa policy to facilitate legitimate travel, provide a high quality of service to visa applicants, ensure equal
treatment of third-country nationals and tackle illegal immigration; b) supporting integrated border management, including
promoting further harmonization of border management-related measures in accordance with common Union standards and
through the sharing of information between Member States and between Member States and the Frontex Agency, to ensure,
on one hand, a uniform and high level of control and protection of the external borders, including by the tackling of illegal
immigration and, on the other hand, the smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity with the Schengen acquis,
while guaranteeing access to international protection for those needing it, in accordance with the obligations contracted by
the Member States in the field of human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement.
EUR 2.7 billion
ISF-Police General objective to contribute to ensuring a high level of security in the Union. Specific objectives: a) crime prevention,
combating cross-border, serious and organized crime including terrorism, and reinforcing coordination and cooperation
between law enforcement authorities and other national authorities of Member States, […] and with relevant third countries
and international organizations;
b) enhancing the capacity of Member States and the Union for managing effectively security-related risks and crises […].
EUR 1.004
billion
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Table 5 provides an overview of how migration is included in EU’s Regional Indicative
Programmes for 2014-2020204. In practice, many of these programmes work as umbrella
funds to finance national activities and projects.
Table 5: Migration in Regional Programming 2014-2020
Regional
Programme
Priorities
Pan-African
Programme
Support for EU-Africa dialogue on migration, Rabat Process and Khartoum
Process
ENI South Capacity building on migration, mobility and international protection;
strengthened cooperation and analysis of flows
ENI East Strengthening migration systems; Integrated Border Management; Anti-
trafficking; Promoting Mobility etc.
Central Asia Integrated Border Management; Migration Management
Latin America Migration and Border Management, in context of Security-Development
Nexus
West Africa Integrated Border Management; Implementation of ECOWAS Free
Movement Protocols and Common Approach on Migration
Eastern, Southern
Africa & Indian
Ocean
Cross-regional action on migration includes improving migration
governance, facilitating legal migration, and support for refugees and
internally displaced persons
204 Regional Indicative Programmes are the multi-annual programming instruments of EU development
cooperation in a particular region. They are based on Regional Strategy Papers setting out the main regional
challenges and EU interests and complement the national indicative programmes approved for each aid
beneficiary country.
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1.3. Main lessons and inspiring practices from Member States’
cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum
KEY FINDINGS
 EU Member States continue to develop a rather intense external action on
migration at the bilateral level. Some of their cooperation practices could be
reproduced or upscaled at EU level, and integrated into an EU-wide experience-
and evidence-based ‘global learning curve’.
 Some bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of migration evidence that the
reluctance to offer legal migration opportunities is not restricted to EU
frameworks of cooperation.
 Specific projects of external cooperation on migration involving several Member
States, with EU funding support, and in collaboration with EU agencies, seem to
be the most promising way to optimise resources, ensure added value and
pave the way for increasing Union action in this field.
This section reviews some cases of Member States’ cooperation with third countries to
identify their main modalities of intervention in the field of asylum and immigration. The
purpose is also to highlight cooperation practices which could be reproduced or extended
to EU level.
Bilateral cooperation is established by individual Member States and third countries in
those fields within which the Member States retain exclusive or concurrent powers in
accordance with the EU distribution of competences205. This bilateral cooperation takes
various forms according to the types of instruments used to undertake it. First, formal
cooperation has traditionally been established through legally binding international
agreements concluded with main countries of origin and transit. Bilateral treaties mainly
concern readmission agreements; agreements on management of admission of labour
migration; social security conventions; agreements on short-term visa exemption for
holders of diplomatic passports, and on facilitations regarding long-term visas; police
cooperation agreements against criminal activities, including trafficking and smuggling;
and also local border traffic agreements as an exercise of the exclusive EU competence in
this field delegated to Member States.
A remarkable specimen of bilateral agreements on migration can be found in migration
cooperation agreements respectively concluded by Spain and France with countries of
origin and transit, mainly from the African continent206. In contrast to other traditional
treaties concluded by these Member States on different fields of migration, these so-
called “new generation agreements” are characterised by addressing in one single legally
binding instrument all the diverse dimensions of the migration phenomenon, thus
highlighting the new global approach to migration207. The Spanish and French
agreements address, with slight variations in scope and detail, the admission of migrant
205 See García Andrade, 2015, op. cit.
206 For Spain, los “acuerdos marco de cooperación migratoria” find their origin in the Plan Africa 2006-2008
aimed at governing the relationship with Sub-Saharan African countries and renewed for the period 2009-2012.
The importance of these agreements has been highlighted by the inclusion of a reference in Article 2 bis of
Organic Law 2/2009 amending the Spanish Law on Aliens. For its part, France also initiated the signature of
“accords de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et développement solidaire” in 2006 as part of its new
strategy on migration towards third countries, particularly addressing African countries too.
207 This kind of framework agreements on migration cooperation have been concluded by Spain with Guinea,
Gambia (2006), Mali, Cape Verde (2007), Guinea Bissau and Niger (2008). France has concluded agreements
on concerted migration management and solidary development with Senegal (2006), Gabon, Congo, Benin
(2007), Tunisia, Cape Verde (2008), Burkina Faso and Cameroun (2009).
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workers, voluntary return, integration of legal residents, migration and development
synergies, the fight against irregular immigration and human trafficking, border
management, and readmission. The overlap between these goals and those of EU MPs208
calls into question the level of interest of these Member States in participating in the EU
instrument, as they both do with regard to Cape Verde, and France does with regard to
Tunisia. This dual approach could be justified in their willingness to remain an important
interlocutor on migration issues with their partners; or cultural or historical links with
third countries involved209; or in the fact that, as MPs replicate the bilateral approach of
these Member States and even help them to achieve their national preferences, their
participation does not seem problematic210. More specifically, these agreements include
diverse commitments on mutual assistance for the integration of migrants, pre-departure
measures and reception programmes; vague commitments on multiple entry visa
facilitations for economic, scientific or cultural purposes; provisions on cooperation in the
fight against irregular immigration and in border management through exchange of
information, provision of technical assistance, training courses, support on document
security and awareness campaigns; as well as engagements on cooperation and
assistance for the development of regions of origin of migration and promotion of co-
development actions. Readmission clauses are inserted in all these agreements, with
direct executive force through the inclusion of annexes on procedural obligations and
safeguards in the case of Spanish agreements. As regards labour migration, Spanish new
generation agreements merely serve to facilitate channelling labour offers through the
authorities of the third country211, while French agreements contain a list of professions
in which access to employment by nationals of the partners is allowed, including quotas
for certain categories of residence permits. In both cases, provisions are drafted to avoid
binding commitments in this field, showing their limited added value as far as labour
migrants’ admission is concerned212. This also evidences that the reluctance of Member
States to offer labour migration opportunities to third countries is not restricted to EU
frameworks of cooperation, but replicated, to some extent, at the bilateral level too.
The external action on migration developed by Italy is also notable. Apart from
concluding agreements on labour migration with third countries213, annual quotas of
admission of economic migrants, defined by decree, are assigned to countries with which
Italy has concluded agreements on cooperation against irregular immigration and
readmission214. Those quotas can be restricted if the partner country does not effectively
208 See N. Reslow, “Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility
Partnerships”, Journal of European Integration, 34/3, 2012, p. 229, who states that Spanish and French
agreements formed the inspiration for MPs.
209 N. Ward, “Facilitating the temporary movement of natural persons. Economic partnership agreements versus
bilateral migration agreements and Mobility Partnerships”, in R. Kunz, S. Lavenex, M. Panizzon, Multilayered
Migration Governance. The promise of partnership, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 151.
210 Reslow, 2012a, op. cit., pp. 223-239.
211 In contrast with Spanish agreements specifically devoted to labour migration that govern in detail the
selection and recruitment procedure of migrant workers and to which labour offers are preferentially directed
according to Spanish legislation on aliens. These agreements have been concluded with countries such as
Colombia, Ecuador, Morocco, Dominican Republic (2001), Mauritania (2007) or Ukraine (2009).
212 See the analysis in Ward, 2011, op. cit. For the detailed content of Spanish and French agreements, see P.
García Andrade, A. Di Pascale and A. Sarraj, “L’importance des relations bilatérales entre États membres et
pays tiers en matière d’immigration: une analyse de l’action extérieure de l’Espagne, la France et l’Italie”, in M.
Maes, M.C. Foblets, P. De Bruycker (eds.), Dimensions externes du droit et de la politique d’immigration et
d’asile de l’UE, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011, pp. 221-309. For an analysis on the compatibility of these
agreements with the EU distribution of competences, see García Andrade, 2015, op. cit., pp. 525 et seq.
213 Such as Moldova (2003), Morocco, Egypt (2005), Albania (2008), or Sri Lanka (2011). Also an agreement on
circular migration has been signed by Italy with Mauritius (2012). See European Commission, Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the 5th Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2013), SWD (2014) 165,
p. 86 for recent developments on the external dimension of labour migration policies of other Member States.
214 Such as Morocco (1998), Tunisia (1998 and 2003), Algeria (2000), Egypt (2007), Nigeria (2000 and 2009)
or Libya. See P. Cuttita, “Readmission in the Relations between Italy and North African Mediterranean
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cooperate with the Italian Government on return and on the prevention of irregular
immigration215.
Another significant modality of collaboration between Member States and third countries
is set up through informal arrangements or political agreements, mainly used to establish
operational cooperation on border management, as for example with Spanish and Italian
arrangements with African border authorities aimed at providing equipment and training
on border controls, and serving as the basis for the deployment of joint patrols in the
territorial waters of partner countries216. Informal arrangements are also employed to
address readmission217, and, in some cases, labour migration. Despite their
effectiveness, these forms of cooperation seem problematic in view of their lack of
publicity and democratic legitimacy, which hinder monitoring of their design and
impact218.
Specific projects and initiatives of external cooperation undertaken by EU Member States
are developed either under the umbrella of EU instruments of cooperation such as MPs or
under national policies, nevertheless in most cases receiving EU funding. Some examples
from these projects help to demonstrate good practices in the fields covered by this
study.
In the field of legal migration, several projects developed by Member States have been
presented to foster circular migration, probably the most repeated objective of the GAMM
after readmission. One example is a German project on circular migration for health
professionals from Moldova, inscribed under an EU funded project “Better managing the
mobility of health professionals in the Republic of Moldova”219, and implemented by the
World Health Organisation from October 2011 to September 2014. The project aimed to
promote circular migration of Moldovan health professionals, diminish the negative
effects of brain drain, and facilitate the reintegration of migrants returning to the national
health system. A key achievement of the project was the development of a model
bilateral agreement and support throughout the negotiations and the signing, in August
2014, of a MoU between Moldova and Germany aimed at developing circular migration
programmes in this field220. The Spanish seasonal migration schemes for the agricultural
sector directed towards Moroccan nationals are often referred to as a model to follow221.
In 2013 France signed an agreement with Georgia, within the framework of the MP, on
Countries”, in J.-P. Cassarino (ed.), Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-
Mediterranean Area, Middle East Institute Special Edition Viewpoints, 2010, pp. 30-53.
215 See Di Pascale’s contribution in García Andrade, Di Pascale and Sarraj, 2011, op. cit.; P. Cuttita, “Yearly
quotas and country-reserved shares in Italian immigration policy”, Migration Letters, vol. 5 (1), April 2008, pp.
41-51.
216 See A. Di Pascale, “Migration Control at Sea: The Italian Case” or P. García Andrade, “Extraterritorial
Strategies to Tackle Irregular Immigration by Sea: A Spanish Perspective”, in B. Ryan, V. Mitsilegas (eds.)
Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010. SWD (2014) 165, p. 39
for more examples of arrangements establishing joint border patrols: Croatia-Serbia, Hungary-Serbia, Poland-
Ukraine, Slovak Republic-Ukraine, Romania-Ukraine.
217 According to Cassarino’s study, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have been, over the
last few decades, at the forefront of a new wave of agreements linked to readmission in the form of MoU,
arrangements, pacts or police cooperation agreements. Cassarino, 2010, op. cit., p. 26.
218 See section 2.1.2.2 of this study.
219 United Nations in Moldova, “Better managing the mobility of health professionals in the Republic of Moldova
– context, challenges, and lessons learned”, 30 March 2015, available at http://www.un.md/viewnews/203/
220 A German employment ordinance has imposed a ban on the recruitment of health personnel from 57
countries suffering skills shortages according to the WHO Code of Practice on International Recruitment of
Health Personnel, SWD (2014) 165, p. 87.
221 See, e.g., A. Triandafyllidou, Circular Migration between the EU and its Neighbours. A Comparative Analysis,
Metoikos Project, EUI, 2011 and C. González Enríquez and M. Reynés Ramón, Circular Migration between Spain
and Morocco: something more than agricultural work?, Metoikos Project, EUI, 2011. This programme is based
on the reactivation of the Agreement between Spain and Morocco on labour migration of 2001. See a brief
assessment of this programme in M. Bensaid, and I. Martín, Mesures de soutien aux migrants en matière
d’emploi et de compétences (MISMES), Maroc, Fondation européenne pour la formation, 2015.
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circular migration of professionals, aimed at facilitating access to a first professional
experience for students, the exchange of young professionals to improve their career
perspectives, and temporary access to the labour market for certain professions222.
Despite its title, the content of the Agreement shows that it is focused on temporary, not
circular, migration223, an unfortunate example which is however replicated in EU
legislation in which provisions facilitating circular migration and preventing brain drain
are scarce224.
On the synergies between migration and development, the Italian project “Addressing
the negative effects of migration on minors and families left behind” is notable. This
project, which ran from January 2011 to September 2013, aimed at addressing the
negative effects of migration on children and other vulnerable family members left
behind as a result of emigration from Moldova. Under EU and national funding, it was
jointly implemented by Italian and Moldovan governments, NGOs, diaspora associations
and the IOM. Its main impact relied on generating a deep understanding by Moldovan
authorities of the situation of children in the country; adopting recommendations for
developing strategies to address this phenomenon; providing assistance to vulnerable
children in vocational training and professional formation; and grants. The project was
combined with actions in Italy, developing awareness raising campaigns for Moldovan
migrants in Italy on the negative effects of migration, as well as providing them with
psychological, social and legal assistance225.
On the fight against irregular immigration and fostering return, Belgium, Netherlands and
Poland have developed, from December 2012 to March 2015, a project, implemented by
IOM and funded by the EU, on “Supporting the establishment of effective readmission
management in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia”. Its objectives were to contribute to
the establishment and development of an effective mechanism for the management of
readmission in the three countries by assisting in establishing case management systems
of readmission, and facilitating and monitoring the implementation of EURAs with these
countries; building capacity in Armenia and Azerbaijan for management of migration
detention centres; and assisting in capacity building for reintegration of returned
migrants. As far as Georgia is concerned, key achievements relate to the introduction of
an electronic readmission management system for dealing with individual readmission
cases in Georgia, with EU Member States’ cooperation; and the implementation of the
Assisted Voluntary Return from Georgia and Reintegration Programme for readmitted
migrants who wish to return to their home countries226.
On strengthening border controls and fight against irregular immigration, Spanish
practice can be highlighted. One important project is the Seahorse Mediterranean
222 Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la Géorgie relatif au séjour
et à la migration circulaire de professionnels (ensemble deux annexes), signé à Paris le 12 novembre 2013
(pending ratification).
223 Only a reference is found in the agreement to temporary permits “compétences et talents” granted to
Georgian nationals on the condition that their experience in France is profitable to the development and
entrepreneurship in Georgia at their return. For the distinction between circular and temporary migration, see
for instance A Wiesbrock and H. Schneider, Circular migration and Mobility Partnerships, European Parliament,
DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, PE 410.680, 2009.
224 With regard to the EU Blue Card Directive, see P. Devisscher, “Legal Migration in the Relationship between
the European Union and ACP Countries: The Absence of a True Global Approach Continues”, European Journal
of Migration and Law, 13, 2011, pp. 53-94.
225 IOM Moldova, “EU helps hundreds of Moldovan families address the effects of migration at home and
abroad”, http://www.iom.md/index.php/media-center/press-releases/252-eu-helps-hundreds-of-moldovan-
families-address-the-effects-of-migration-at-home-and-abroad Similar cooperation exists between Italy and
Ukraine. See also L. Yanovich, Children Left Behind: The Impact of Labor Migration in Moldova and Ukraine,
Migration Information Source, January 2015, available at www.migrationpolicy.org
226 See IOM, “Readmission to Georgia”, Newsletter issue 3, September 2014, available at http://iom.ge/1/iom-
releases-its-latest-newsletter-readmission-management-project
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Network, initiated in 2013 and focused in North Africa. This project aims at training
African agents in maritime and land border surveillance and establishing a network of
satellite communications to fight irregular immigration in the Mediterranean. Its
conception and implementation is led by the Spanish Guardia Civil, with the participation
of France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece, together with the EU Commission
and Frontex, and receives EU funding. Currently, the third country involved is Libya,
while Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt have been invited to join the project. It is built on the
past experience of Spanish cooperation projects with African countries bordering the
Atlantic developed since 2006, including training, provision of equipment and joint patrols
at sea. This cooperation has, according to Spanish authorities, significantly contributed to
the reduction of migratory pressure by sea227, although its effects on the protection of
human rights of migrants are highly problematic. In addition, Spanish practice of police
cooperation with African countries in the fight against organised criminality is an example
of good practice emerging from regional migration dialogues. Replicating existing
patterns of cooperation with Mauritania in this field, Spain presented at the meeting of
the Steering Committee of the Rabat Process, held in April 2015, a project to set up a
joint investigation team between the Spanish and the Nigerien police to fight human
trafficking networks on the ground228. This project is included in the framework of a
bilateral convention on the fight against criminality signed between Spain and Niger in
May 2015229, which follows similar conventions concluded by Spain with several other
countries230.
On capacity building on asylum and international protection, several – although fewer -
projects in cooperation with third countries have been carried out to enhance the
external dimension of international protection. These mainly support institutional
development of third country asylum systems and organise training courses231. For
instance, Denmark’s experience on projects such as the “Regions of Origin Initiative” led
it to become the leading partner of the RDPP in the Middle East232. Although resettlement
and humanitarian admission do not seem to develop in strict cooperation with third
countries, the German federal programme for the admission of Syrian refugees in 2013-
14 provides a good practice example in this field233. An important project developed
under the Prague Process, the Pilot Project 4 “Quality and Training in the Asylum
Processes: The European Asylum Curriculum” (PP4), similarly provides an example
relating to the field of asylum. This project was led by Sweden with the support of
Germany, in close cooperation with EASO and UNHCR, and also involves other EU
Member States. It ran from August 2012 to April 2014, aiming to explore the possibility
of implementing the EASO Training Curriculum (formerly the European Asylum
Curriculum) in interested Prague Process States. The project targeted case officers and
227 Guardia Civil, Spanish Ministry of Interior, press releases of 19 September 2013 and 1 April 2014. See also
SWD (2014) 165, p. 33. MoUs are the instrument used for the setting up of these joint patrols both at sea and
at land.
228 Spanish Ministry of Interior, press releases of 23 April 2015 and 14 May 2015.
229 Convenio de cooperación en materia de lucha contra la delincuencia entre el Reino de España y la República
de Níger, hecho en Niamey el 14 de mayo de 2015, BOE no. 160, 6.07.2015.
230 All these conventions include cooperation on irregular immigration and trafficking of human beings and have
been concluded by Spain with countries such as Senegal, Cape Verde (2006), Mali (2008), Turkey (2009),
Cameroun, Jordan, Serbia (2011) or Moldova (2013).
231 SWD (2014) 165, pp. 25-26.
232 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (DANIDA), The Regions of Origin Initiative, September 2005, available
at http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/5918/pdf/Naeromraader_GB.pdf
233 The programme was initially directed towards 5000 Syrians and have successively increased up to 20,000,
prioritising those with humanitarian needs, people with family links in Germany and individuals who can
contribute to the reconstruction in Syria. UNHCR, ‘First group of Syrian refugees flies to Germany’, News Stories
(11 September 2013), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/523076919.html>; UNHCR, ‘UNHCR welcomes
Germany’s decision to extend Humanitarian Admission Programme to an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees’ (13
June 2014), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/539afe256.html>.
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decision-makers working in the asylum process in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine. A meaningful outcome is the elaboration of
guidelines aimed at standardising procedures and suggesting ways to build high quality
training programmes on international protection234. It is therefore a good example of a
multilateral project of several EU Member States, supported by EU funding, with the
direct involvement of an EU agency, EASO, in collaboration with UNCHR, and emerging
from a regional migration dialogue.
234 Prague Process Guidelines on Training in the Asylum Process - Approaches to Achieve Quality Training on
core issues within the area of asylum and international protection, 2014, available at www.pragueprocess.eu.
(20.08.2015). This project has been continued by a new project on “Quality in Decision-making in the Asylum
Process –Focus on Evidentiary Assessment, Due Process and Jurisprudence” (PP7), running from November
2014 to January 2016.
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2. IMPACT OF EU COOPERATION INSTRUMENTS IN THE
FIELD OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM
Literature and policy analysis on the implementation of EU external cooperation in the
field of migration, both regarding cooperation instruments and funded projects, is
extremely scarce. In part, this is due to the unavailability of relevant information on the
impact and even output assessment of EU cooperation in this field (it is often not
published, even if formally public, and in any case it is scattered across EU Delegations
and Commission units). Simple inputs for such an analysis, such as a comprehensive list
of migration and asylum related projects in a specific country, are often lacking, including
data on budgets or numbers of beneficiaries. As a recent review of migrant support
measures worldwide concluded, “there are not enough data and information available to
evaluate, in a consistent and scientific way, the efficiency and impact of migrant support
measures. The lack of systematic monitoring and follow-up mechanisms and impact
assessments […] is obviously a major obstacle to a systematic improvement of [migrant
support measures in countries of origin]”235. The same study concluded that “despite the
wide transfer of practices, there is only a limited experience-based ‘global learning
curve’. Practices and models are transferred and replicated from country to country in a
mechanical way, often by global actors in the framework of responses to calls for project
proposals” or by contracted experts, rather than as a result of a systematic learning
process.
Mandatory project and programme evaluations do not provide the basic information
required to assess the cost-effectiveness and impact of migration cooperation
interventions. They are conducted as part of the technical and administrative evaluation
of the projects, and not with the objective of determining their impact. So a project
management rationale prevails, focused on project outputs and activities (deliverables)
rather than on their outcomes. The most useful sources of this type are the thematic
evaluations carried out on behalf of the Commission, for instance on Regional Protection
Programmes (2009), labour migration AENEAS and TPMA projects (2011), the TPMA itself
(2013) and migration and development (2014). There are evaluations in progress on
anti-trafficking projects and the global calls for proposals in this field.
Implementing institutions and units need greater support in the form of efforts to
generate standardised information on migration-related development cooperation
projects and policy interventions, to allow for a systematic assessment of their impact
and efficiency. Some general rules on the information to be made public by project
implementers might dramatically improve the knowledge base for policy interventions. In
the same way that ex-ante project fiches are increasingly standardised, the production of
a standard ex-post project fiche with data about the allocation of a budget across
different components of the project and elements for assessment could be envisaged at
least in the framework of large programmes like the former TPMA. The EU has
undertaken such a commitment in the framework of the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation, which should be fully implemented by December 2015236. A
clear legislative framework in this regard could greatly contribute to a “learning curve” of
practices in the field of external cooperation in migration and asylum.
Similarly, Member States have asked the Commission to include indicators of
performance on the next implementation report of the GAMM due in early 2016. Although
235 I. Martín and S. Makaryan, Migrant Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES):
Global Inventory with a Focus in Countries of Origin, European Training Foundation, 2015.
236 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation,
http://effectivecooperation.org/files/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf, point 23.
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the Commission is planning to include some indicators, those currently being envisaged
are quite limited due to scarcity of resources and to the fact that progress assessment
should not be based only on facts and figures. Of course, beyond the availability of
accurate information, the concurrence of difference factors on measured outcomes (the
issues of contribution and attribution) is an additional difficulty.
Finally, data provided to Eurostat by Member States on their implementation of EU
immigration and asylum policies are often fragmentary or outdated, making it difficult to
compile all relevant information and use it for comparative evaluation purposes.
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2.1. Evidence on the output and impact of different instruments
of EU cooperation with third countries in the field of
migration and asylum
KEY FINDINGS
 Available public information on EU external cooperation in the field of
migration and asylum does not allow for a systematic evaluation of its impact and
efficiency. Even basic information on distribution of funds, projects implemented
or state of progress of projects is scattered and often not available.
 Mandatory evaluations of projects implemented should not focus only on
outputs and outcomes, but also on impact in relation to the strategic objectives
of each project.
 Evaluations of the global calls for proposals implemented since 2004 in
the framework of the AENEAS Programme and the Thematic Programme
for Migration and Asylum have shown, partly due to fragmentation, a very
limited impact and the need for a more strategic approach.
 In the framework of the new European Agenda on Migration, there is a
trend to evaluate all external cooperation initiatives in this field in
relation to their contribution to the European migration policy. However, a
large share of those actions has a main objective to contribute to the development
of beneficiary countries, which should be taken into account in evaluations.
 From a substantive dimension, legal migration, mobility and international
protection have been subordinated in relation to the control of irregular
immigration, fields in which the value of cooperation seems more obvious. On
migration and development, the support provided may not translate into direct
benefits for migrants, while a growing confusion of development assistance and
migration objectives might undermine EU credibility in this field.
 Regarding implementation, EU Delegations often lack the specialised staff
required to plan, implement and monitor projects. Besides that, the
programming process is very slow, limiting the capacity to respond to new
developments. Administrative procedures are too burdensome to be effective.
 Political instruments that are increasingly common in the external dimension of
EU immigration and asylum policies may be useful for initiating cooperation on
migration issues with third countries, but in view of the shortcomings and
weaknesses derived from their soft law nature, migration cooperation should
evolve towards an increasing recourse to hard law.
 Concerning the institutional dimension, a systematic exchange of
information on bilateral activities and projects between Member States
and the Commission is needed, while coordination and rapprochement of
priorities among the different European Commission DGs, as well as with
the EEAS, appears indispensable. The limited involvement of the European
Parliament in the design and implementation of GAMM instruments requires to
search for ways of increasing its monitoring capacities.
The assessment of the outcomes of EU cooperation with third countries in the fields of
migration and asylum, carried out based on evidence in secondary sources, will focus on
three dimensions: the strategic interests and objectives pursued by the external
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dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies (substantive dimension); the pros, cons
and consequences of different instruments used to achieve those objectives (functional
dimension) and the areas for improving coordination across different levels and
departments of government (institutional dimension). Although available information on
the different instruments of EU cooperation, in particular funds and projects, does not
allow for a quantitative analysis of the impact of that cooperation, a series of qualitative
insights emerge from the analysis of existing practices.
2.1.1. Substantive dimension
From a substantive point of view, it is important to analyse EU external cooperation
instruments in the light of their impact on the objectives of the GAMM, i.e., on mobility,
legal migration and integration; irregular migration, border control and readmission;
international protection and human rights standards; and the migration-development
nexus in partner countries. Although a full quantitative analysis is not possible, the use of
some basic indicators allow some insight into the dynamics of the GAMM implementation.
2.1.1.1. Mobility, legal migration and integration
Despite being one of the four key dimensions of external cooperation in the field of
migration, legal migration and mobility have been subordinated in policy terms compared
to the control of irregular migration. The European Commission recognised this, stating in
its evaluation of GAMM that “more work needs to be done to make sure that the MPs are
being implemented in a balanced manner, i.e. better reflecting all four thematic priorities
of the GAMM, including more actions with regard to legal migration, human rights and
refugee protection”237.
In this sense, the external dimension of the EU visa policy is driven for the time being by
irregular immigration considerations, as shown by the fact that no VFA is concluded or
even negotiated until the conclusion of a readmission agreement is ensured. However,
enhancing mobility of bona fide travelers - and even promoting the safe arrival of asylum
seekers238 - are important objectives that should also be taken into account when
designing this external dimension239. Existing EU visa exemption agreements do not
cover persons travelling for remunerated activities240, which limits their potential for
facilitating economic mobility.
Regarding the impact of VLDs, one of the main outcomes observed in the Western Balkan
countries (Albania, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia) relates to the
steady increase of asylum applications, largely unfounded, from citizens of these
countries241. Research shows that the emphasis put by target EU partners on ending
abuses of the European asylum systems by their citizens have had the consequence of
curtailing the mobility rights of marginalised groups of citizens, in opposition to the
Commission’s objective of improving anti-discrimination and integration policies within
VLD. For instance, Macedonia has passed a new law providing for the suspension of the
right to travel for persons suspected of being potential failed asylum seekers, and
237 COM (2014) 96, p. 9.
238 See E. Guild et al, Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, EP Study,
PE 519.234, 2015, p. 21, where it is suggested that lifting visa requirements from countries producing high
numbers of asylum seekers could reduce the compulsion for their nationals to undertake dangerous journeys in
search of safety.
239 At national level, Member States are using their long-term visa policy as a channel to encourage legal
migration by implementing certain facilitating measures in third countries and/or with their cooperation. See
European Migration Network, Visa Policy as a Migration Channel, EMN Study, October 2012, p. 45 et seq.
240 Joint declarations annexed to these agreements however clarify that this category of persons refers to
employees and service providers but should not cover business persons travelling for business deliberation,
sports persons, artists, journalists or intra-corporate trainees
241 See section 2.1.1.4 on asylum and human rights protection.
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authorising border checks based on ethnic profiling242. On a more positive note, it seems
that visa-free travel is still mostly used by bona fide travelers from the Western Balkan
countries243, reducing their financial and time costs, and that visa liberalisation has
allowed EU partners to refocus their efforts on surveillance – up to then concentrated on
irregular border crossings - of other cross-border criminal activities, reducing local
demand for smugglers and facilitators’ services244. The Commission stated that visa-free
travel for Moldovan citizens, effective since April 2014, has been implemented
satisfactorily245.
Indicators concerning the impact of MPs on legal migration and mobility could possibly be
based on the number of visas granted to citizens from specific partner countries over
time, rates of visas granted in relation to applications, and number of first residence or
work permits granted. Figure 5 provides an overview of the evolution of the number of
first residence permits granted to citizens of MP partner countries before and after the
signature of the MP. Although these data might indicate a lack of impact or even a
negative impact of MPs on the number of first residence permits, with the exception of
Georgia for the first year after its adoption, the impact of the economic crisis after 2008
might explain much of the fall, for instance for Moldova. In any case, it appears that MPs
did not create new dynamics of legal migration from partner countries to the EU246.
Figure 5. Number of first residence permits issued by Member States to citizens
of MP partner countries
Source: Eurostat. Residence permits for more than 3 months, for all purposes.
Regarding the number of short-term visas granted the view is more nuanced. Some VFAs
have entered into force too recently to allow for a comprehensive assessment of impact.
Figure 6 shows an increase in the number of Schengen visas issued to Georgian citizens
after the signature of the VFA in 2011, and in particular in 2013. This trend continued in
2014, when it reached 80,986 visas issued according to Eurostat, almost 70% more than
in 2010. For Moldova, after the visa exemption in force since 2014, there was a clear
242 Trauner and Manigrassi, 2014, op. cit., p. 137.
243 Frontex Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2015, p. 6.
244 Frontex Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2012, p. 16-17.
245 COM (2015) 236, p. 13.
246 Data for 2014 are still not available in September 2015.
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drop in the number of visas issued247. However, Reslow concludes that there is
insufficient information available to draw conclusions on the impact of MPs and VFAs on
mobility248.
Figure 6: Number of Schengen visas issued by Member States in MP countries
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Source: Visa Statistics 2010-2014
The legal channels available to materialise EU cooperation regarding labour migration are
underdeveloped. This is particularly clear in the cases of recent MPs with Morocco,
Tunisia and Jordan. Of the four pillars of the GAMM, there has been less cooperation
under the first pillar on better organising legal migration and fostering well-managed
migration than in other areas249. A major obstacle comes from the fact that whereas the
EU is investing heavily in institutional capacity building for better labour migration
management in developing third countries, the credibility of those efforts is often
undermined by the limited legal migration opportunities offered by EU Member States
within MPs. The cases of international placement services of public employment services
in Morocco and Tunisia (ANAPEC and ANETI) largely developed with the support of EU
cooperation funds, illustrate this problem250. Furthermore, existing legal migration
avenues are often not operational due to lack of capacities in labour market analysis and
limited labour market information systems, lack of functional frameworks for fair and
ethical international recruitment, and challenges in recognition of qualifications. The
European Agenda on Migration, which has legal migration as one of its four main axes, is
a unique opportunity to set the framework to advance this first pillar of the GAMM, but
the envisaged measures do not seem to go in this direction so far. For countries with
which the EU has concluded or is negotiating free trade agreements, and in particular
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, such cooperation should also include some
degree or prospect of liberalisation of services provided through the temporary presence
of natural persons of a State party in the territory of other State party (“GATS Mode
247 Of close to 50.000 to slightly over 13.398. Visa Statistics Compilations, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm.
248 N. Reslow, “EU ‘Mobility” Partnerships’: An Initial Assessment of Implementation Dynamics”, Politics and
Governance Vol. 3.2, 2015.
249 See COM (2014) 96.
250 See Bensaid and Martín, 2015, op. cit., for Morocco, with references to three other evaluations of this
service, and I. Martín, Kriaa, M. and Demnati, M.A. (2015), Mesures de soutien aux migrants en matière
d’emploi et de compétences (MISMES): Tunisie, Fondation européenne pour la formation, 2015.
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4”)251. Although Member States have so far refused any concession in this field, the
liberalisation of services could also be an important incentive to offer to EU partners once
a visa-free regime has been granted, as a way of ensuring the continuity of the reforms
undertaken in that country within a VLD.
EU institutions have also repeatedly advocated that circular migration be included as an
objective in cooperation with third countries. MPs were meant to be the frameworks used
to achieve this objective, but up to now they have only encouraged national projects on
circular migration – sometimes rather on temporary migration252 - through EU funding,
leading to questioning whether no other EU intervention is possible in this field. The main
legislative measure related to this objective, the EU Blue Card Directive, does not
significantly promote circular migration253.
2.1.1.2. Irregular migration, border control and readmission
In this field the value of cooperation with third countries seems more obvious. Figure 7
shows a direct correlation between cooperation developments and the number of illegal
border crossings detected by Member States’ authorities. After the peak of irregular
crossings in the Western Mediterranean route in 2005-2006254, increased cooperation
with Morocco and enhanced border surveillance systems served to stabilise the numbers
of irregular border crossings detected under 8,000 per year. Nonetheless, migration
pressure slightly increased again in summer 2014 due to violent conflicts in countries
mainly from Western and Central Africa that have added to the economic causes of
migration in this region. Of course, strengthened control of borders may have diverted
irregular migration flows to other, more dangerous routes. As for the Central
Mediterranean route through Italy and Malta, the agreement between Italian and Libyan
authorities in 2009 was reflected in a significant drop of irregular border crossings
detected. There was another peak in the aftermath of the Tunisian Revolution in 2011,
when controls by Tunisian authorities collapsed for some months, and then again a much
more important increase in total numbers after the fall of the Libyan regime in late 2012.
In 2014, detections attained staggering levels, mainly affecting Italy.
251 Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services refers to the presence of persons of one member of
the World Trade Organization in the territory of another member for the purpose of providing a service. It does
not concern persons seeking access to the employment market in the host member, nor does it affect measures
regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis (see
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_persons_e.htm).
252 See section 1.3 of the present study.
253 See G. Papagianni, “Forging an External EU Migration Policy: From Externalisation of Border Management to
a Comprehensive Policy?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 15, 2013, p. 294 for criticism on the lack of
substantial follow-up measures on the circular migration concept.
254 Not featured in the graph, as Frontex data only reach back to 2007, and Member States’ data for former
years are fragmentary and not comparable.
EU cooperation with third countries in the field of migration
_______________________________________________________________________
77
Figure 7. Illegal border crossings detected in Western and Central
Mediterranean routes
Source: Frontex Risk Analysis reports
The Eastern Mediterranean route had the second largest number of detections of illegal
border crossings in 2014 in EU Member States (50,830), almost twice as many as in
2013. Because of the Syrian conflict, these migration flows are mixed, as in the Central
Mediterranean route. In the Eastern European land borders with Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, where significant resources were invested in
integrated border management operations between 2004 and 2011, in particular in
Ukraine and Moldova255, the numbers of illegal border crossings detected has remained
between 1,000 and 1,600 a year. Finally, the Western Balkans route witnessed
unprecedented numbers of illegal crossings in 2014, more than twice as many as in
2013.
In general terms, numbers of third-country nationals found illegally present in the EU
rose in 2014 or remained high during previous years with regard to certain countries
which are EU partners on migration cooperation, such as Morocco, Albania, Pakistan,
Ukraine, Nigeria, Serbia and Russia256. Figures from Moldova have declined.
Among the top ten nationalities of individuals subject to return decisions issued in 2014
are countries with which the EU has concluded EURAs such as Albania, Morocco, Pakistan
and Ukraine. These, Russia and Serbia are among the top ten of nationalities of people
effectively returned to third countries257. Problems lie in the fact that the nationality of
returned migrants does not necessarily correspond to the requested State of return in the
available data, and that it is not specified on the basis of which instrument these returns
took place (EURAs, bilateral readmission agreements, informal arrangements). Data on
the use of EURAs by Member States is incomplete258. It may be advisable to amend
Regulation 862/2007 on statistics on migration and international protection in order to
request Member States that statistics supplied to Eurostat on numbers of third-country
nationals returned to a third country include disaggregation by type of act allowing the
255 Between 2005 and 2014, the EU contribution to the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) amounted to
more than EUR 100 million.
256 Eurostat, “Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data, 2008-2014”.
257 Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2015.
258 Eurostat, Third-country nationals who have left the territory to a third country by type of agreement
procedure and citizenship, 2014.
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effective return259. Data should also be disaggregated not only with regard to the
citizenship of returnees, but also to the third country where the individual was returned.
Quantitative data on returns under EURAs can be indicators of the effectiveness of these
instruments, but a comprehensive evaluation of EURAs must include how they affect the
fundamental rights of migrants260. This has not been the case. Cassarino proposes, as
measurable indicators, that the Commission should include in a thorough evaluation
process ways in which rights to an effective remedy and fair treatment of asylum claims
have been addressed, the number and conditions of asylum seekers in detention centers,
numbers and types of complaints made against immigration officers, medical records, or
conditions after readmission in the third country261.
Return and reintegration support continues to be a major priority for EU development
funding in the field of migration. However, projects in this field often overlap in the same
country of origin - with several programmes by different donors operating at the same
time, occasionally even for the same countries of destination -, with different conditions
and assistance packages for different return and reintegration projects by the EU,
Member States or other international actors262. This creates substantial distortions.
Beyond this, sustainability of initiatives is questionable, and return and reintegration
programmes tend to promote the creation of parallel training, funding or business
creation tracks instead of reinforcing public schemes already at work at the national
level. Due to high operating costs and labour-intensity, the share of total funds which
actually reaches beneficiaries is typically relatively small263.
2.1.1.3. Migration and development
The Commission’s recent evaluation of EU-funded migration and development projects
found a gap between support provided to institutions and concrete positive outcomes for
the migrants themselves, i.e., the focus on capacity building and institutional
strengthening may ultimately not translate into direct benefits for migrants264. This is
confirmed by the low average numbers of beneficiaries and hence the low cost-efficiency
of migrant support measures analysed in a global inventory of such measures265.
Cooperation in this field is labour intensive, it often involves international staff, and unit
cost per beneficiary seems very high whenever data are available to calculate it.
Burdensome administrative procedures often increase the cost disproportionally.
As stated in the Commission’s evaluation, initiatives funded under the AENEAS and TPMA
programmes mainly explored three channels for maximising the role of migrants for the
development of countries of origin: the mobilisation of diaspora members with high
qualifications to serve for short term periods in the countries of origin; the creation of
small enterprises by diaspora members in these countries; and the use of remittances for
259 Through an amendment to article 7 or article 8.1.f) in relation to article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and
international protection (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 23). Disaggregation by type of return - voluntary or forced –
should also be included.
260 See Cassarino, 2010, op. cit., p. 46
261 Ibid.
262 In Armenia, for instance, in 2013 there were seven different return and reintegration projects ongoing:
Return Assistance in Armenia (Cooperation OFII-BAMF) – RACOB; Post-arrival assistance to Armenian returnees
from the Netherlands, Return to Sources, Returnees from Europe; Sustainable Reintegration after Voluntary
Return, Migration and Development 2 and Strengthening Armenia’s migration management capacities,, with
special focus on reintegration activities in the framework of the EU-Armenia, see S. Kalantaryan, Migrant
Support Measures from an Employment and Skills Perspective (MISMES). Armenia, ETF, 2015.
263 Often under 50%. See Martin, Kriaa and Demnati, 2015, op. cit.
264 E. Picard and R. Greco Tonegutti, Technical Assistance for study on concrete results obtained through
projects on Migration and Development financed under AENEAS and the Thematic Programme for Migration and
Asylum. Final Report, 2014.
265 See Martín and Makaryan, 2015, op. cit.
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local development. The first proved to be effective only when countries of origin showed
the capacity to link up with their diasporas in a positive and attractive manner, through
considerable efforts of communication and a high level of coordination among national
institutions. The involvement of national and local authorities and institutions should
therefore be sought as a priority in diaspora interventions. The second channel, the
creation of small enterprises by migrants or their families in countries of origin, seems to
have led to only a limited number of such businesses with sound prospects for
sustainability (the same happens with businesses created in the framework of return and
reintegration programmes, the worst performer among different categories of
interventions). The evaluation concluded that the sub-topic of remittances has been the
most successful area for external cooperation in this field, and return and reintegration
the least successful.
Simultaneously, from the analysis of the profile of EU-funded projects in this field, it
emerges that there are very few projects to mitigate the impact of brain drain. In this
context, while the Blue Card Directive only contains optional provisions to ensure ethical
recruitment and although it has foreseen the possibility to use EU and Member States’
external action for that purpose266, these clauses should be combined with compulsory
conditions or an EU code of conduct on ethical recruitment binding on all Member
States267. Also very limited projects are in place for the development of skills and
qualifications in relation to employment. This is increasingly relevant given the growing
emphasis by some Member States on attracting highly-skilled migrants, replicated at EU
level through the different instruments to facilitate legal labour migration, including the
Blue Card Directive268.
The relatively small size of actions and the large number of actors involved in the
migration and development field - civil society organisations and migrant’s associations
play an important role in implementing many projects - has led to a multiplicity of
initiatives. This allows for a great variety of actions and a high social visibility of EU
cooperation, but entails an excessive dispersion of impact, often without mutual learning
mechanisms. The recent mapping of migration and development initiatives undertaken in
Morocco in the framework of the Sharaka project demonstrates this problem269. The
recommendation to set up a repository for main outputs of migration and development
projects is particularly relevant in this context, as in relation to training materials. On the
other hand, evaluators noted that project management was sometimes handled by
expatriate managers, at a much higher cost, even where local experts would have been
able to undertake the required tasks. This is clearly a general problem in EU development
cooperation practice.
An interesting aspect specifically of MPs is the extent to which their signature leads to an
increase in the number and size of projects, i.e., in the resources mobilised for
cooperation regarding migration, and in particular migration and development projects.
These projects are listed in the Annexes to the Joint Declarations indicating their budget,
funding entity, objectives and implementation period in the corresponding Scoreboards.
However MP Annexes and Scoreboards contain different types of initiatives, many of
which pre-date the MPs or were in progress and subsequently “aligned” to the MP’s
objectives. So whereas the process of developing and updating the Annexes or
Scoreboards is useful in terms of policy and cooperation coherence, it does not convey an
accurate view of the added value of MPs in terms of cooperation. In any case, there
266 See art. 8.4 and 3.3 of Directive 2009/50.
267 Devisscher, 2011, op. cit., p. 70.
268 Martín et al, Exploring New Avenues for Legislation for Labour Migration to the European Union, op. cit.
269 See Morocco’s case study in Annex I of this study.
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seems to be an evolving pattern: whereas in the case of Moldova the signature of the MP
brought about a proliferation of projects in this field and a substantial increase of funds
allocated, and in Georgia a similar process was observed, in subsequent MPs the
additional funding has been more limited, and consisting largely of the new flagship
initiatives funded by the EU to support the implementation of MPs, and in some cases
other new EU-funded projects270. Member States, in contrast, have been less active in
funding projects to achieve the objectives of the MPs.
Finally, a continuous trend in EU external cooperation in the field of migration related to
the links between migration and development brings into question the ultimate objective
of a substantial part of this cooperation. Some Member States have been demanding EU
development cooperation in the field of migration and asylum, which has according to its
legal basis the main objective of promoting the development of third countries, to be
reoriented to contribute to the achievement of the EU migration policy. The Policy
Coherence for Development 2015 EU Report271 recently expressed that:
Integration of foreign policy aspects into the EU migration policy and ensuring
linkages between internal and external dimensions is vital. Home Affairs issues
need to be embedded in the EU’s overall external relations, including development
cooperation, in view of facilitating reinforced dialogues and cooperation with third
countries. In this vein, cooperation and coordination among the various
stakeholders should be stepped up. This aims to mobilise a variety of tools to
promote readmission and return process of irregular migrants in line with EU
standards on fundamental rights. At the request of the European Council, the
Commission is considering how to strengthen an incentive based approach in
external cooperation on migration with strategic partners in the EU neighbourhood
and beyond. EU development assistance to partner countries is, in essence, not
conditional on cooperation on migration matters. Still, recent developments,
notably in the Mediterranean, have highlighted the crucial importance of
encouraging cooperation with partner countries on irregular migration. Efforts are
being made to strengthen measures at Member State level to ensure that the use
of conditionality in the migration dialogue does not negatively impact development
cooperation.
This confusion of development assistance objectives and migration policy or home affairs
objectives, including for instance readmission and return of irregular migrants, and the
eventual subordination of the former to the latter through some form of conditionality is
a major challenge for EU external cooperation on migration, and more generally for
future EU development cooperation.
2.1.1.4. Asylum and human rights protection
This is another area that, according to the Commission evaluation of the GAMM, has been
relatively neglected in recent years, although this might be changing, in relation to
asylum, in the wake of the ongoing crisis in the Mediterranean. EU efforts aimed at
ensuring asylum and human rights protection in third countries have had only very
limited measurable impact. Despite a principled approach to human rights as guiding
criteria for development cooperation (see article 208 TFEU), the reality on the ground
does not always promote the respect of human rights of migrants.
270 See Morocco’s case study in Annex I of this study.
271 European Commission, Staff Working Document, “Policy Coherence for Development 2015 EU Report”,
SWD(2015)159, 3.8.2015.
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In 2009, an external evaluation requested by the European Commission assessed pilot
RPPs in Eastern Europe and African Great Lakes Region, comprising 12 projects funded
for an aggregate value of EUR 17.1 million272. Despite delays in implementation and lack
of coordination, those first RPPs evidence good progress in assuring local protection of
refugees, but success was elusive in terms of their local integration. Training and
capacity building of national authorities had positive effects, but projects were not able to
kick-start coordination of EU refugee, humanitarian and development policies within the
framework of RPPs (the problem of compartmentalisation of cooperation). Limited
flexibility regarding changing situations on the ground was another major issue identified
by the evaluators. Difficulties in trying to measure outcomes and impacts of RPPs were
highlighted, as well as weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation process. In any
case, since the EU has continued to launch RPPs in the Horn of Africa and North Africa
and more recently RDPPs273, it is clear that those first pilot programmes served their
main purpose of testing new intervention frameworks and improving EU cooperation.
In particular, UNHCR reported that the RPP in Tanzania made noticeable progress in
increasing the capacity of the national asylum system274. Activities undertaken included
training police officers in areas hosting refugees; radio campaigns to spread information
about the possibility for Burundian refugees to repatriate; establishing information
technology services to register those who preferred to apply for Tanzanian citizenship;
identifying and processing resettlement candidates; and early-stage activities to help
develop a civil society network275. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, specifically Belarus,
Moldova and Ukraine, the RPP focused mainly on adding support to activities already
being undertaken by UNHCR. Efforts aimed at capacity building and at raising public
awareness and acceptance of the presence of refugees were beneficial, according to
UNHCR, but hampered somewhat by turnover among the staff assigned by the partner
governments276. UNHCR reported some improvements in access to asylum procedures
through better awareness on the part of officials, and through a higher quality asylum
procedure277.
Reflecting the large and protracted nature of the refugee situation in the region, the RPP
established in 2011 in the Horn of Africa placed a significant focus on improving security
and living conditions for refugees in camps, and on enabling registration to refugees in
urban and border areas. Building on previous EU-funded projects, the RPP has shown
“qualitative results in the overall protection environment and relationships with
stakeholders”, and demonstrates “that RPPs should be complementary instead of stand
alone programmes that can promote durable solutions”278. In North Africa, the RPP began
also in 2011 and, during periods when conditions were stable enough, engaged in
training, awareness raising, facilitating fair RSD and voluntary return, and basic support
in particular for trafficking victims. One important development of this RPP is its dialogue
with a regional organisation, the League of Arab States, in addition to the interactions
with national partners. The RDPP for the Middle East that began in July 2014 shows
promise in its aims to add to the protection-specific activities of the other RPPs
components of advocacy and dissemination of results to aid policy development, and of
272 GHK, 2009, op. cit.
273 See Section 1.1.1.3, including a global review of main weaknesses of existing RPPs.
274 M. Garlick, “EU Regional Protection Programmes: Development and Prospects”, in M. Maes, M.C. Foblets, P.
De Bruycker (eds.), External Dimensions of EU Migration and Asylum Law and Policy, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011,
p. 380.
275 Papadopoulou, 2015, op. cit., p. 11.
276 Garlick, 2011, op. cit., pp. 382-383.
277 Papadopoulou, 2015, op. cit., p. 10.
278 Ibid., p. 13.
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significant socioeconomic development aid to enhance the prospects for self-support
through education, business development and employment279.
In all RPPs and RDPPs to date, the resettlement component has been well executed, but
remains remarkably small compared to the size of the need. On 8 June 2015 the
European Commission adopted a Recommendation calling for a European pledge of
20,000 resettlement places, mostly for refugees coming from RPP partner countries280.
UNHCR projected a total global resettlement need for 2016 of over 1,150,000 places281.
The EU pledge, if fully taken up by the Member States, would alleviate slightly less than
1.75% of this need. In this regard, at the JHA Council of 20 July 2015, the
representatives of Member States’ Governments agreed on resettling 22,504 people in
clear need of international protection and the distribution among them, to be
implemented through multilateral and national schemes, giving priority to regions such
as North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, where RDPPs are being
implemented282. Arguably, one result of this lack of a significant resettlement component
may be to lead partner states to see RPPs as “mere containment tools”283. Finally,
recommendations to effectively cooperate with third countries in resettlement activities
do not have been acted upon yet284 but should lead to a Commission proposal in March
2016 under the European Agenda on Migration285. RDPPs and especially their
resettlement component should be designed and implemented taking into consideration
the necessities and capacities of the targeted third countries286.
As regards the impact of other GAMM instruments on human rights protection, it seems
problematic that asylum applications and positive asylum decisions in EU Member States
rise with regard to nationals of countries that have concluded EURAs287. Although
national return decisions must respect the non-refoulement principle and that therefore
EURAs per se do not violate human rights obligations in this regard and may be effective
with regard to unfounded asylum applications, one could question the reliability of these
partners for the treatment of returnees if they simultaneously constitute countries of
origin of refugees288. As already highlighted, mechanisms of monitoring persons
concerned in effective readmission to those countries and their subsequent fate should
be put in place.
Border control arrangements with third countries must also take due account of their
impact on people in need of international protection, as usually Frontex and Member
States’ arrangements on border control entail the surveillance of the partner’s territory,
279 Ibid., pp. 13-15. Some limited information on actions and projects developed under the RPPs in North Africa
and the Horn of Africa, as well as on assistance to the Syrian refugee crisis can be found in SWD (2014) 173,
22.05.2014.
280 C (2015) 3560.
281 UNHCR, UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2015, 1.7.2015, p. 12.
282 Conclusions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on
resettling through multilateral and national schemes 20 000 persons in clear need of international protection,
JHA Council, 20.7.2015. Council conclusions on safe countries of origin were adopted to at this meeting, by
which priority to assess the safety of the Western Balkan countries was agreed.
283 De Bruycker and Tsourdi, forthcoming, op. cit., p. 31.
284 As suggested in De Bruycker et al., 2010, op. cit., p. 410, multilateral dialogues should be initiated with
third countries hosting large numbers of refugees in order to facilitate cooperation and fostering commonality of
objectives and practices. Some form of tripartite agreements between EU Member States, UNHCR and third
countries of first asylum could be envisaged. See in this sense European Parliament, Resolution of 10
September 2015 on migration and refugees in Europe, P8_TA-PROV(2015)0317, point 18.
285 COM (2015) 240, p. 18.
286 Guild and Moreno Lax, 2013, op. cit., p. 25.
287 Eurostat, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship” and ”Final decisions of applications by
citizenship”, 2008-2014.
288 On the links between readmission agreements and human rights, see, among others, Coleman, 2009, op.
cit.; M. Giuffré, “Readmission agreements and refugee rights: from a critique to a proposal”, Refugee Survey
Quarterly, 2013, 32, pp. 79-111.
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hindering the exit of asylum seekers, in addition to other controversial effects on the
human rights of migrants as a consequence of interdictions at sea289. Moreover, it should
be borne in mind that Frontex has subscribed WAs with countries which represent priority
countries of nationality of asylum applications in the EU, such as Serbia, Russia, Nigeria
and Albania290.
Regarding the impact of past VLDs with the Western Balkan countries (Albania, FYROM,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia), the significant increase of asylum applications,
mostly unfounded, from these countries is noteworthy. Although diverse factors might of
course be at its source, this trend is noticeable since the entry into force of the visa-free
regime in 2010. In 2014 asylum applications from the Western Balkan countries
continued to rise - 47% more than in 2013, representing 97% of asylum applications in
the EU from visa-exempted nationalities. Belgium has volunteered within SCIFA to
monitor the effects of visa free regimes, particularly indicating that the information
campaigns targeting the Western Balkans have been successful in reducing the inflow of
asylum seekers with unfounded applications in Belgium291. As indicated in the Moldovan
case study, no serious abuses have been recorded since the entry into force of the visa-
free regime with this country, and the numbers of asylum applications filed by Moldovan
citizens in the EU remain low292.
2.1.2. Functional dimension
The EU external action on migration is being developed, as has been shown, through an
assorted set of instruments of different nature. EURAs, VFAs and VWAs, as well as AA
and PCA containing migration clauses, are international treaties, agreements with legally-
binding force for the respective Parties. In contrast, MPs and CAMMs have been
formalised through the signature of joint political declarations with third countries, while
regional and bilateral migration dialogues share with the former also their political
nature, having being adopted through terms of references among the participants or
simple political declarations, statements or conclusions. Financial development
cooperation in the field of migration and asylum is also channelled through a multiplicity
of funds and assistance instruments.
The nature and the mix of all these instruments has certain implications in relation to
their impact and effectiveness. The following analysis of the respective features of each
category of instruments aims to assess their advantages, disadvantages and
consequences for the attainment of the GAMM’s objectives.
2.1.2.1. Legal instruments
The recourse to the negotiation, signature and ratification of international agreements for
the establishment of cooperation on migration issues certainly provides predictability and
legal certainty regarding the content and scope of the commitments undertaken by their
Parties. As sources of international law, conventions enable the EU and third countries to
invoke international responsibility in case of infractions to these agreements. Particularly
within the EU, this entitles the CJEU to assess the compatibility with EU primary law of
Council decisions authorising their conclusion and to declare infringements by Member
289 See, among others, M. Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012.
290 Eurostat, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship 2008-2014”.
291 SWD (2014) 165, p. 42.
292 See Annex I on the present study on the case study on Moldova.
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States if appropriate, although the Commission has not to date formally started any
infringement procedure related to the external dimension of migration293.
The possibility for the EU to enter into international agreements in these fields is clearly
established, as the extent and scope of EU external competences in the field of migration
is wide294. Nonetheless, the recourse to legally binding instruments by the EU evidently
entails more cumbersome procedures for their adoption, complexity which is aggravated
in fields where the current distribution of competences would require the conclusion of
mixed agreements. The lengthy procedures required for formal agreements may not
provide sufficient flexibility to be effective in this domain of external relations.
However, the limitations caused by formal instruments are offset by their advantages, as
international agreements seem to be the appropriate instrument to regulate certain
matters related to enforceable rights of migrants such as social security entitlements,
recruitment of foreign workers and their rights, facilitation or exemptions on the issuance
of visas, or guarantees and safeguards applicable to returned or intercepted migrants.
Hard law is needed to enforce individual rights and ensure legal certainty on the accepted
engagements. Additionally, the conclusion of international agreements enhances
democratic legitimacy of the development of this external dimension, since the approval
of European Parliament is required according to art. 218.6.a) v) TFEU.
2.1.2.2. Political instruments
Recent years have seen a clear trend towards an increasing recourse to political
instruments, deprived of legally binding force, for the development of EU external action
on migration, mirroring a previous similar evolution at national level. The main
advantages of this trend relate to the adaptation of informal or political instruments to
flexibly respond to changing circumstances, allowing for readjusting and renegotiating
the terms of an agreement295. This flexibility also permits the updating of engagements
of the partners without repeating lengthy negotiation and ratification procedures, as in
the case of MPs and contrary to the amendments of the VFAs with Moldova, Ukraine and
Russia.
According to several stakeholders, another positive aspect of political instruments, such
as regional and bilateral migration dialogues, is that they increase exchange of best
practices and mutual knowledge of participants, serving as a forum to initiate discussions
on sensitive issues that the partners will not probably undertake in formal negotiations,
also engendering new projects and further agreements and helping to mobilise additional
funding for the development of practical actions. The risk is however that these dialogues
focus on sterile discussions, or on simply selecting topics for next meetings, which can be
especially problematic when officials sent as representatives of the participating countries
are not always empowered to assume commitments.
An additional advantage of this kind of instruments is that migration management and
cooperation with countries of destination is still controversial for countries of origin and
transit, especially for their public opinions, thus explaining why political instruments are
sometimes also preferred by third countries’ authorities, instead of legally binding
instruments that must receive publicity and parliamentary ratification. In particular, a low
level of public visibility is positive for countries where readmission is unpopular, giving a
293 With the only exception of the opening of an infringement procedure against Germany because of the
signature of an ADS bilateral agreement with China in 2002, contrary to the EU exclusive competence on short-
term visas.
294 See introductory section supra.
295 J.-P. Cassarino, “Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood”, International Spectator,
vol, 42 (2), June 2007, p. 187 and 189.
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negative image of them as dominated by European powers296. For the EU and its Member
States, the operability of forms of migration cooperation is consequently prioritised over
their formalisation.
The EU considers the fact that MPs are adopted through political declarations to be a
positive aspect, entailing flexibility with regard to the voluntary participation of Member
States in these partnerships. This might increase, according to the EU, the involvement
in implementation of willing Member States in countries where they have particular
interests and expertise297, while allowing others which do not agree with MPs objectives
not to take part.
Also soft law is considered to be the price to be paid in order to have “some Europe” in
the external dimension of legal migration. Only by proposing political instruments such as
MPs has it been possible to diminish Member States’ reluctance to address legal
migration issues within EU cooperation with third countries298. This approach has
however not yet yielded significant progress, while at the same time diminishing any
motivation to pursue a common approach to legal migration in relations with third
countries299.
In the Commission’s view, this is also the Achilles heel of this approach, as it makes
more difficult to secure a balanced and complete EU offer to third countries300. Indeed,
the degree of discretion and margin of appreciation left to Member States’ governments
is considered too large to ensure a coordinated effort at EU level301. Moreover, the
reduced engagement of Member States in the development and financing of certain
political instruments such as MPs is a consequence of their flexibility and non-binding
nature302.
In addition to this, the shortcomings of political declarations and informal agreements
increasingly used by the EU and its Member States are manifold. First, informal
agreements and political declarations lack democratic legitimacy and judicial control303,
preventing the mandatory participation of the European or national parliaments and a
possible intervention of the CJEU and national courts on the interpretation, control of
compliance and conformity of their content with other legal obligations, as well as
avoiding the enforcement of the right to an effective remedy in case of undesirable or
damaging effects of a specific instrument. Specifically in relation to the limited
parliamentary involvement in political instruments, one could consider that the material
scope of non-normative agreements has no limitations, their basis being the attribution
of the direction of external policy to the executive power. At EU level, the TEU arguably
confers this task upon the Council, in particular to the FAC304. Consequently, if political
instruments should match with political controls, instruments such as MPs, which are not
subject to the right to information and intervention of the European Parliament enshrined
in article 218 TFEU for international agreements, should not however escape from the
prerogatives of political monitoring of this institution.
296 Ibid., p. 189.
297 COM (2014) 96, p. 20.
298 “The Global Approach should contribute to this effort through considering non-binding measures aimed at
better organising legal migration in cooperation with third countries taking into account the priorities, needs
and capacities of each Member State.”, Council Conclusions on the GAMM, May 2012, point 10 (emphasis
added).
299 R. Parkes, “EU Mobility Partnerships: A Model of Policy Coordination?”, European Journal of Migration and
Law, 2009/11, p. 329.
300 COM (2014) 96, p. 20.
301 Carrera and Hernández I Sagrera, 2009, op. cit., p. 30.
302 COM (2014) 96, p. 20.
303 Carrera and Hernández I Sagrera, 2009, op. cit.
304 Article 16.6, last indent, TEU.
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Secondly, being informal, political instruments usually lack publicity, as with the informal
arrangements on readmission and border cooperation subscribed by EU Member States
with third countries. Most informal agreements linked to readmission in the form of MoUs
or exchanges of letters subscribed by Member States are with countries in the South and
East Mediterranean and Africa, while most formal readmission agreements have been
concluded with Eastern European countries and the Western Balkans305. If these
arrangements are not recorded in official bulletins or other formal documents, difficulties
arise in detecting them, aggravated if a fluent exchange of information is not taking place
between Member States and the EU. The lack of publicity does not affect however every
political instrument, since joint declarations establishing a MP or a CAMM are published.
Even in these cases, however, there is still some degree of obscurity regarding
implementing tools such as the MP scoreboards.
Finally and most importantly, the lack of publicity usually characteristic of political
instruments and informal arrangements casts doubts on the ways to ensure compliance
of their implementation with international and European human rights law306. Illustrating
examples are the readmission cooperation between Italy and Libya or the criticism
directed towards EURAs and Frontex cooperation with third countries.
For all these reasons, political instruments should be primarily used as means to favour
and to enter into legally-binding instruments, restricting their use to govern only specific
migration issues and not the kinds of matters that need to be regulated in hard law
instruments. It must be noted however that the fact that a formal agreement is
concluded does not imply that hard law is always present with regard to all the
commitments included therein, entailing the appearance of material soft law. This is the
case of readmission and migration management cooperation clauses inserted in several
AAs and PCAs signed by the EU, as well as Spanish and French bilateral migration
cooperation agreements, containing clauses related to the rights of migrants which are
usually drafted in rather vague terms307.
2.1.2.3. Operational perspective
The operational perspective refers to the effects and consequences of funds, areas of
intervention and types of projects and working arrangements to implement them. A first
issue concerns the lack of balance between the components of the GAMM: despite
political commitment to a balanced approach, the implementation of EU cooperation in
the field of migration and asylum is biased in favour of the control of irregular migration,
including integrated border management programmes, and return and reintegration,
even if there is a positive evolution in this regard in favour of labour migration, migration
and development and asylum and international protection interventions.
A second major issue is the dispersion of funds and funding instruments, which translates
into a lack of visibility for partner countries and implementers; a frequent lack of
coordination and coherence between interventions in the same area; and overlapping
and duplications of efforts and resources. The multiplicity of geographical and thematic
funds and programmes (see section 1.2) also introduces arbitrariness in the choice of
projects to be funded, and undermines a coherent approach to funds distribution in this
field among different goals and areas, as well as the overall amount of resources devoted
to migration in the framework of EU external cooperation.
The large share of resources in this area devoted to capacity building and training of
authorities in partner countries addresses what all actors identify as the crucial issue in
305 Cassarino, 2007, op. cit., p. 187.
306 Ibid., p. 193.
307 See García Andrade, 2012, op. cit.
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improving migration management and optimising the development impact of migration.
But it poses major problems of relevance and added value (to the extent that
international cooperation substitutes for the action of partner States), sustainability
(after international funds are exhausted) and effectiveness. Significant resources are
spent on training actions, often without prior analysis of real training needs (of
institutions, but also of individuals who will benefit from the training activities, since the
same officers often receive similar trainings in different contexts over the years). New
training packages and tools are often developed in the framework of each project without
building on formerly developed ones in the same areas. A more thorough evaluation of
capacity building and training actions should be undertaken, since so far there is no
established set of good practices to build on in this field.
In terms of implementation, EU Delegations often lack the specialised staff required to
program, implement and monitor those projects. The recent changes in status as a
consequence of the creation of the EEAS has added to the confusion in this respect.
Additionally, the programming process is often very slow, greatly limiting the capacity to
respond to new developments or contextual changes, and administrative procedures for
the selection of service providers, project funding and implementation are often too
burdensome to be effective. Combined, these issues lead to a very limited flexibility of EU
action. This aspect might improve in relation to future projects in Africa with the
implementation of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, but operational procedures are
yet to be defined. Regional programmes in particular are implemented by specific EU
delegations, so they tend to be “split” between involved delegations and separate
national actions, to a certain extent losing their regional dimension.
Linked to this institutional capacities issue and to the fragmentation and multiplicity of
funds and programmes, EU external cooperation in the field of migration and asylum
features a high degree of compartmentalisation, with recurrent problems of coordination,
alignment and integration across projects or actions pursuing complementary or even
similar objectives.
In this context, the growing involvement of Member States’ institutions in the
implementation of projects as service providers, for instance, in the implementation of
RDPPs and targeted initiatives or projects to support the implementation of MPs308, is
challenging. Whereas peer-to-peer support no doubt constitutes an effective way to build
institutional capacity in partner countries, and Member States are best placed to provide
it, the direct engagement of public institutions from Member States in project
implementation in the area of migration risks politicising the selection of service
providers, making accountability more difficult and letting Member States political
priorities and objectives interfere with the implementation of EU-funded projects in
migration and asylum, probably to the detriment of development-related objectives. This
risk also applies to the implementation of the external actions in the framework of AMIF,
which should be included in Member States’ National Action Plans, and hence may even
fund human resources in Member States. However, this is less serious than in the case of
the development cooperation fund, given that AMIF’s main objective is precisely to
contribute to a common asylum and immigration policy.
Finally, information on project implementation should be more systematically compiled
and disseminated, as often it is public but not actually published beyond the action fiche.
Mandatory evaluations should not focus only on outputs and outcomes, but also on
308 For example, the Targeted initiative in Georgia was implemented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Czech Republic, in Moldova by the Swedish Public Employment Service, in Armenia by the OFII and GIZ and in
Morocco by France Expertise International.
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impact in relation with the strategic objectives of each project, and more resources
should be invested in follow-up and evaluation of impact after the finalisation of projects.
Standard performance indicators of projects and instruments would greatly facilitate
making comparisons across regions and types of projects.
2.1.3. Institutional dimension
2.1.3.1. EU - Member States coordination
As highlighted above, the current distribution of competences in the EU immigration and
asylum policies requires strengthened coordination efforts between the Union and its
Member States for developing and implementing the GAMM. The point of departure for
ensuring that the EU and its Member States coordinate their external actions on
migration is the need to count on adequate means to exchange information on
agreements concluded, projects and actions carried out at Member States’ level. At
present, however, the Commission lacks information regarding what Member States’
governments are doing on a bilateral level, as no systematic exchange of national
practices of cooperation with third countries seems to be occurring within EU structures.
Institutional mechanisms are nevertheless in place, as well as legal obligations in force
for this purpose. Indeed, one of the functions to be fulfilled by the HLWG on Asylum and
Migration was to serve as a working structure where Member States should inform about
their own external action on migration and exchange experiences and practices with each
other and with the Commission309. However, there does not seem to be an orderly
exchange of bilateral practices within the HLWG, but rather an ad hoc process of
presenting and discussing some national projects.
As a development of the loyal cooperation principle, the obligation to exchange
information on migration issues is specifically enshrined in Council Decision 2006/688
establishing a mechanism of mutual information on national measures that Member
States intend to take or have recently taken in the areas of immigration and asylum,
provided that these measures are publicly available and likely to have a significant
impact on several Member States or on the EU as a whole310. In the evaluation of this
mechanism undertaken in 2009, the Commission acknowledged that its functioning in
practice had not met expectations311. It was therefore decided that the information
communicated by Member States would be provided in the following years in the
Commission’s report on the tracking method for monitoring the implementation of the
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum312. Since then, general information on
national measures, including bilateral agreements with third countries, has been included
in working documents accompanying the annual reports on immigration and asylum313.
This does not necessarily mean that an exchange of views and debates on their external
309 See “Modification of the terms of reference of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration
(HLWG)”, Council doc. 9433/02, 30.5.2002, point 9.
310 Article 1 of Council Decision (EC) 2006/688 of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual information
mechanism concerning Member States' measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, OJ L 283,
14.10.2006.
311 Since April 2007 until September 2009, only 45 national measures were communicated through this
mechanism, while 11 Member States have not provided any information at all. At the evaluation, no
international agreement or external cooperation measure was identified. See European Commission, Report
pursuant to Article 4 and Article 5 of the Council Decision of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual
information mechanism concerning Member States' measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, COM
(2009) 687, 17.12.2009.
312 Ibid. See European Commission, Communication on the “Tracking method for monitoring the implementation
of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”, COM (2009) 266, 10.6.2009.
313 1st report COM (2010) 214; 2nd report COM (2011) 291; 3rd report COM (2012) 250; 4th report COM (2013)
422; 5th report COM (2014) 288. See the Commission Staff Working Documents accompanying the annual
reports for specific references to national actions, e.g. SWD (2014) 165, 22.5.2014. Surprisingly, the report on
the implementation of the GAMM does not include references to Member States’ external action on migration.
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action take place among Member States and with the Commission. For this reason, an
amendment to Council Decision 2006/688 should be undertaken in order to include an
explicit obligation to exchange information on projected bilateral agreements,
arrangements and projects that Member States plan to set with third countries, to hold a
debate on these measures and to internally coordinate before their adoption. If the
current mechanism is not considered appropriate, a new legally binding norm should be
adopted in order to clearly set specific obligations on Member States with regard to
concluded and projected bilateral agreements or arrangements with third countries in
this field314.
A similar lack of information and coordination is present in the relationship between
Member States and EU agencies, mainly Frontex. As the Agency’s regulation permits
cooperation with third countries outside the Frontex umbrella provided that it
complements the action of the Agency315, Regulation 2007/2004 requires Member States
to report to the Agency on the operational cooperation they develop at the external
borders outside the framework of Frontex316. However, a fluent exchange of information
does not seem to be the rule particularly as regards border management operational
cooperation with third countries at national level.
Readmission negotiations, cooperation within mobility partnerships or national projects
receiving EU funding are examples of specific matters in which a certain lack of
coordination is felt.
First, regarding readmission, the Return Migration and Development Platform (RDP) of
the European University Institute reveals how Member States do not always respect the
loyal cooperation principle which is at the basis of the “mandate theory”317. For instance,
while the Commission received the mandate to negotiate an EURA with Russia in
September 2000, Greece signed a police cooperation agreement linked to readmission
with the same country in May 2004, as did Italy in January 2006, four months before the
signature of the EURA with Russia. Similarly, France, the United Kingdom and Italy
signed bilateral readmission agreements or memoranda linked to readmission with
Algeria in 2003, 2006 and 2009, respectively, after the mandate to negotiate a EURA had
been adopted in November 2002 with the same country318. Apart from the fact that the
sincere cooperation principle enshrined in article 4.3 TEU has been infringed by these
Member States without legal consequences, these examples serve to highlight the need
to prevent EU negotiations on readmission from being impaired by Member States’
parallel negotiations.
Another case of limited coordination between the Union and its Member States concerns
the design and implementation of MPs with third countries. Overlap is visible between
projects or initiatives offered by individual Member States and the EU or an EU agency.
For instance, within the MP with Cape Verde, Portugal, Spain, France and Frontex each
offer projects on border managements with similar purposes. The MP with Morocco offers
a clear illustration of overlapping efforts with regard to information campaigns and
training courses on legal migration (IT, BE, ES); capacity building for employment
314 With regard more specifically to readmission, Cassarino recommended to the European Parliament to
request the Commission to carry out a thorough and regularly updated inventory of all bilateral agreements
linked to readmission concluded by each Member State. Cassarino, 2010, op. cit., p. 18.
315 Article 2.2, first para. of Frontex Regulation.
316 Article 2.2, last para. of Frontex Regulation.
317 This information is available at the Inventory of the agreements linked to readmission, prepared by the RDP
of the EUI at http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/analyses/ra/ (last access on 17.8.2015).
318 Note that, although United Kingdom enjoys an opt-out situation within the EU immigration and asylum
policies, the British government had opted-in to the mandate to negotiate a EURA with Algeria. See Council doc.
no. 14835/1/02, 26.5.2008.
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agencies (EU, SE); training measures on border management, prevention and fight
against smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, and document security
(FR, PT, NL, Frontex) or capacity building on international protection (NL, DE, PT, EU,
EASO). Although each project may bring added value to migration cooperation between
the partner and individual Member States, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that
MPs are EU instruments, receiving EU funding for their implementation, so that projects
and activities contained therein should have an EU or at least a multilateral scope.
In some MPs, certain Member States offer projects which were already being
implemented at the bilateral level. This is well exemplified again in the MP with Cape
Verde within which France and Spain included proposals of cooperation that were being
negotiated or already in place with the Cape Verdean authorities319. The French case is
even more questionable, as its bilateral migration cooperation agreement with Cape
Verde was negotiated in parallel with the discussions on the EU MP, in which France
participated, which could be against the loyal cooperation principle in the EU external
relations. The MP with Morocco also evidences the limited added value of MPs as
currently devised, since an important part of the initiatives included in this instrument
were already in progress as of March 2013320.
These shortcomings related to MPs could be solved by requiring Member States to
exclusively include new proposals and initiatives, and, more importantly, by making EU
funding available only to multilateral projects involving several Member States under a
MP, therefore adding a real value to this EU instrument.
A need for increased coordination is also noticeable concerning funding of the EU and
Member States’ external dimension of immigration and asylum policies. In particular,
criticism may be addressed towards the increasing recourse to a shared management
system in the external dimension of AMIF and ISF. According to the Commission, the
distribution of competences on immigration and asylum necessitated giving more
responsibility to Member States to decide on the implementation of EU funds. However, it
is surprising to have this system by which Member States get more funding for bilateral
external action at a moment when the Union has more and more competences in this
area. Another challenge is of course to ensure complementarities on financing, as the EU
provides funds for the implementation of the GAMM by Member States, but it might not
be aware of which funds national authorities are themselves devoting to the
implementation of the GAMM.
From the interviews carried out during this study, it emerges, as has been pointed out
before, that Member States are willing to be involved in every activity of EU external
action on migration. However, they do not always participate later on or do not ensure a
continuous involvement in those EU activities, nor in regional and bilateral migration
dialogues or in the implementation meetings of MPs. A possible way to address the weak
participation of Member States, usually due to lack of financial and human resources to
cover all fora especially regarding regional and bilateral migration dialogues, could be to
simplify the external representation of the EU and its Member States. This could be done
by having the Commission as one single representative of both the EU and its Member
States. According to article 17 TEU, the Commission ensures, with the exception of CFSP,
319 In particular, the Agreement between France and Cape Verde on concerted management of migration flows
and solidary development which was to be signed in Paris on 24.11.2008 (JORF no. 90, 16.4.2011, p. 6680) as
regards the French proposals on economic admission of migrants and a co-development programme, and the
Agreement between Spain and Cape Verde on joint surveillance of maritime zones under sovereignty and
jurisdiction of Cape Verde, done in Praia on 21.02.2008 (BOE no. 136, 5.6.2009, p. 47545), as regards the
Spanish proposal on sea patrols and surveillance operations.
320 MP with Morocco, Council doc. 6139/13, 3.6.2013, pp. 33-45
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the Union’s external representation. Since this only grants the Commission the external
representation of the Union itself in its fields of competence, not of its Member States,
the latter should confer on the Commission a clear mandate with specific guidelines to be
followed with regard to those issues in which Member States still preserve national
powers, on the basis of the needs and interests of national governments. Nevertheless,
for now, Member States governments would not accept such a proposal in fields in which
they still preserve important competences, margin of discretion and financial capacities,
taking also into account that regional dialogues in which intergovernmental presence is
key, such as the Rabat Process, are producing very positive results.
2.1.3.2. Inter-institutional coordination
A great variety of EU institutions and working structures are involved in the design and
implementation of the GAMM. One of the major institutional challenges affecting the
external dimension of immigration and asylum policies is the relationship between the
Commission and the EEAS. Their difference in perspectives is evident, since the
Commission, and specially DG HOME, is more centred on concrete migration priorities
from a technical perspective, while the EEAS wishes to introduce a more strategic and
geopolitical vision from an external relations point of view321. Many voices argue in favour
of increasing the involvement of the EEAS in this field, a path welcomed by the Council,
the European Parliament and Member States322. The problem lies, most stakeholders
agree, in whether the EEAS has sufficient capacity and human resources to undertake a
greater responsibility in the conception and implementation of the GAMM.
In particular, EU Delegations, as part of the EEAS, are supposed to assume a
strengthened role in the implementation of EU forms of cooperation with third countries
in this field, as they represent the EU in the countries where they are accredited323, and
should thus constitute the main political support for the operability of this external
dimension324. For this purpose, migration liaison officers are to be sent to EU delegations
abroad before the end of 2015325. Their role would be important in every field of
migration, even in labour migration326. It is not however clear that these officers would
321 Apparently, the EEAS is more influential in the development of dialogues and other forms of migration
cooperation with Africa than with the Eastern partners, with which discussions have acquired a more technical
character.
322 See Council Conclusions on the GAMM, 2012, point 5, and especially Council Conclusions on the
implementation of the GAMM, 2014, point 6; European Parliament, Resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration
flows arising from instability: scope and role of EU foreign policy, P7_TA (2011)0121, 5.4.2011, Resolution of 3
April 2014 on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action,
P7_TA-PROV (2014)0286, point 8. See S. Carrera, J. Parkin, L. den Hertog, “EU Migration Policy after the Arab
Spring: the Pitfalls of Home Affairs Diplomacy”, Policy Paper 74, Notre Europe/CEPS, February 2013; Carrera,
den Hertog and Parkin, 2012, op. cit.; or Guild and Moreno Lax, 2013, op. cit., p. 24.
323 See Council Conclusions on the implementation of the GAMM, 2014, point 7. The EP has noted that “while
the EU delegations in third countries will complement existing diplomatic representations of the Member States,
there will be possibilities for long-term gains in efficiency, as the future EU delegation could in many cases take
over consular services and deal with Schengen visa issues”, European Parliament Resolution of 22 October
2009, on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service, P7_TA(2009)0057, DO C
265 E, 30.9.2010, point 10. The European Agenda on Migration highlights that EU delegations in key countries
will “in particular report on major migratory related developments in the host countries, contribute to
mainstream migration issues into development cooperation and reach out to host countries to ensure
coordinated action” (p. 8).
324 In this regard, Spanish practice could be examined as a model, since the external strategy on migration
developed by this Member State towards Sub-Saharan Africa was accompanied by intense efforts on extending
Spanish institutional presence in those countries, through the opening of new diplomatic missions and by
strengthening its diplomatic and sectorial agents in existing ones (see Plan África 2006-2008, Executive
Summary, p. 9).
325 Stockholm Programme, point 7.1; European Council meeting of April 2015; the European Agenda on
Migration, p. 8; and especially Council doc. no. 11782/1/15 REV 1, 11.9.2015, point 45.
326 It is suggested to explore the idea of “EU Labour Information points” as part of EU delegations, offering the
possibility to European employers of posting job vacancies and providing information on labour opportunities in
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belong to DG HOME in the Commission, but they could even be national agents seconded
for this purpose. Coordination between EU delegations and Member States’ diplomatic
missions abroad should also be ensured and increased327, as well as the connection
between EU migration liaison officers and liaison officers from EU agencies such as
Frontex328.
inally, a significant drawback of the EU external action on migration resides in the limited
democratic scrutiny of its design and implementation. The fact that political and
operational instruments take a more and more meaningful place in the development of
the GAMM substantially diminishes the role of the European Parliament, only legally
bound to intervene by approving the conclusion of international agreements in this field.
The role and involvement of the European Parliament should be increased329, making it
advisable to search for ways of boosting deeper consultations and cooperation between
the Commission and the Council, on the one side, and the European Parliament, on the
other. If rigid means of involvement should be avoided in view of the flexibility and
celerity that currently characterise this external dimension, forms of involvement such
as, for instance, regular debates and consultations on the design and impact of MPs,
CAMMS and RDPPs should be envisaged. Also, the role of the European Parliament with
regard to formal agreements like EURAs and VFAs should not be limited to the formal
procedure of consent foreseen in article 218 TFEU, but this institution could arrange for
mechanisms of monitoring their implementation, in which MEPs should be deeply
involved330. A more visible and intense involvement of the European Parliament is also
desirable with regard to the supervision of the external action developed by EU agencies
in this field. Currently, the revised mandate of Frontex only refers to a duty to inform the
European Parliament on working arrangements subscribed by the Agency with other
Union agencies, international organisations and third countries, as well as about the
deployment of Frontex liaison officers in third countries331. The EASO regulation does not
include a similar reference with regard to its external activities.
2.1.3.3. Intra-institutional coordination
Inside specific EU institutions, enhancing coordination and coherence is an evident
challenge of the EU external action on migration. This is particularly true of the
Commission. The diverse Directorates General involved in the design and implementation
of the GAMM have different mandates and different perceptions of the objectives and
needs of the EU regarding the external dimension of these policies. According to several
stakeholders, DG HOME - particularly its International Coordination Unit - seems to follow
a more security-centred approach and considers the external dimension as a means to
achieve internal migration objectives332, not always having in mind the general external
relations policy goals and the specific needs and objectives of development
the EU: MPC and P. Bosch, “Towards a pro-active European migration policy. Concrete measures for a
comprehensive package”, MPC Policy Brief 2015/03, EUI, pp. 10-11.
327 The use of a cooperation model based on the concept of the Schengen Local Cooperation might prove
helpful, according to Papagianni, 2013, op. cit., p. 297.
328 COM (2015) 285, p. 5. In this regard, mention is also to be made to the African Frontex Intelligence
Community (AFIC), an informal cooperation platform for regular knowledge and intelligence sharing on border
security between Frontex, African countries and EU Member States ILOs in those countries. The Commission
suggests to enhance the development of this platform and to extend the model to other regions: COM (2015)
285, p. 5.
329 Papagianni, 2013, op. cit., p. 297 and Reslow, 2012b, op. cit., p. 226 and 231.
330 With regard to EURAs, see, for instance, Cassarino, 2010, op. cit., and M. Manrique Gil et al, “Mediterranean
flows into Europe: Migration and the EU’s foreign policy”, EP in depth analysis, March 2014, PE 522.330, pp.
17-18.
331 Articles 13 and 14.8 of Frontex Regulation after the reform made by Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011.
332 As acknowledged by the Council since the inception of the external dimension of migration (see supra note
16).
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cooperation333. DG DEVCO, which is devoting an increasing amount of development funds
for migration-related purposes334, has a different set of technical expertise on
immigration and asylum, more focused on development, as compared to DG HOME
agents, while DG NEAR seems to be more focused on objectives of purely political
character. RPP/RDPPs illustrate these different views, since in designing and developing
these programmes DG DEVCO was apparently focused on refugee protection and fighting
for the inclusion of development links within RPPs, while, under DG HOME funding, these
programmes might assume many other objectives, including fighting smuggling of
migrants and human trafficking, with the risk of marginalising refugee concerns.
Coordination among the DGs involved is therefore crucial. The alternative to concentrate
everything under one existing Directorate within the Commission, i.e. DG HOME, would
not be adequate in our view, as each Directorate involved in the external dimension
contributes to a more comprehensive and balanced EU external action in the field.
However, the advantage of the variety of actors implicated should not become a
hindrance for the effectiveness of the policy. It should even be considered whether
keeping all the dimensions of migration under DG HOME is the best approach. Although
this allows greater coherence, having interior officials in charge of legal and labour
migration, integration of residents, migration-development synergies and international
protection should be carefully assessed335. To this effect, the internal institutional
organisation of certain Member States with regard to migration and asylum could provide
a model of governance336.
In any case, the institutional coordination of the policy planning and action of DG DEVCO,
DG HOME, DG NEAR and the EEAS will be a key issue to ensure “acting as one” in
relations and cooperation with partner countries. Migration policy dialogues should be
fully integrated, also institutionally, with cooperation in the field of development, in
particular in countries with enhanced cooperation frameworks such as the Action Plans
and Single Support Frameworks agreed in the framework of the European Neighbourhood
Policy. This will be even more important in the framework of the implementation of the
European Agenda on Migration. With its adoption, an inter-service group composed of DG
HOME and other Directorates involved in migration will be in charge of monitoring the
follow-up of the new agenda.
Being responsible for ensuring coherence and coordination of the external action inside
the Commission, the HR/VP has been charged, since the start of the mandate of the new
Commission, with chairing a Commissioners’ Group on External Action, in order to
develop a joint approach in conducting EU action in several portfolios having a strong
external dimension, including migration together with neighbourhood and enlargement;
trade; development; humanitarian aid; climate action and energy; and transport337. A
similar initiative was on the table during the mandate of the former Commission, but it
only met once a year without the presence of the former HR/VP. It is however still too
early to assess the added value of this promising initiative, although it is already clear
that current HR/VP has assumed a more active role on the external dimension of
migration.
333 See Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2012, op. cit.
334 Papagianni, 2013, op. cit., p. 288.
335 Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2012, op. cit.
336 For instance, in Spain, asylum, irregular immigration, border management and readmission are under the
mandate of the Interior Ministry, including negotiation and implementation of bilateral agreements on these
issues. Labour migration and integration is governed by the Ministry on Employment and Social Security, while
visas, migration and development synergies and broad migration cooperation agreements correspond to the
mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.
337 Mission Letter from President Juncker to HR/VP Mogherini, 1 November 2014, p. 3.
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The Council is another institution which needs to ensure coordination of the design and
implementation of the GAMM, not only between the JHA and FAC formations, but also
among various working parties and structures charged with tasks related to the external
dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies, such as the Working Party on
Integration, Migration and Expulsion, the Visa Working Party, the Asylum Working Party,
the HLWG and SCIFA, as well as geographic Working Parties on foreign affairs. In
particular, in addition to the coordinating role of the COREPER, the HLWG, the most
important structure in this external dimension, remains, in words of the Council, “the
central steering forum for strategic discussions and initiatives in relation to the Global
Approach and to prepare the ground for concrete actions of implementation, where
appropriate, in consultation with other Council Working Parties”338. SCIFA plays a leading
role in coordinating the external and the internal dimensions of migration policies339.
Currently, work is apparently being done, and should be encouraged, to ensure better
coordination between these structures in order to avoid overlaps340. An alternative to
explore could be to merge these working groups into one single unit in charge of the
external dimension of immigration and asylum policies within the Council.
338 Council Conclusions on the GAMM, doc. 9417/12, 3.5.2012, point 6. The mandate of the HLWG indicates that
Counsellors responsible for the geographic areas referring to countries addressed in its agenda also participate
in the meetings (Council doc. 9433/02, 30.5.2002, point 12).
339 Council docs. 6166/2/99, 16.03.1999, 6370/00, 22.2.2000, and especially 17476/10, 6.12.2010 and
17182/11, 18.11.2011.
340 JAIEX, the JAI-RELEX Working Party, created in 2008 to coordinate external relations in the area of justice
and home affairs, prepare dialogues with third countries in this field, provide with strategic reflections, and
debate on the external activities of EU agencies, is however more focused, at present, on the external
dimension of police and judicial cooperation issues. See its mandate in Council doc. 14236/08, 27.10.2008 and
14431/1/08, 28.10.2008.
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2.2. Short case studies
KEY FINDINGS
 Moldova signed Readmission and Visa Facilitation Agreements with the
EU in 2007, and was the first neighbourhood partner country to sign a
Mobility Partnership in 2008. It obtained a visa free regime with the EU in
2014. The EU-Moldova MP has proved a comprehensive and flexible umbrella
instrument that facilitated the country’s reform agenda in the field of migration.
Over 100 initiatives were set supported by over EUR 50 million commitments from
the EU and the 15 partner Member States. The MP has shown good coordination
and close observance of the initial objectives. The challenges identified point to
the need for increased clarity on the scope of the tool and its relation to other EU
instruments in the area, a more balanced approach in line with GAMM pillars,
better-informed planning of financial assistance projects and a thorough
commitment to human rights aspects of migration.
 Morocco was the first Arab Mediterranean partner country with which the
EU signed a Mobility Partnership, in June 2013, jointly with nine of its
Member State. Morocco was already at least since 2006 a reliable partner in the
field of border control to contain irregular migration to Europe, and between 2007
and 2010 benefitted of a budget support programme for integrated border control
amounting to EUR 67.6 million. Negotiations for a VFA and a EURA started in
January 2014, but the prospects of agreeing are remote. In contrast, the MP has
proved instrumental to a thorough review of Morocco’s immigration policy based
on the protection of human rights and the integration of immigrants. This new
policy is being strongly supported by the EU, which has doubled its financial
commitments in the field of cooperation on migration and asylum to EUR 20
million.
 After successive migration crisis following the Revolution in January 2011, Tunisia
signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU and 10 Member States in March
2014 in the framework of the “Privileged Partnership” established to support
political and economic transition. However, social opposition to the MP was strong,
as social movements and migrant associations denounced an attempt by the EU to
“outsource” migration control. As a consequence, MP implementation is proving
slow, and negotiations for a EURA and a VFA have not yet started, whereas the
flagship project to support the implementation of the MP has yet to start one and
a half years after the signature. The consultation process to agree on a
negotiation platform with the EU (for instance on the content of the Annex of
implementing projects for the MP) has already helped the inter-governmental
coordination of national authorities in this field, and might be instrumental in
advancing a clearer formulation of national migration policies.
A short abstract of the three country case studies carried out as part of this research
paper is provided in this section. Annex I contains the full country case studies, including
references.
2.2.1. Moldova
Moldova has been an active EU partner in migration cooperation for seven years.
Moldova signed Readmission and Visa Facilitation Agreements with the EU in 2007 and
joined the EU Mobility Partnership in 2008. A Regional Protection Programme was set up
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in the region during 2009-2013. In 2010, a Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched
and a visa free regime was granted to Moldova in April 2014.
The EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership (MP)341 has proved a comprehensive and flexible
umbrella instrument which facilitated the country’s reform agenda in the field of
migration, in line with the EU acquis. Over 100 initiatives were set342 supported by over
EUR 50 million commitments from the EU and the 15 partner Member States343. The MP
has shown good coordination and close observance of the initial objectives344. The
challenges identified point to the need for increased clarity on the scope of the tool and
its relation to other EU instruments in the area, a more balanced approach in line with
GAMM pillars, better-informed planning of financial assistance projects and a thorough
commitment to human rights aspects of migration.
The EURA and VFA have known a smooth implementation in Moldova. The country has
made very good progress in readmission matters, having established an effective legal
and institutional framework in the area. The number of Moldovan citizens readmitted
from the EU decreased and remains stable. With the support of the EU, Moldova is to
continue the efforts on readmission agreements negotiations with the main third
countries in the coming years, currently the main threat to the stability of the country’s
migration management system.
The RPP, in place from 2009-2013 for Moldova-Belarus-Ukraine, ensured crucial
infrastructure and technical assistance at Moldova’s borders345, regular border protection
monitoring missions346, training of border guards, legal practitioners and civil society
representatives on asylum matters. Yet the programme largely lacked a genuine regional
dimension hampered mainly by diverging capacities and varying commitment of the
three targeted states.
The VLD, together with the VLAP, have proved strong reform tools in the case of
Moldova. In less than 4 years, the country has adopted and put in place an impressive
legislative, policy and institutional framework in the field of migration and beyond,
including the reform of border police, a national data protection authority, a national
anti-corruption centre, an integrity council and an Ombudsman’s office. The
implementation phase also showed good progress, but the far-reaching reform agenda
has generally stagnated after the visa free regime entered into force.
As for the strict case of visa liberalisation, during the first year of enforcement, the visa
waiver for Moldova has been implemented smoothly, with no serious abuses recorded347.
The number of Moldovan citizens readmitted from EU Member States is stable and the
number of asylum applications from Moldovan citizens in the EU Member States remains
low. Future implementing steps include adherence to the Schengen acquis and
standards, with more than EUR 21 million EU budgetary commitments for 2014-2016.
341 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and
the Republic of Moldova, 21 May 2008, doc. nº 9460/08.
342 http://scoreboard.mfa.gov.md.
343 COM (2014) 96 final, 21.2.2014, p.5.
344 Monitoring of migration flows; Consolidation of the National Migration Management System; Information on
legal migration and assistance for returning migrants; Labour migration schemes; Voluntary return and
reintegration schemes; Diaspora consolidation and co-development; Social protection of migrants and their
families; Development of the Moldovan labour market; Visa and readmission; Cooperation in border
management; identity and travel documents, fight against illegal/irregular migration and trafficking in human
beings. See, note 1, Annex, p.8.
345 Nine reception centres for interview and/or short receival of asylum seekers for up to 24 hours have been
established at the International airport Chișinau, land border points Leușeni and Palanca, border police pickets
of Criva, Sculeni and Giurgiulești, Ocnita, Saiti; one interview room was renovated within the premises of BMA.
346 63 missions during 2011-2013.
347 COM (2014)711 final of 27.11.2014, p.11.
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2.2.2. Morocco
There are between 3.5 and 5 million Moroccan residents abroad, according to official
estimates, i.e. between 10% and 15% of the population. Annual migration flows remain
between 80,000 and 100,000. Even if migration rates have declined over the last few
years, between 29% and 40% of young people express the wish to migrate (i.e., 4 to 5.3
million young people). Morocco has also become a transit country from Sub-Saharan
Africa to Europe, although figures remain modest (between 25,000 and 40,000 Sub-
Saharan irregular immigrants in the country, according to Ministry of Interior estimates,
out of a total of fewer than 100,000 legal foreign residents).
Morocco was the first Arab Mediterranean partner country with which the European Union
signed a Mobility Partnership, in June 2013. The Joint Declaration between the EU, nine
of its Member States and Morocco was complemented by an Annex of cooperation
projects by EU agencies and Member States supposed to contribute to the achievement
of each of the objectives stated348.
In the Joint Declaration, the parties engage themselves to negotiate a Visa Facilitation
Agreement and a Readmission Agreement, but after a first round of talks negotiations
seem blocked since January 2015. Sources linked to the negotiations consider chances
for reaching an agreement in the foreseeable future to be very small.
The MP was followed, three months after its signature, by a deep change in the
immigration policy in the Kingdom. This has become a unique case in the EU’s Southern
Neighbourhood of a partner country establishing an immigration and asylum policy based
on human rights principles, in line with the EU’s GAMM. An exceptional regularisation
campaign during 2014 resulted in 17,918 one-year residence permits from 27,330
applications registered (almost half of them to Senegalese and Syrians, followed by
Nigerians and Ivoirians). In March 2014, the Government presented to Parliament three
new laws on Immigration, Trafficking of Human Beings and Asylum, although they have
not yet been adopted. In December 2014, a National Migration and Asylum Strategy was
launched, including eleven immigrant integration programmes in all relevant fields; the
first progress report on the implementation of this strategy was presented in September
2015.
The new policy prompted a quick reaction from the European Union and a redefinition of
its priorities of cooperation in this field. Now EU cooperation in migration focuses strongly
on the integration of immigrants, and the mobilisation of Moroccan skills abroad, in full
agreement with the policy priorities of the Moroccan government, as well as on return
and reintegration to and from Morocco to the countries of origin.
In August 2015, there were in Morocco 25 different ongoing projects in the field of
migration funded by the EU349, for a total amount of more than EUR 20 million over their
implementation period. Of this amount, EUR 10 million corresponds to the new budget
support programme to promote the integration of immigrants in Morocco, launched in
2015 after the adoption of the new immigration policy. Another EUR 5 million
corresponds to the Sharaka Project to support the implementation of the MP, which also
has a strong technical assistance and institutional capacity building component. EUR 1
million funds a return programme to countries of origin from Morocco, plus EUR 1.6
348 These objectives are i) a better management of the movement of persons for short stays, legal migration
and labour migration, ii) strengthening cooperation in the field of migration and development, iii) fighting
irregular migration, networks of trafficking of human beings and the promotion of an effective return and
readmission policy, and iv) respecting international instruments on the protection of refugees.
349 Projets financés par l’Union européenne au Maroc dans le domaine de la migration, document de la
Délégation de l’UE au Maroc.
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additional million in the framework of a multi-country project to improve cooperation
between countries of origin, transit and destination on voluntary return to meet the
needs of vulnerable migrants. Overall the implementation of the MP has translated so far
into a more than doubling of EU resources for cooperation allocated to the field of
migration in Morocco. However, these figures pale compared to the EUR 67.6 million
invested between 2007 and 2010 in an integrated border management programme
managed by the Ministry of Interior, for which no evaluation is available.
2.2.3. Tunisia
Tunisia has a long tradition of labour migration, and roughly 10% of its total population
lives abroad: 1.2 million emigrants, 83% of them in Europe. After the 2011 revolution,
two migration crisis affected the country350: between February and August 2011, 28,000
Tunisians benefitted from the confusion in the border control system to get to the Italian
island of Lampedusa, and then the European continent, creating a political crisis in the
system of the free movement of persons within the European Union. Then the civil war in
Libya in 2011-2012 provoked a flow of some 200,000 refugees into Tunisia (according to
UNHCR), as well as a temporary return of up to 137,000 Tunisian emigrants (IOM
figures). Since 2012, the situation has stabilized351.
On 3 March 2014, the EU, Tunisia and ten Member States signed the Joint Political
Declaration of a Mobility Partnership, the second MP (after Morocco in 2013) signed with
a Mediterranean partner. It was signed by Tunisia’s interim technical Government which
had entered office only two months before to prepare the second democratic elections
after the Revolution. Negotiations for a Visa Facilitation Agreement and for a Readmission
Agreement between the EU and Tunisia, provided for in the MP Joint Declaration, have
not yet started. The Annex listing the actions to be implemented to achieve each of the
objectives of the MP (or “Scoreboard”, as it is denominated) is not yet fully agreed either
and has not been published. In any case, the consultation process to agree on the Annex
of implementing projects has already helped the inter-governmental coordination of
national authorities in this field, and might be instrumental in advancing a clearer
formulation of national migration policies.
In preparation of the MP, and in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution, the EU-Tunisia
Migration Agenda (ETMA) was adopted. The project was funded under the ENPI and
aimed to promote comprehensive migration cooperation between Tunisia and the EU, by
fostering the exchange of expertise on border management and migration related
subjects, as well as technical assistance in drafting a national migration policy and
improving institutional coordination mechanisms. It was implemented by ICMPD, initially
between January 2012 and June 2013, with an extension until the end of 2014, and
involved the work of an international expert for three years in Tunisia. Its initial budget
amounted to EUR 800.000. A gaps and needs assessment was carried out assessing the
institutional capacities of Tunisian authorities with a view to identifying challenges and
ways to overcome them. This assessment also led to the elaboration of a tailor-made
programme of capacity building activities and the organisation of a series of workshops.
However, the political transition made it very difficult to secure the active participation of
Tunisian authorities, and many objectives of the project did not materialise. In the
framework of the project, an attempt to coordinate international donors in the field of
migration around the EU Delegation was undertaken, with a first coordination meeting in
350 See SEMTE, Vers une stratégie nationale en matière de migration et des Tunisiens à l’étranger, 2013,
Secretariat d’Etat pour les migrations et les Tunisiens à l’étranger.
351 See H. Boubakri, Revolution and International Migration in Tunisia, Migration Policy Centre Research Report
2013/04.
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2012 that had no continuity. An on-line EU-Tunisia Platform on Migration was developed
(https://www.eurotun-migr.net/en/), but without much activity.
In this same context, Tunisia is at the crossroads of the public debate about outsourcing
of irregular migration control and asylum. From a positive perspective, the idea is to
provide Southern Mediterranean partner countries, in the framework of the MPs, with the
incentives and cooperation resources they need to uphold their responsibility in the field
of international protection and deal as transit countries with irregular migration and
refugee flows before they reach Europe, ensuring human rights protection of migrants.
For critics, in particular for civil society and human rights organisations, this is an
attempt by Europe to push away the migration crisis and evade its responsibilities, and
will lead to reduced human rights protection for migrants and refugees. Efforts of the EU
to improve integrated border management systems or develop national asylum systems
through RPPs, for instance, would basically aim to “contract out” migration control to
those countries.
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
ACTION
Key findings of this study include the following conclusions and recommendations for
future action in the external dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies, which
have been structured in accordance with the two main parts in which this report is
divided.
3.1. Regarding the toolbox of EU external cooperation in the field
of immigration and asylum
 The multiplication of regional dialogues on migration in which many countries
take part simultaneously requires rationalisation, while more attention should be
given to increasing their practical value and action-oriented approach. The launch
of more temporary and concrete initiatives could be explored, as well as
organising more targeted meetings and ensuring funding for their development as
a way to reverse the limited participation of Member States.
 Regarding Mobility Partnerships, their implementation is not balanced among
their different components. MPs should include additional possibilities for legal
migration, and, since the latter mostly depend on Member States’ competences,
participation in these instruments should be conditioned to their offering concrete
concessions in this field. MPs scoreboards should be upgraded to a true tool for
progress assessment in achieving the stated objectives of the MPs, as they
currently are mainly a register of initiatives undertaken unilaterally by Member
States and the EU. So far, the added value of MPs in terms of cooperation
resources is very limited. To mark the special partnership with partner countries in
this field, specific resources should be mobilised to achieve the objectives of the
MP and develop measures and interventions geared to each of them. The
upcoming Mobility Partnership Facility could be an instrument to face this
challenge.
 The EU readmission policy should focus on countries of origin of migratory flows
in order to avoid difficult negotiations on readmission obligations regarding third
country nationals in transit. The TCN clause should only be included in EURAs
concluded with neighbouring countries representing a significant risk of transit
migration to the EU, provided that increased leverage and assistance is ensured to
these countries. Concerning leverage for readmission negotiations and for border
control objectives, the EU should strive to look for additional incentives within
other EU policies such as trade, neighbourhood policy and education, avoiding
nonetheless the diversion of these policies from their main objectives according to
the EU Treaties.
 The level of facilitations of mobility included in Visa Facilitation
Agreements should be increased and envisaged as an autonomous objective for
promoting mobility from certain third countries that do not pose serious irregular
migratory risks. The EU should start a reflection on what could be offered to third
countries once they receive a visa-free regime after the successful ending of a
VLD, so as to maintain the impetus for reforms undertaken by partner countries.
Mobility-related incentives in the field of trade in services could be explored for
this purpose.
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 EU external action on legal migration has not been adequately developed.
Only certain clauses included in association and cooperation agreements contain
enforceable rights for migrant workers that reinforce their integration in EU
Member States. Advancing as much as possible in the internal harmonisation of
rules on admission, as well as exploiting the potential of the EU external
competence on association enshrined in art. 217 TFEU, as a way to address every
field of potential cooperation covered by the EU Treaties, can strengthen the
development of a truly common external action on legal admission of migrants
that includes, among other objectives, facilitation of legal admission, recognition
of diplomas and qualifications and portability of social rights. Moreover, the
possibility to present to partner countries a coordinated EU offer on labour
migration opportunities should be explored, as the Union could act as a
coordinating tool of Member States’ competences on this issue on the basis of art.
74 TFEU. However, Member States’ bilateral external action evidences that their
reluctance to offer labour migration opportunities to third countries is not
restricted to EU frameworks of cooperation and is therefore not dependent only on
the legal distribution of competences.
 The GAMM pillar on asylum and international protection is still insufficiently
developed. Current actions in this field, under RPPs/RDPPs, focus on capacity-
building of third countries in regions of origin and transit, while the resettlement
component of these programmes continues to be extremely weak. Other
shortcomings of RPPs/RDPPs, such as the lack of local ownership, Member States’
involvement and coordination with other EU related-policies, need to be tackled.
The mere existence of an external dimension of asylum, understood as implying
the development of forms of cooperation with partner countries, is questionable.
Capacity-building efforts and resettlement activities should be stepped up and
carried out in real dialogue with countries hosting large refugee populations. As
the preamble of the 1951 Geneva Convention acknowledges, international
cooperation is needed to address the disproportionate burdens that asylum places
on certain third countries.
 The mandates of EU agencies such as Frontex and EASO should be clarified
with regard to their involvement in cooperation with third countries in the field of
immigration and asylum. While assessment exercises on the efficiency of Frontex
WAs with third countries’ authorities and on the impact of this cooperation on the
rights of immigrants and asylum seekers are scarce, the EASO external action is
still underdeveloped probably due to budget limitations and a lack of political will.
 Coherence and complementarities among different instruments of the
GAMM directed to the same countries or regions or sharing similar
priorities must be ensured. For instance, MPs, VLDs and RDPPs should be
coordinated regarding their objectives and joint complementary efforts aimed at
capacity building of partner countries on asylum.
 Most importantly, greater involvement of third countries in the design and
negotiation of GAMM instruments would enhance the “partnership” nature of these
instruments, improving their local ownership, their efficiency and their
contribution to their own migration challenges and needs.
 EU external action on migration should ensure added value with regard to
Member States’ bilateral external activities. To this effect, the compatibility
clauses included in EURAs, by which these EU agreements do not prejudice the
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implementation of returns through any existing formal or informal agreements
different to EURAs, undermine the added value of EU action, damage their
uniform application and prevent effective monitoring of how returns are
implemented by EU Member States. As certain overlaps among individual Member
States’ initiatives as well as the offering of already on-going activities at the
bilateral level may be identified within MPs, EU funding should only be granted to
multilateral projects involving several Member States while the latter should be
required to exclusively include proposals for new projects in future MPs.
 Funding instruments applicable to EU external cooperation in the field of
immigration and asylum are the result of a long process of accumulation in the
framework of different EU policies: migration and asylum policy, international
development cooperation, external policy, neighbourhood policy, humanitarian
aid. Therefore, there is a high number of relevant instruments responding to
sometimes different logics and often leading to overlaps. Visibility and
coherence are difficult under these conditions and hinder scrutiny and
democratic control. A simplification of the funding framework should be
envisaged, clearly distinguishing between objectives and EU policies and the
corresponding funding possibilities.
3.2. Regarding the impact of EU cooperation instruments in the
field of immigration and asylum
 Available public information on EU external cooperation in the field of
migration and asylum does not allow for a systematic evaluation of its impact and
efficiency. Evaluation reports and impact assessments officially requested by EU
institutions or conducted by independent entities in this field are extremely scarce.
Even basic information on distribution of funds, projects implemented or state of
progress of projects is at best scattered and often not available. Periodic and
comprehensive evaluation efforts should be undertaken for each instrument of the
GAMM, including both cooperation tools and financial instruments.
 The implementation of the GAMM through the existing forms of external
cooperation and the financial instruments mobilised for its support have been
geographically focusing on the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and South
Caucasus countries, deeply involved on cooperating with the EU on migration
issues. More recently, however, migration cooperation has intensified with
Southern Mediterranean countries and has started to address relations with Sub-
Saharan and Eastern African countries. These latest efforts must be pursued so as
to secure a balanced implementation of the GAMM.
 Evaluations of the global calls for proposals implemented since 2004 in the
framework of the AENEAS Programme and the Thematic Programme for
Migration and Asylum have shown, partly due to fragmentation, a very limited
impact and the need for a more strategic approach. This has led to the new
merged Global Public Goods and Challenges programme, which absorbs five
former thematic lines. However, the distribution and management of funds
continues to largely respect former thematic distributions, so no significant real
change has occurred. This reorientation of the thematic programme on migration
towards more global, strategic actions has the disadvantage of leaving many civil
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society organisations and small actors in the field of migration without funding for
their activities, and EU Delegations without a tool to act in this field.
 In the framework of the new European Agenda on Migration, there is a trend to
evaluate all external cooperation initiatives in this field in relation to their
contribution to the European migration policy - and hence the control of
irregular migration. However, a large share of those actions has a main
objective to contribute to the development of beneficiary countries, which should
be more taken into account.
 Mandatory evaluations of projects implemented should not focus only on
outputs and outcomes, but also on impact in relation to the strategic
objectives of each project, and more resources should be invested in follow-up
and evaluation of impact after the finalisation of projects. Standard performance
indicators of projects and instruments would greatly contribute to make
comparisons easier across types of projects and regions.
 The production of a standard ex-post project fiche with data about the
allocation of the budget across different components of the project and elements
for assessment should be envisaged at least in the framework of large
programmes. Clear rules in this regard could greatly contribute to a “learning
curve” of practices in the field of external cooperation on migration and asylum.
 Data provided by EU Member States on the implementation of EU
instruments of cooperation is incomplete and do not allow for
comprehensive and detailed evaluation exercises. For instance in the field of
return, Regulation 862/2007 on statistics on migration and international
protection should be amended in order to request Member States that statistics
supplied to Eurostat on numbers of returned third-country nationals include
disaggregation by type of act on which the return was based and the specific third
country where the individual has been actually returned.
 Regarding implementation, EU Delegations often lack the specialised staff
required to plan, implement and monitor projects. Besides that, the
programming process is often very slow, greatly limiting the capacity to respond
to new developments or contextual changes, and administrative procedures for
the selection of service providers, project funding and implementation are often
too burdensome to be effective. Combined, these issues lead to a very limited
flexibility of EU action. Linked to this institutional capacity issue and to the
fragmentation and multiplicity of funds and programmes, EU external cooperation
in migration and asylum features a high degree of compartmentalisation, with
recurrent problems of coordination, alignment and integration across projects or
actions pursuing complementary or even similar objectives.
 Another growing trend in the implementation of EU actions in this field concerns
the increasing involvement of Member State institutions in the
implementation of projects. Whereas peer-to-peer support no doubt
constitutes an effective way to build institutional capacity in partner countries, and
Member States are best placed to provide it, the direct engagement of public
institutions from Member States in project implementation in the area of migration
risks politicising the selection of service providers, making accountability more
difficult and letting Member States’ political priorities interfere with the
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implementation of EU-funded projects in the field of migration and asylum,
probably to the detriment of development-related objectives.
 Political instruments that are increasingly common in the external dimension of EU
immigration and asylum policies may be useful for initiating cooperation on
migration issues with third countries, but in view of the shortcomings and
weaknesses derived from their soft law nature, migration cooperation should
evolve towards an increasing recourse to hard law to ensure stability and
legal certainty of engagements, specify further details of cooperation and
safeguard migrants’ rights in fields such as social security entitlements, admission
and integration.
 A systematic exchange of information on agreements and activities
projected or carried out by Member States in the field of migration is
currently lacking between the latter and the Commission. Despite the
mandatory nature of the loyal cooperation principle, it seems advisable to adopt a
legally binding norm of secondary law or to amend Council Decision 2006/688 to
include explicit obligations for exchanging information about bilateral agreements
and projects planned by Member States with third countries, debating on these
measures and ensuring internal coordination before their adoption.
 Although Member States insist on being involved in every activity of the EU
external action on migration, they do not always ensure their continuous
participation in cooperation frameworks such as regional and bilateral migration
dialogues or MPs and their follow-up. Ways to increase Member States’
involvement in GAMM instruments should be explored, as for now both levels
of action, national and supranational, must be coordinated because of the current
distribution of competences. The external representation of the EU and its Member
States could be simplified in certain fora, by conferring clear guidelines to the
Commission with regard to issues still in the hands of the Member States.
 In order to effectively implement the GAMM and address migration challenges,
efforts must be undertaken to bring closer the divergent perspectives and
priorities of the Commission and the EEAS. If the latter is to be more involved
in this external dimension, its capacities and human resources should be
increased. The secondment of migration liaison officers to EU Delegations abroad
should start immediately, as Delegations should act as the main political support
on the ground for the implementation of the GAMM. Coordination with Member
States’ diplomatic missions and Frontex liaison officers also seems indispensable.
 The limited involvement of the European Parliament in the design and
implementation of the GAMM makes it advisable to search for ways of
increasing its monitoring capacities, especially as regards political and
operational instruments that should not escape from scrutiny. Regular debates
and consultations on the adoption and impact of MPs, CAMMs, RDPPs and EU
agencies’ external activities should be systematically held within the European
Parliament. Its role in international agreements like EURAs and VFAs should not
be confined to the formal procedure of consent foreseen in art. 218 TFEU, and the
European Parliament should push for the adoption of mechanisms of monitoring
implementation, particularly in view of the impact of these agreements on
migrants.
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 Concerning the intra-institutional dimension, coordination and
rapprochement of priorities among the different European Commission
DGs involved in this external dimension – mainly HOME, DEVCO and NEAR -
appears indispensable, an important task for the HR/VP in charge of ensuring
coherence of the external action within the Commission. Within the Council,
coordination should be ensured not only between the JHA and FAC formations, but
especially regarding the myriad working parties and structures having tasks
related to the external dimension of EU immigration and asylum policies. Possible
alternatives include creating a single body in charge of this external dimension,
composed of members from diverse existing working groups, or empowering the
HLWG on Asylum and Migration with a strong coordinating role.
 The European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission in May
2015 was conceived to formulate a comprehensive, coherent, EU-wide response to
migration and asylum related challenges. However, the immediate political
agenda has prevailed and short-term considerations related to the
migration crisis in the Mediterranean have absorbed most of the
attention. This has been detrimental to a full integration of legal economic
immigration considerations as part of the external cooperation dimension
of the Agenda. The significance of strengthening partnership with third countries
has been integrated in the diverse pillars of the new Agenda, albeit especially in
those related to control aspects. It is revealing that the GAMM does not feature as
one of the framework approaches for the implementation of the new Agenda. On
the other hand, the European Agenda on Migration is based on the assumption
that increased development cooperation will lead to the development of countries
of origin, which in turn will reduce migration flows. However, all available evidence
and research show that this is a wrong assumption, and that in the first stages of
development migration flows even increase with the development of a country (de
Haas 2010). This calls for targeted external cooperation aimed to better manage
migration flows rather than to prevent them. However, the Agenda does not
include a specific pillar on Migration and Development, and this issue is addressed
in passing only in the pillar on “A new Policy on Legal Migration”. References to
the external dimension of asylum only regard RDPPs and resettlement
under “immediate action”, are clearly insufficient in view of the current
refugee crisis. To this extent, the European Agenda on Migration risks to be a
missed opportunity to mainstream cooperation with third countries into EU
migration policy.
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Member States of the European Union (Frontex) and the National Security Council of the
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of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Georgia, 4.12.2008.
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Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility:
• Joint Declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility between the Federal
Republic of Nigeria and the European Union and its Member States, 12.3.2015, available
at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria/documents/page_content/eu-ng-jd_en.pdf
• Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States, Council doc. no.
10055/3/14, 9.9.2014.
• Joint Declaration on the Mobility Partnership between Tunisia, the European Union and
its participating Member States, Council doc. no. 16371/1/13, 2.12.2013.
• Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the
European Union and its participating Member States, Council doc. no. 16399/13,
26.11.2013.
• Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco
and the European Union and its Member States, Council doc. no. 6139/13, 3.6.2013.
• Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and
Armenia0.11.2009, Council doc. no. 14963/11 ADD 1, 6.10.2011.
• Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Georgia,
Council doc. no. 16396/09 ADD 1, 20.11.2009.
• Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the
Republic of Cape Verde, Council doc. no. 9460 ADD 2, 21.5.2008.
• Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and the
Republic of Moldova, Council doc. no. 9460/08 ADD 1, 21.5.2008.
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ANNEX I. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
Moldova
EU cooperation with Moldova in the field of migration has steadily increased during the
last seven years. In 2007, Moldova signed the EURA and VFA, in force as of January
2008. The VFA was amended in 2013. In 2008, Moldova was one of the first third
countries (along with Cape Verde) to sign a Mobility Partnership with the EU. Then, in
2009, a RPP was set up for Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, renewed for a second phase in
2011-2013. In 2010 the EU-Moldova VLD was launched and in less than four years a
visa-free regime was extended to Moldova.
EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership
Moldova was the first Eastern neighbour to sign a Joint Declaration on a MP with the EU,
in May 20081. Its general objectives largely mirror the GAMM pillars2, and are
subsequently detailed in ten specific objectives.3 The general and specific objectives are
further transposed in the National Strategy on Migration and Asylum 2011-2020 and the
corresponding action plan4.
The coordination and monitoring of the MP is ensured through a National inter-ministerial
Monitoring Committee, yearly EU-Moldova High Level meetings and a Local Level
Platform meeting twice a year. Since 2012, the implementation of the MP is also
monitored through a dedicated policy “scoreboard”.
European Union – Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership Scoreboard
The Scoreboard is an online, open access monitoring tool, drawing together in a centralised
database over 100 completed, ongoing and considered initiatives implemented in the framework
of the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership. The tool provides a transparent, easy to use tool to
monitor the process and progress of the cooperation between the EU and Moldova. The
Scoreboard has been financed from the EU and implemented by the local office of the IOM in
partnership with the Government of the Republic of Moldova. Since completion of the project,
the tool has been managed and kept up to date by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration.
Available at: http://scoreboard.mfa.gov.md
The implementation of EU-supported MP initiatives seems to follow a subsidiarity
principle approach. The Commission directly manages the initiatives which involve
multiple partners or suppose a broader regional scope of intervention, and otherwise
delegates implementation to better placed actors, such as local offices of International
Organisations, Member States and NGOs. Additionally, FRONTEX and ETF commit
autonomous budgetary resources to specific initiatives.
Member States’ bilateral and multilateral participation is more diverse. Fifteen of them
joined the MP as partner States5. Member States’ involvement varies greatly in the
implementing process, based on the action pursued, objectives and national strategic
1 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and
the Republic of Moldova, 21 May 2008, doc. nº 9460/08.
2 International protection and asylum is absent from the initial MP. However, this pillar has been largely
addressed during MP implementation process.
3 Monitoring of migration flows; consolidation of the national migration management system; information on
legal migration and assistance for returning migrants; labour migration schemes; voluntary return and
reintegration schemes; diaspora consolidation and co-development; social protection of migrants and their
families; development of the Moldovan labour market; visa and readmission; cooperation in border
management; identity and travel documents, fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings.
See Annex to the MP, note 1, p. 8.
4 Government Order 655 of 08.09.2011 and Government Order 1009 of 26.12.2011, respectively.
5 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden.
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considerations. Member States’ forms of involvement cover a wide range of actions, from
technical assistance to bilateral agreements and financial assistance. The Member States
most actively involved in MP initiatives are Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary6. The qualitative contribution of Sweden and Germany was repeatedly praised
by local stakeholders7. Interestingly enough, the rate of migration is not a core
consideration when it comes to Member States’ active participation within the EU-
Moldova MP framework.
The main financial sources of the MP are the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI-
DG NEAR), the Thematic Programme for Cooperation with third countries in the areas of
migration and asylum, set under the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI-
EuropeAid/DEVCO Funds), Member States’ bilateral contributions and the Moldovan
national budget8. Over EUR 25 million of EU and Member States’ budgetary contributions
have been disbursed in support of the MP actions.9
Within the framework of the GAMM pillars, there is a strong focus on irregular migration,
including border management, readmission, return and reintegration. The actions include
trainings, operational agreements and dedicated capacity building projects. The legal
migration and mobility pillar is currently being reinforced, beyond migration system
management and a visa-free regime. Further planned action notably includes facilitating
bilateral circular migration arrangements with Member States10. Additionally, Moldova
committed to pilot the Global Agenda for Economic Mobility within the Framework of
2014 Global Framework on Migration and Development11. The Government continues its
efforts on recognition of documents supporting the professional capacities of Moldovan
citizens and on negotiating social security agreements12.
Recently, there is a growing emphasis on development oriented initiatives. These include
building the capacity of the national labour market and fostering diaspora co-
development projects. The shift towards development is also supported by the ENI 2014-
2020 allocated funds for the country, as over one third of the committed resources target
rural development and reform of the agricultural sector, the main origin sector of
migrants13.
The international protection and asylum pillar is the least supported in terms of MP
dedicated initiatives. Even if the pillar has been tremendously reinforced as part of the
Visa Liberalisation ex ante conditionality package14, currently, with some exceptions15,
the area depends largely on national budgetary resources16, under the pressure of
6 Scoreboard data.
7 Interviews, field mission Moldova 10-12 August 2015.
8 Scoreboard data.
9 Scoreboard data. Other sources point to a EUR 50 million commitments, see COM (2014) 96, p. 5. The
diverging amounts are due to a general lack of clear distinction between the support to MP as opposed to other
actions such as VLAP.
10 Currently in place with Sweden and Germany.
11 Council High Level Working Party on Asylum and Migration, Summary of Discussions, Meeting 23-24
September 2014, doc. 13605/14, 8 October 2014, p. 15.
12 11 agreements on social security have been signed up to 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration, Information Bulletin on Mobility Partnership No 10, p.12, available in Romanian at:
http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/buletin-informational-mobilitate-10.pdf.
13 European Commission, Single Support Framework for EU support to the Republic of Moldova (2014-2017), p.
6, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/financing-the-enp/index_en.htm.
14 See in particular, European Commission, Third Report on the implementation by the Republic of Moldova of
the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, COM (2012)348, 22.6.2012, p. 6.
15 Legal and Social Protection of Asylum Seeking and Refugee Children in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, overall
EuropeAid budget 988830 EUR, available at: http://scoreboard.mfa.gov.md/project/view/154. Several other
EU-supported initiatives are implemented by UNHCR Moldova, under the Thematic Programme for Cooperation
with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum - DG DEVCO Funds.
16 Moldova’s 2014 budget committed over 1 million euro to migration and asylum expenditure (29 071 300 lei
MDL), Law on State Budget no 72 of 12.04.2015.
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constantly rising asylum applications17. The number of applications is expected to rise
further, especially once the travel documents for refugees are in place, an action pending
since 2011 and expected by the end of 201518.
Overall, the MP constitutes an overarching and flexible umbrella framework supporting
the EU-Moldova cooperation on migration. The implemented initiatives have closely
matched the partners’ objectives of a coordinated, multilateral implementation19. The MP
also greatly facilitated the country’s reform agenda in the field of migration, in line with
the EU acquis.
Nevertheless, there is a general need for increased clarity in the MP relationship and
added-value to other EU bilateral and multilateral tools on migration cooperation, in
particular border cooperation and assistance missions, visa liberalisation and RPP.
Because of the wide range of actions addressed in the MP, monitoring and coordination
should remain a top priority. The changing national monitoring arrangements suggest
that coordination proved challenging, especially during the early implementing years20.
Member States’ participation has been increasingly pooled under the common MP
umbrella since 201121. However, the Member States’ bilateral and multilateral action is
still largely engaged on an ad-hoc basis, lacking a comprehensive, streamlined approach.
In this sense, a prioritisation of areas with increased opportunity for Member States
participation should be constantly observed.
As to whether the ‘partnership’ in name is also a ‘partnership’ in nature, the answer must
be nuanced by macro and micro levels. At country level, the EU clearly sets the MP
agenda in terms of core objectives and results to achieve. Locally, especially regarding
concrete implementing actions, national authorities largely perceive the cooperation in
‘partner’ terms.
Strong indicators point to the need for increased quality of planned assistance. The
design of assistance, while thoroughly observing international principles, should be more
closely tailored to Moldova’s specificities and needs. Where feasible, small and better
targeted projects should be considered over “one size fits all” projects. The sustainability
of EU initiatives is generally low, with their life-span generally tracking the life-span of EU
expert or financial assistance, with the project ending with the cessation of the EU
involvement. Budgeted initiatives should better address the national institutions’ capacity
to replicate and sustain the achieved results. Inclusive Partnership Agreements (based on
the example of 2014 EU Code of Conduct in Partnership22) may be considered from the
very start of the project implementation to ensure that all the relevant actors are on
board.
Regarding the balance between GAMM pillars, there has been a sustained strong focus on
irregular migration, including border management, migration systems, visa and
readmission issues. Recently substantial development-oriented initiatives were
programmed and implemented, however their tangible impact is not yet clear. The
development-related initiatives have largely failed to address the pull factors of migration
and fundamental barriers to return and reintegration. A more careful and better informed
planning of development initiatives, based on country migration profile data23 and ex
17 The number of asylum applications increased by 50% in 2014, reaching a still manageable number of 245.
The number is constantly increasing with already 195 applications registered in the first quarter of 2015,
according to the data provided by the National Bureau for Migration and Asylum (BMA).
18 The measure is expected to further increase the asylum applications in Moldova, according to UNHCR
Moldova experts, Field mission interview Chisinau 12.08.2015.
19 COM (214) 96, note 11, pp. 4-5.
20 Evaluation Report 2008-2011, 01.10.2012, p. 57, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-
moldova-mobility-partnership-evaluation.pdf
21 Ibid.
22 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on
partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Fund, OJ L 74 of 04.3.2014.
23 IOM, Extended Migration Profile of Republic of Moldova, 2012, available at:
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=42&products_id=929.
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ante impact assessment, should be pursued. The legal migration and mobility pillar needs
further attention as it can enhance development as well as facilitate a transition phase
towards reintegration. In this sense continued attention must be paid to circular and
seasonal migration arrangements, social rights and social security portability
agreements. The international protection and asylum pillar has seen important progress
and substantial reform. Nevertheless, the pillar’s visibility is reduced within the MP
framework.
Regarding the human rights horizontal priority of GAMM, increased efforts have been
made towards the respect and protection of human rights, particularly in the field of
asylum. However, a positive/preventive component of human rights promotion is
underdeveloped. Initiatives in place make only limited use of the potential for
mainstreaming human rights. Future initiatives should observe a thorough approach to
fundamental rights mainstreaming, including better mainstreaming of the National
Human Rights Action Plan throughout the MP implementing actions.
EU Readmission and Visa Facilitation Agreements
The EU-RA and VFA were signed in 2007, and entered into force in 200824. The
implementation of the agreements is monitored by the EU-Moldova Readmission and the
Visa Facilitation Joint Committees.
The Bureau for Migration and Asylum (BMA), a unit of Ministry of Interior, is responsible
for the implementation of the EURA. According to BMA data, the number of readmission
requests from EU Member States decreased from 242 in 2011 to 157 in 2012 and
remains stable with 157 readmission requests 2013 and 151 in 2014. For 2012-2013 the
highest number of requests originated from France (41%), Germany (12%) and Austria
(11%). One EU citizen was readmitted from Moldova in 201025, two in the first half of
201326 and five in 201527. In the first half of 2013, at least 8 persons readmitted were
not citizens of Moldova28.
Moldova continues to negotiate EURA Implementing Protocols with Member States, with
19 protocols signed29. Negotiation and signature of readmission agreements with the
main countries of origin remains a priority, in particular with Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) members30.
Under EURA technical and financial support provisions, several EU-funded projects were
implemented from 2011-2015, with an estimated financial commitment for Moldova of
over EUR 3 million31. The projects supported measures directed at BMA capacity building
24 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of persons
residing without authorization, Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on
the facilitation of the issuance of visas, OJ L 334 of 19.12.2007.
25 BMA data.
26 European Commission, Fifth Report on the implementation by the Republic of Moldova of the Action Plan on
Visa Liberalisation, COM (2013)807, 15.11.2013, p.11.
27 BMA data.
28 COM (2013)807, note 28, p.11.
29 Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands (Benelux common Implementing
Protocol), Denmark (bilateral agreement). Draft agreements have been sent to all remaining Member States
(Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Poland, Finland, United Kingdom and Sweden) with negotiations planned or
under way.
30 Readmission agreements have been signed with Norway, Switzerland, Georgia, Turkey, Albania, Serbia, FYR
Macedonia, Ukraine. Negotiations are under way with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan and Montenegro.
Difficult negotiations have been under way with Russian Federation, currently blocked due to sensitive political
reasons regarding Transnistria. Draft intergovernmental agreements have been sent to Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Kirghizstan, Syria, Bangladesh, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Jordan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, China,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. According to BMA data, 317 return and 41 removal decisions were
issued in the first quarter of 2015.
31 Support to implementation of EC Readmission Agreements with the Republic of Moldova, The Russian
Federation and Ukraine: Facilitation of Assisted voluntary return and reintegration (SIREDA) 2011-2013, overall
budget: 2,377,205 EUR, EC(DCI-MIGR/2010/229-644); Fighting Irregular Migration in Moldova (FRIMM),
budget for Moldova 1200000 EUR; Support to the implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission
agreements - Moldova and Georgia (ReVis) 2011-2013, overall budget: 1,031,900 Euros EC(DCI-
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on readmission, consolidating data analysis systems, facilitating negotiations on
readmission agreements with selected countries of origin and training public officials.
The 2007 VFA established facilitated visa application procedures for certain categories of
Moldovan citizens. In 2013, the VFA was amended in line with the new VC granting
additional visa facilities32. The VFA continues to apply also after the entry into force of
the visa-free regime (28 April 2014) for Moldovan citizens not holding a valid biometric
passport. To support the implementation of the VFA, a first ever Common Application
Centre (CAC) was set up in 2007 at the Hungarian Embassy in Chisinau, managing short-
stay visa applications for 15 Schengen Member States and Croatia33. Romania, Lithuania
and Italy, the Member States issuing the highest number of multiple-entry visa to
Moldovan citizens34, did not join the CAC. Originally conceived to manage up to 10,000
visa applications per year, the CAC capacity was readapted due to increased numbers of
visa applications (from 7,487 in 200835 to over 17,500 in 201236). A dedicated
programme was put in place as of 2009 to support the enlargement of the Centre,
financed from Moldova’s budgetary resources37. To prevent fraud, national contact points
have been designated within the responsible national authorities to confirm the
authenticity of visa supporting documentation38. Overall, the impact of the CAC is
reflected in a substantially increased number of visas issued, better representation of
Member States, higher transparency and coherence of visa application procedures. The
rate of visa rejections decreased from 7.75% in 2010 to 5.9% in 201239. However, the
decreasing rejection rate is not attributable to the CAC alone. It has been rather a
general trend for all EU consulates in Chisinau during the reference period, with a
weighted average of 4.89% for 2012, which is less than the CAC visa rejection rate for
the same year40.
Overall, the EURA with Moldova is being effectively implemented. There is good
cooperation between the Moldovan responsible authorities and EU Member States on
readmission procedures. The number of Moldovan citizens readmitted from the EU
decreased and remains stable. The negotiation of readmission agreements with third
countries of origin is more challenging. In this aspect, sustained support from the EU,
especially in the politically sensitive negotiations, is crucial to secure the effective
functioning of Moldova’s still fragile readmission system as a whole.
The VFA has had a smooth implementation in Moldova. Lessons learned include a CAC
which ensured better representation of EU Member States in the country, increased
transparency and coherence of the visa application process. A good cooperation example
is the establishment of CAC dedicated contact points in the relevant national authorities
to check the authenticity of visa supporting documents and thwart fraud attempts.
MIGR/2010/229-600); Strengthening migration management and cooperation on readmission in Eastern
Europe – Moldova-Ukraine-Belarus (MIGRECO) 2013-2015 budget for Moldova 673 000 EUR.
32 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the facilitation of the issuance
of visas, O.J. L 168 of 20.06.2013.
33 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Croatia. See further the official page of the Centre
http://www.cac.md/index_en.html.
34 COM (2013)807 final, note 28, pp.11-12 „ [...] the most multiple-entry visas were issued by Romania
(61.94% or 32533 multiple- entry visas out of a total of 52520); Lithuania (45.15% or 647 multiple-entry visas
out of a total of 1 433); and Italy (36.07 % or 3 795 out of a total of 10 521).”
35 European Commission, Working Document on the overall progress made on the implementation of the EU-
Moldova ENP Action Plan for 2009, SEC (2010) of 12.05.2010, accompanying the Communication ‘Taking stock
of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM (2010) 207.
36 S. Mananashvili, “Access to Europe in a Globalised World: Assessing the EU’s Common Visa Policy in the Light
of the Stockholm Guidelines”, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/74, p. 10.
37 See http://scoreboard.mfa.gov.md/project/view/162
38 European Commission, Joint Staff Working Paper, First Progress Report on the implementation by the
Republic of Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, SEC (2011) 1075, 16.9.2011, p. 2.
39 European Commission, Fourth Report on the implementation by the Republic of Moldova of the Action Plan on
Visa Liberalisation, COM (2013) 459, 21.6.2013, p. 10.
40 COM (2013) 459, pp. 9-10.
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Regional Protection Programme for Eastern Europe
The RPP for Moldova-Ukraine-Belarus was implemented between 2009-2010 (Phase I)41
and further renewed for 2011-2013 (Phase II)42. The RPP was designed to ensure the
efficient management of refugee flows and enhance the protection capacities of the
Eastern European region transit zone. The implementing actions for Moldova concerned
mainly enhancement of protection capacities through monitoring of border regions and
placement facilities; technical assistance and infrastructure support; training of
responsible authorities and, as of 2011, supporting refugee self-reliance.
Implementation, monitoring and evaluation was ensured by the Steering Committee
formed by representatives of the three partner countries, meeting annually. The local
office of UNHCR led the RPP implementation in Moldova43. Further national coordination
agreements and MoUs were signed with national authorities and civil society
organisations44.
The RPP evaluation indicators show that, during five years of implementation, the
programme ensured crucial infrastructure and technical assistance at borders45, regular
border monitoring missions46, and training of border guards, legal practitioners and civil
society representatives on asylum matters. Under the self-reliance component, as of
2011, 110 asylum seekers and refugees had been counselled, 36 had been integrated in
the job market and 12 asylum seekers benefited from self-reliance grants47. Since 2010
the number of asylum seekers registered at borders has constantly risen, from 2 cases in
2010 to 32 in 2013 and 20 cases in the first half of 201548. The number of resettlements
remains low in the region and particularly low in Moldova49.
The RPP action was complemented by other ECHR led projects funded under the EU
Thematic Programme for Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and
asylum50.
Overall, the perception of national authorities towards the RPP is positive. The most
visible and appreciated actions are the technical assistance and equipment of nine
interview and first reception centres at border points, awareness raising campaigns, and
training of border police officials, judges and legal practitioners, which led to an increased
openness and change of attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees. One major
challenge reported is the increased shift of border personnel, hindering the sustainability
of achieved results.
41 Budget allocation for Moldova 400 000 EUR.
42 Budget allocation for Moldova 191 722 EUR.
43 Other local implementing partners included: Migration and Asylum Bureau (BMA), Business Advisory Centre,
Law Centre of Advocates, “Salvati Copiii” Moldova, Society for Refugees, Charity Centre for Refugees, ULIM
Moldova, UNDP Moldova, ILO-IPEC Moldova - 1st Phase and BMA, Ministry of Education, Ministry of
Employment, Family and Social Protection, Border Police Department, Law Centre of Advocates NGO -2nd
phase.
44 Including the Border Police department, BMA, National Justice Institute, Agency for Employment, National
Legal Aid Council.
45 Nine reception centres for interview and/or short receival of asylum seekers for up to 24 hours have been
established at the International airport Chișinau, land border points Leușeni and Palanca, border police pickets
of Criva, Sculeni and Giurgiulești, Ocnita, Saiti; one interview room was renovated within the premises of BMA.
46 63 missions during 2011-2013.
47 UNHCR data.
48 UNHCR data: 2010 – 2; 2011 – 3; 2012 – 11; 2013 – 32; 2014 – 27. 2015 – 20. The majority asylum
seekers entered Moldova through border points of Chisinau International Airport, Tudora, Palanca and
Basarabeasca.
49 UNHCR, Note on RPP, 8 June 2010: “In 2010, some 74 refugee cases (157 persons) from Ukraine, 3 cases (3
persons) from Belarus and 2 cases (6 persons) from Moldova were referred by UNHCR for resettlement. 44
cases or 92 refugees were accepted and departed for resettlement countries in 2010”.
50 Local Integration of Refugees (LIR) 2009-2011 in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, budget allocation for
Moldova 554 963 EUR; Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus (QIEE) 2013-2015 in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, overall commitment 2.5 million EUR.
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The RPP in Moldova reveals that a genuine regional cooperation was underdeveloped,
hampered mainly by diverging capacities and varying levels of commitment of the three
targeted states.
Regarding the budgetary planning, the RPP for Moldova (and the RPP as a whole) did not
follow the EU budgetary principle of concentration. As such, the impact of a relatively
limited EU financial budgetary allocation for Moldova (around EUR 600,000 for 5 years),
was considerably decreased by dispersed allocations throughout a wide range of
implementing measures addressing multiple national actors and target groups51.
The situation in the Transnistrian region hindered effective monitoring of the Moldovan
and Ukrainian non-controlled border sector (453 km).
Even if considered, no substantial synergies with other EU-funded cooperation
programmes were developed, such as the EU Border Assistance Mission for Moldova and
Ukraine (EUBAM) or Facilitation of Assisted voluntary return and reintegration project
(SIREDA).
Visa Liberalisation Dialogues and visa free regime
The EU-Moldova VLD was launched in 2010, and in 2011 Moldova was presented with a
first VLAP. In November 2013, the Commission proposed a visa-free regime for Moldova,
in force as of 28 April 201452.
The coordination and monitoring of the VLAP was ensured by a national Task Force that
met weekly53. Regular Senior Officials meetings and on-site evaluation missions,
including Member State experts, officials of the Commission and the EEAS have been
organised.
The first VLD phase related to the legislative, policy and institutional framework was
completed in 2012. The main output of the first VLD phase was the establishment of
consolidated legislative and multiannual policy frameworks in the field of document
security, border management, integration of foreigners and migration management,
asylum, statelessness, the fight against cross-border organised crime and human
trafficking, terrorism, corruption, money laundering, drug trafficking, judicial cooperation
in criminal matters, national law-enforcement cooperation, data protection and citizens’
fundamental rights, including non-discrimination and protection of minorities54. Important
institutional reform was achieved, including strong consolidation of BMA capacities such
as a ‘One-stop-shop’ registration point for migrants, asylum seekers and stateless
persons, reform of the Border Police, establishment of a Data Protection Centre, an Anti-
Corruption Centre, a National Integrity Council and an Ombudsman. Numerous
international and Council of Europe conventions have been signed and ratified in the area
of judicial cooperation, organised crime, corruption, data protection, non-discrimination
and protection of persons with disabilities.
The second phase of VLD was initiated in 2013 targeting the effective implementation
and operation of the previously established frameworks. These included consolidation of
document security systems, border management operationalisation in line with the
51 The financed actions included: border monitoring missions, technical assistance of Border Police Department,
BMA, border points, language centres, equipment of six temporary reception centres, information campaigns,
multiple training activities of border personnel and national judges, study visits, book donation, language
courses for refugees and self-reliance measures aiming at social market integration of asylum seekers and
refugees.
52 Regulation (EU) No 259/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. L 105 of
08.4.2014.
53 SEC (2011) 1075.
54 SEC (2011) 1075; European Commission, Joint Staff Working Document, Second progress report on the
implementation by the Republic of Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, SWD (2012)12, 9.2.2012.
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Schengen Border Code,55 training of border guards on applying EU Schengen Catalogue
best practices, increased cooperation with FRONTEX and effective use of data
management and surveillance systems. The BMA migration management capacity was
further reinforced by the establishment of six additional territorial units near the
Transnistrian region56. The public order and security reforms have been reinforced with
improved inter-institutional coordination and databases in place. The new anti-corruption
bodies have started to show positive results with a modest track record of high level
corruption sentences. An operational cooperation agreement with Europol was signed in
early 2014.57 An exemplary functioning system on statelessness was put in place58. The
Commission reported good progress on the implementation of the national human rights
action plan and consolidation of the Ombudsman Office capacities59.
Over EUR 21 million of EU assistance has been allocated to support VLAP implementation
for 2014-201660. Important complementary support was provided under the EUBAM to
Moldova and Ukraine61. Additionally, the EU has committed over EUR 60 million in
support of justice sector reform62. The VLAP implementation process, which benefited
greatly from the expert assistance of an EU High Level Policy Advice Mission to Moldova
in 2010-2015, is mandated to support the main institutions in strategic planning, policy
making and management efforts63.
As of 28 April 2014, the visa-free regime for Moldova entered into force, granting
Moldovan citizens holding biometric passports visa-free entry and stay rights on the
territory of EU Member States (excepting the United Kingdom and Ireland) and in non-EU
Schengen states for short stays of up to 90 days in any 180-days period.
By 2014, over 1 million out of 3.5 million Moldovan citizens had received biometric
passports64. From 28 April 2014 to 31 May 2015, the Border Police registered 530,487
exits of Moldovan citizens with biometric passports towards the EU (out of 2,313,401
total).65 For the same period, 1,355 cases of refusal of entry and illegal stay by Moldovan
citizens were reported66. In 2014, the Border Police of Moldova registered a decrease in
numbers of illegal migrants at the Moldovan-Romanian border by 35%, while the number
of migrants aiming to reach the EU at the Moldova-Ukraine border increased by 60%67.
During the first year of enforcement, the visa waiver for Moldova has been implemented
smoothly, with no serious abuses recorded68. The number of Moldovan citizens
readmitted from EU Member States is stable amounting to over 150 requests per year69.
The number of asylum applications from Moldovan citizens in the EU Member States
remains low.
Further implementing steps concern continued adoption and implementation of the
Schengen acquis and standards, including the effective application of the Visa
Information System (VIS)70. Moldova is to deepen its cooperation with EUROPOL, EASO
55 Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), O.J. L 105 of 13.4.2006.
56 BMA data.
57 https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_news/signing-operational-cooperation-agreement-moldova.
58 SWD(2012) 12, note 57, p. 23; Interviews with national stakeholders.
59 COM (2013) 807, p. 35.
60 Border Police of Moldova data.
61 http://www.eubam.org.
62 COM (2013) 807, p. 36.
63 EU Budget contribution 2 414 648 EUR, implemented by UNDP Moldova. See, http://www.euhlpam.org.
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration data.
65 Border Police of Moldova reported data.
66 Border Police of Moldova reported data.
67 Border Police of Moldova, Annual Report 2014, available at:
http://www.border.gov.md/images/docs/fin_Raport_activitate_DPF_2014_final-eng.pdf.
68 European Commission, Sixth bi-annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 31 October
2014, COM (2014)711 final of 27.11.2014, p. 11.
69 See Readmission Agreement and Visa Facilitation section.
70 Council High Level Working Party on Asylum and Migration, Summary of Discussions, Meeting 23-24
September 2014, 13605/14, p.15.
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and FRONTEX especially in the area of training and capacity building71. Continued EU
support is secured for 2014-2017, under the ENI 2014-2020, whereas EUR 67-82 million
has been committed to police reform and border management objectives (EUR 122-149.2
million for the 2014-2020 financial period, 30% of the ENI portfolio for Moldova)72.
In the case of Moldova, the VLD and VLAP have proved to be strong dismantling tools
which rapidly fostered important reforms in the area of border management, migration
and asylum. Moreover, the credible visa liberalisation prospect (and the AA, including a
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) signed in July 2014) favoured
reforms reaching far beyond the specific area of home affairs. The constant EU expert
and financial assistance added to Moldova’s incentives to sustain progress on the reform
agenda.
The EU-Moldova VLD is an outstanding example of a genuine bilateral engagement. The
EU, the Member States and the Moldovan authorities alike proved strongly committed to
the process73. From 2011 to 2013, the Commission issued five VLAP Progress Reports on
Moldova (as opposed to one per year for Georgia and Ukraine) and commissioned one
visa liberalisation impact assessment. Multiple high level and on-site in-depth evaluation
missions have been organised to monitor the country’s progress.
From a political point of view, the visa free regime did not have its expected impact. This
is so mostly because a large share of Moldovan citizens had already secured the right to
travel and reside in EU Member States through other means, before the visa waiver
entered into force74. A large share of the remaining citizens are less likely to exercise the
right primarily due to scarce financial resources, professional capacities and skills, geo-
political views or other ideological factors. Hence, out of the overall potential beneficiaries
of the measure, only a limited share is actually actively exercising the right. The Border
Police data shows that only ¼ of Moldovan citizens’ exits towards EU used biometric
passports, thus benefiting from a visa waiver75. Moreover, there is a general low
awareness and poor understanding of the benefits of the EU-Moldova cooperation,
including the visa liberalisation regime.
After the visa-free regime entered into force (and the AA, including a DCFTA signature in
July 2014), the pace of reforms and the VLAP benchmark indicators have generally
stagnated and in some cases even regressed. The main reported challenges relate to
frozen progress on justice reform, regression in the effective functioning of the non-
discrimination system and the established Ombudsman Office, and very modest progress
on the integrity and fight against corruption action plan.
The deteriorating indicators confirm that the EU conditionality tool remains a political one
in nature, and its use in the case of the Moldova VLD is no exception. While the areas of
border security and prevention of irregular migration benefited from tight conditionality
benchmarks, the progress towards other VLAP benchmarks, such as judicial reform, non-
discrimination or the fight against corruption lacked a similar systematic assessment and
clear fulfilment criteria. In other cases, the EU showed increased tolerance, as the
example of travel documents for refugees shows. The latter have been demanded by the
EU and promised by national authorities in all VLAP progress reports, but were still not in
place in mid-2015.
71 Ibid.
72 Single Support Framework for EU Support to the Republic of Moldova 2014-2017, adopted on 11 June 2014,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/pdf/key-
documents/moldova_2014_2017_programming_document_en.pdf.
73 COM (2013) 807, p. 3: “The missions were unmatched in terms of the depth of the assessment — four weeks
involving 12 EU Member States’ experts accompanied by officials of the Commission and of the EEAS”.
74 Right of residence and work in EU Member States, migration regularisation laws in certain Member States
(especially Italy), naturalisation (especially in the case of Moldovan citizens granted the Romanian, Bulgarian,
Irish, Italian, Greek citizenship), increased family reunification rights, facilitated long stay and multiple entry
Schengen visas.
75 530,487 out of 2,313,401 total Moldovan citizens exists towards EU during the first month of visa
liberalisation.
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Morocco
Moroccan residents abroad amount to 3.5 million according to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (on the basis of consular registers) and up to 5 million according to the Ministry of
Migration Affairs, i.e. between 10% and 15% of the population. 84% of them are in
European countries (34% only in France, followed by Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and
Belgium). Morocco considers Moroccans abroad to be all its citizens, whether or not they
have taken a foreign nationality, and hence these numbers include second and third
generation migrants. Annual migration flows remain at a level of between 80,000 and
100,000. Even if migration rates have shown a declining trend over the last few years,
emigration flows seem poised to remain high; indeed, depending on the survey, between
29% and 40% of young people express the wish to emigrate (i.e., 4 to 5.3 million young
people). But Morocco has become a key host country as well as a transit country from
Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe; even if figures remain very modest (between 25,000 and
40,000 Sub-Saharan irregular immigrants in the country, according to Ministry of Interior
estimates, and a total of fewer than 100,000 legal foreign residents). For the last ten
years Morocco has cooperated closely with Spanish authorities to control irregular
migration to the European Union through the Gibraltar Strait and the Ceuta and Melilla
enclaves, implementing the Morocco-Spain Readmission Agreement of 17 March 1992
(other readmission agreements have been signed with Germany, Italy, France, Belgium
and the Netherlands).
Accordingly, ever since EU external cooperation in the field of migration took shape in
2004 Morocco has been one of the main destinations of that assistance. Under the
AENEAS programme between 2004 and 2006 Morocco was the beneficiary (sometimes
not exclusive) of EUR 18 million distributed in 22 out of 105 projects implemented
globally, in 11 of them with the objective to strengthen its migration management
capacities, and as many to fight irregular migration76.
Mobility Partnership
Morocco was the first Arab Mediterranean partner country with which the European Union
signed, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a Mobility Partnership. A Joint Declaration77
was signed and published in June 2013 between the EU, nine of its Member States78 and
Morocco, jointly with an Annex of cooperation projects by EU agencies and Member
States supposed to contribute to the achievement of each of the objectives stated in the
Joint Declaration. The objectives of the Mobility Partnership are: i) better management of
the movement of persons for short stays, legal migration and labour migration, ii)
strengthening cooperation in the field of migration and development, iii) fighting irregular
migration and human trafficking networks and the promotion of an effective return and
readmission policy respecting human rights, applicable legislation and the dignity of
concerned persons, and iv) respecting international instruments on the protection of
refugees.
In the Joint Declaration, the parties committed to negotiate a Visa Facilitation Agreement
and a Readmission Agreement, but after a first round of talks negotiations seem blocked
since January 2015. Sources linked to the negotiations consider chances for reaching an
agreement in the foreseeable future to be very low. However, until the signature of these
two legal instruments, the Mobility Partnership does not provide for any increased
76 See A. Kirchner, The “External Dimension” of the EU’s Immigration Policy and Morocco’s Capacity to Manage
Migration, Bachelor Thesis, European School of Management and Governance, University of Twente, Enschede,
Netherlands, 2010.
77http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/docs/20130607_declaration_conjointe-
maroc_eu_version_3_6_13_en.pdf.
78 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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mobility between the EU and Morocco or new labour migration possibilities, and involved
Member States have not made any concrete offer in this respect (participation in the
Mobility Partnerships does not entail for Member States the obligation to take any
engagement in relation to any of the objectives of the MP). This severely limits the
potential for action to realise objective i) above on promoting mobility and legal
migration.
The Annex of cooperation projects has an “evolving nature”. Indeed, in the autumn of
2013 Moroccan authorities presented a series of counter-proposals, but apart from those
integrated in the Sharaka project they were not taken on board by the European
partners. This created some dissatisfaction among Moroccan officials. The Annex basically
consists of an inventory of projects undertaken by the EU and partner Member States in
this field in the framework of their development cooperation, either new or ongoing even
before the signature of the Mobility Partnership (92 initiatives under consideration, in
preparation or ongoing are inventoried in the last version). The last available version of
the Annex dates to June 2015, and is presented as a Scoreboard (or Tableau de Bord),
but without a real progress assessment of the implementation of the projects or their
contribution to the achievement of the MP objectives (the information provided refers
only to the MP objective pursued, the MS or institution initiating or funding the action,
the proposed initiative or project, indicative implementation period, indicative budget,
funding source and status). To carry out such an assessment on a regular basis, either
independently or as a joint exercise, would be a major breakthrough to advance the
implementation of the MP. On the other hand, the mere existence of the Scoreboard acts
as a tool to align projects, increase coherence and facilitate complementarity and
coordination among donors.
The flagship initiative funded by the EU in relation to the Mobility Partnership is the
Sharaka Project to support the implementation of the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership,
launched in 2014 with a budget of EUR 5 million over 3 years. The project is
implemented by a French public entity, France Expertise International, in partnership
with six other Member States. Its main objective is to support national migration and
development and mobility policies in Morocco in a framework of reinforced cooperation
between Moroccan and European administrations. The specific objectives are to optimise
the positive effects of migration, both for Morocco and for the European Union, mobilising
the expertise of the seven partner Member States to respond to the needs of Moroccan
institutions (short and long term expertise, peer-to-peer exchanges, studies and
benchmarking, pilot actions, networking and targeted communication). It has four main
components:
- to capitalize on migration and development projects in Morocco and scale up the
most effective (a thorough mapping of these projects is in progress, to look for
complementarity and good practices to scale up);
- to build government capacities in the mobilisation of Moroccans residing in Europe
(in line with the Moroccan government policy, this will be focused on qualified
migrants, who are only a small share of all Moroccan migrants; around 400,000
Moroccan residents abroad have a higher education degree);
- to build institutional capacities in labour migration management, and specifically:
 support regularised immigrants for their integration into the Moroccan labour
market (this targets the less than 18,000 regularised migrants, for whom a
full services portfolio is being developed at ANAPEC);
 support the Public Employment Service (ANAPEC) in international placement
of Moroccan workers in Europe (a thorough diagnostic of the capacities of the
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international division of ANAPEC has been carried out and a series of support
actions planned, which will build on the at least three other cooperation
projects which have supported this division since 200479;
- to support Moroccan institutions and civil society organisations working in the
reintegration of returning Moroccan migrants.
New immigration policy
The Mobility Partnership was followed, only three months after its signature, by a deep
change in the immigration policy in the Kingdom. This has become a unique case in the
EU’s Southern Neighbourhood of a partner country establishing an immigration and
asylum policy based on human rights principles, in line with the EU’s GAMM. As a
consequence, it redefined the framework and priorities of EU cooperation in this field in
Morocco.
The sequence of the adoption of the new policy is revealing. On September 2013, the
National Council for Human Rights announced a report on “Foreigners and Human Rights
in Morocco: For a Radically New Asylum and Immigration Policy”80. A few days later, the
King issued a set of “High Orientations” launching a new global immigration policy and an
operational action plan. In October, a new Department on Migration Affairs was created
in the Ministry of Moroccan Residents Abroad, which took over planning, coordination and
implementation of the new policy. In November 2013 an exceptional regularisation
scheme was launched for the year 2014. This campaign resulted in 17,918 one-year
residence permits from 27,330 applications registered (almost half of them to Senegalese
and Syrians, followed by Nigerians and Ivoirians). Among these, all women and children
who submitted applications (more than 10,000) were granted residence permits given
their special vulnerability. The residence permits have been automatically renewed for
2015. In March 2014, the Government presented to Parliament three new laws on
Immigration, Trafficking of Human Beings and Asylum, but they have not yet been
adopted. In December 2014, a National Immigration and Asylum Strategy was launched,
including eleven immigrant integration programmes in all relevant fields. The Moroccan
Government presented the first progress report on the implementation of this strategy in
September 2015.
This new policy was a major departure from the official migration policy enforced in
Morocco since the adoption of the Immigration Law 02-2003, which criminalised irregular
migrants and established heavy fines and prison penalties for irregular immigrants and
those who provide support to them. The Minister of Migration stated, in the public
presentation of the new bill, that, in the 2003 law, “the repressive and procedural
aspects prevailed” in dealing with immigration. The 2003 Law provoked an intense
political debate, with heavy criticism from civil society over the lack of respect for
fundamental human rights and with denunciations of the “externalization” of the
European Union border control to Maghreb countries.
These public criticisms of Moroccan policy towards irregular immigrants were
subsequently aimed at the administrative practice of abandoning to their own fate on the
border with Algeria in the desert irregular immigrants detained trying to cross over to the
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (the only land border between Africa and Europe).
There were documented cases of deaths and these migrants often reappeared in the
79 Bensaid and Martín, 2015, op. cit.
80 Étrangers et droits de l’homme au Maroc: pour une politique d’asile et d’immigration radicalement nouvelle”,
www.cndh.ma.
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border city of Oujda after a few days and many ordeals. In the framework of the new
approach, Morocco has discontinued this illegal practice and now brings detained
migrants, instead, to major urban centers far from the European borders, mainly Rabat.
Beyond some challenges posed by the new immigration policy, in particular in terms of
human rights protection, institutional capacities, social tensions, integration potential of
immigrants and long-term prospects81, the new policy prompted a quick reaction from
the European Union and its cooperation in this field. Indeed, the EU was quick to support
this new immigration policy, which has become the top priority of cooperation with
Morocco in this field. In the framework of the Sharaka Project much of the EUR 1.4
million labour migration component has been ear-marked for capacity building of the
Public Employment Service (ANAPEC) for immigrant workers’ integration into the labour
market. Additionally, a new EUR 10 million budget support programme to promote the
integration of immigrants has been deployed, including EUR 2 million each for the
Ministries of Public Health and Education to support the extension of health care and
school enrolment to all immigrants.
EU cooperation on migration
In August 2015, there were in Morocco 25 different ongoing projects in the field of
migration funded by the European Union, for a total of more than EUR 20 million over
their implementation period (for multi-country projects, it is not easy to determine the
share corresponding to Morocco). Of this amount, EUR 10 million corresponds to the new
budget support programme to promote the integration of immigrants in Morocco,
launched in 2015 after the adoption of the new national immigration policy. EUR 4 million
of it was added to existing budget support programmes in the health and education
sectors (EUR 2 million each), EUR 1.6 million for technical assistance to the competent
Ministry and EUR 4.4 million for assistance to migrants (EUR 1.4 million for integration
assistance to immigrant women and EUR 3 million for immigrant integration actions).
Another pre-existing project (EUR 1.6 million) aims to improve the protection of human
rights of Sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco. Another EUR 5 million corresponds to the
Sharaka Project to support the implementation of the Mobility Partnership (see below),
which also has a strong technical assistance and institutional capacity building
component. EUR 1 million funds a return programme to countries of origin from Morocco,
plus EUR 1.6 million in the framework of a multi-country project to improve cooperation
between countries of origin, of transit and of destination on voluntary return to meet the
needs of vulnerable migrants. The rest goes to small migration and development
technical assistance programmes.
Current EU cooperation in the field of migration focuses strongly on the integration of
immigrants, and the mobilisation of Moroccan skills abroad, in full agreement with the
policy priorities of the Moroccan government, as well as on return and reintegration to
and from Morocco to the countries of origin. Overall the implementation of the Mobility
Partnership signed in June 2013 has translated into a more than doubling of EU resources
for cooperation allocated in the field of migration in Morocco. However, these figures pale
compared to the EUR 67.6 million invested between 2007 and 2010 in an integrated
border management programme managed by the Ministry of Interior, for which there is
no evaluation available.
81 See Ten years afterwards, is Morocco an immigration trailblazer again?, Migration Policy Centre blog entry
posted by Iván Martín on the February 25, 2015, https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/ten-years-
afterwards-is-morocco-an-immigration-trailblazer-again/.
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Tunisia
Tunisia has a long tradition of labour migration, and roughly 10% of its total population
lives abroad: 1.2 million emigrants, 83% of them in Europe, and in particular more than
54% in France, followed by Italy and Germany82. 28% of the adult population (and 44%
of those 15-24 years old) express their desire to emigrate if the opportunity arises, and
22% plan to do so in the next 12 months (OCDE 2012). For the last forty years, the
country has consistently pursued a policy aimed at facilitating labour migration, including
the migration of skilled workers. However, there has not been, to date, a comprehensive
national migration strategy clearly specifying the main policy objectives, the ways and
means to achieve them and the institutional division of work and coordination
mechanisms, though some attempts to define one have been undertaken since the 2011
revolution (including the circulation of a draft National Migration Strategy, which was
never formally adopted).
The rich variety of public institutions which deal with different aspects of migration
management include: the Ministry of Social Affairs with its State Secretariat for Migration
and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE), integrating a General Directorate for International
Cooperation on Migration, and its Office for Tunisians Abroad (OTE, with a network of 44
labour attachés); the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment with its Bureau of
Foreign Labour and its public employment service (ANETI, with more than 90 regional
offices), including an International Employment Department; and the Tunisian Agency for
Technical Cooperation (ACTC) under the Ministry of Development and International
Cooperation. In addition, the country has a series of bilateral labour agreements with
main destination countries (e.g. France, Italy, Switzerland), mainly with the aim of
facilitating labour emigration. However, there has not yet been a clear institutional
coordination platform on migration.
After the 2011 revolution, two consecutive migration crisis affected the country: between
February and August 2011, 28,000 Tunisians benefitted from the confusion in the border
control system to get to the Italian island of Lampedusa and then the European
continent, creating a political crisis in the system of the free movement of persons within
the European Union. Then the civil war in Libya in 2011-2012 provoked a flow of some
200,000 refugees into Tunisia (according to UNHCR), as well as a temporary return of up
to 137,000 Tunisian emigrants (IOM figures). Since 2012, the annual migration balance
has stabilised and shows a slight increase83, estimated by the National Statistical
Institute at around -16,000 per year over the last five years. Cooperation in the field of
migration has increased dramatically since the revolution, in terms of projects, resources
invested and actors.
Mobility Partnership
On 3 March 2014, the EU, Tunisia and ten Member States84 signed the Joint Declaration
establishing a MP85, the second with a Mediterranean partner country (after Morocco in
2013). This was one of the steps planned in the framework of the “Privileged Partnership”
with the EU announced in November 2012 in the wake of the Tunisian revolution, with an
Action Plan agreed for 2013-2017. On the Tunisian side, it was signed by the interim
technical Government, which had entered office only two months before to prepare the
second democratic elections after the revolution and face the dire economic situation,
82 See SEMTE, Vers une stratégie nationale en matière de migration et des Tunisiens à l’étranger, op. cit.
83 See H. Boubakri, Boubakri, Revolution and International Migration in Tunisia, op. cit.
84 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
85 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/
declaration_conjointe_tunisia_eu_mobility_fr.pdf.
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and only two months before the announcement of a Macro Financial Assistance package
to Tunisia amounting to EUR 300 million. In contrast with the case of Morocco, the Annex
of the EU-Tunisia MP was not published at the request of the Tunisian authorities, and
has been negotiated ever since.
The MP was signed with the explicit opposition of main Tunisian migrants associations
and civil society organisations, including the former single trade union, the Union
Générale des Travailleurs Tunisians (UGTT). They published a statement calling the
Government to “refuse the signature of the Mobility Partnership proposed by the EU,
which has a more than obvious securitary approach and amounts to imposing the
outsourcing of migratory controls”86. They denounced “the lack of transparency in the
negotiation process which did not involve civil society actors, many of whom have been
active on issues directly relevant to the agreement”. The EU Delegation invited civil
society organisations to some preparatory meetings with the Tunisian government, but at
the last minute and without sharing the working documents, which prompted the
organisations to decline to participate. After the signature of the MP, they called on the
Government not to sign a readmission agreement, invoking human rights concerns87.
The content of the EU-Tunisia MP resembles that of other MPs, with some specificities
reflecting the priorities of the Tunisian authorities: for instance, it is more articulate than
the EU-Morocco MP in relation to legal migration. As with other MPs, it has four areas of
action: mobility, legal migration and integration; the fight against irregular migration and
human trafficking, migrant readmission, security of travel and identity documents and
border management; migration and development and asylum and international
protection. To support the implementation of the MP, a EUR 5 million project was
formulated in the framework of the AMIF programme. In the Project Action Fiche
prepared by the Commission, the project would have the following main results:
 Strengthened capacity of relevant Tunisian authorities to manage labour migration
and trade-related mobility through enhanced cooperation with EU partners.
 Improved knowledge of the features and trends of the main Tunisian communities
in Europe and the establishment of a targeted diaspora mobilisation programme.
 Strengthened capacity of relevant Tunisian authorities and of civil society
organisations to provide support for the reintegration of returnees.
One year and a half after the signature of the MP, it has not yet been launched (in the
case of Morocco, the MP was launched within 9 months of its signature).
An ENI-funded EUR 3 million programme was launched in early 2015 to support the
Tunisian authorities in putting in place an integrated border management system. A
major security sector reform support programme under preparation would also have a
strong border management component. Additionally, a two-year EUR 1 million project to
improve sustainability of reintegration of voluntarily returning migrants to Morocco,
Tunisia and Senegal started at the beginning of 2015.
Negotiations for a Visa Facilitation Agreement and for a Readmission Agreement between
the EU and Tunisia, provided for in the MP Joint Declaration, have not yet started. The
Annex listing the actions to be implemented to achieve each of the objectives of the MP
(or “Scoreboard”, as it is denominated) is not yet fully agreed either and has not been
published (the last version dates to May 2015, and inventories a total of 101 initiatives
86 www.maison-migrations.tn/index.php/39-actualites/actualites-migrations-en-tunisie/86-tunisie-immigration-
adresse-au-prochain-premier-ministre.
87 « Partenariat de Mobilité entre la Tunisie et l’UE : l’externalisation des frontières européennes à marche
forcée », http://www.migreurop.org/article2491.html?lang=fr.
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under consideration, in preparation or ongoing in all fields of cooperation), and the new
actions envisaged in it have in most cases not yet started. Tunisian authorities complain
that the MP does not provide for any additional legal labour migration opportunity or
even the activation of bilateral labour agreements with some Member States which are
not fully exploited so far (in particular France, where only a third of the total potential
number of 9,000 migrant workers benefit every year), and that support measures
included in the Annex by the European Union and Member States concern mainly
technical assistance. In any case, the consultation process to agree on the Annex of
implementing projects has already helped the inter-governmental coordination of
national authorities in this field, and might be instrumental in advancing a clearer
formulation of national migration policies.
EU-Tunisia Migration Cooperation Agenda (ETMA)
This project, funded under the ENPI, was the first supported by the EU in Tunisia in this
field, and aimed to promote comprehensive migration cooperation between Tunisia and
Europe, in line with the EU GAMM and in the context of negotiations for a MP, by
fostering the exchange of expertise on border management and migration related
subjects, as well as technical assistance in drafting a national migration policy and in
improving institutional coordination mechanisms. It was implemented by the ICMPD,
initially between January 2012 and June 2013, with an extension until the end of 2014,
and involved the work of an international expert for three years in Tunisia. Its initial
budget was EUR 800,000.
The project addressed six thematic components: (1) mobility/legal migration, (2)
diaspora outreach and development, (3) return, readmission and reintegration, (4)
border management and document security, (5) pilot projects (addressing integration/re-
integration) and (6) migration management strategy development. A gaps and needs
assessment was carried out88 assessing the institutional capacities of Tunisian authorities
both at central and local levels with a view to identifying challenges and ways to
overcome these. This assessment also led to the elaboration of a tailor-made programme
of capacity building activities and the organisation of a series of workshops. However, the
political transition made it very difficult to have an active participation of Tunisian
authorities, and many objectives of the project did not materialize. The pilot projects
aimed at supporting returnees were implemented through a call for applications for the
local associations (13 returning migrants and seven local NGOs benefitted from it). There
are two other ongoing assisted voluntary return and reintegration projects in Tunisia, one
managed by IOM and the other one by the French OFII89.
In the framework of the project, an attempt to coordinate international donors in the field
of migration around the EU Delegation was undertaken, with a first coordination meeting
in 2012 which had no continuity. An on-line EU-Tunisia Platform on Migration was
developed90, but without much activity. Whereas the project achieved some progress in
integrated border management, at least in terms of elaboration of a diagnostics and of
an action plan, in the field of national migration policy it was side-stepped by national
authorities, who elaborated a draft national migration strategy without involving the
project.
88 Etat des Lieux de la Gestion des Migrations en Tunisie : Partie mobilité, migration légale, diasporas et retour,
réinsertion and Partie gestion des frontières, migration irrégulière et fraude documentaire.
89 See Martín, Kriaa and Demnati, 2015.
90 https://www.eurotun-migr.net/en/
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“Outsourcing” of migration controls, asylum and rescue operations
A recurrent issue in the framework of discussions for an EU-Tunisia MP, but well ahead
since the early 2000s and until very recently in the framework of the ongoing migration
crisis in the Mediterranean, is the idea of “outsourcing” or externalisation of controls of
irregular migration, processing and reception of asylum-seekers, in particular to Tunisia
and Morocco. In March 2015 informal proposals of the Italian Government were
discussed within the Council of Ministers of Interior to support Southern Mediterranean
countries, in particular Egypt and Tunisia, with training and funds to take over maritime
search and rescue operations, dealing with the reception or the return of those migrants.
From a positive perspective, the idea is to provide those partner countries, as transit
countries, with the incentives and resources they need to assume their responsibility in
the field of international protection and deal with irregular migration and refugee flows
before they reach Europe, ensuring human rights protection of migrants. For critics, in
particular civil society and human rights organisations, this is an attempt of Europe to
push away the migration crisis, evade its responsibilities and will reduce human rights
protection for migrants and asylum-seekers91. EU efforts to improve integrated border
management systems or develop national asylum systems through Regional Protection
Programmes, for instance, would aim to “contract out” migration control to those
countries. In the meantime, irregular migrants lack access to legal representation and to
fundamental legal guarantees, and can be held up to one year in detention before being
deported.
Tunisia, with Egypt and Libya, was one of the three beneficiary countries of the Regional
Protection Programme for North Africa launched in 2010 under the TPMA (EUR 3.6
million)92. It started to operate in December 2011 and was managed as three different
programmes. Most of the activities supported through the RPP were standard UNHCR
services, including refugee status determination and up to 3,500 resettlements from the
camp of Shousha93. The latter opened in February 2011 after the crisis in Libya, and
more than 250,000 refugees transited through it. It was closed in mid-2013 without
guaranteeing full protection to all asylum-seekers (in terms of residence permit and
access to social benefits). The RPP also funded a series of capacity building and advocacy
activities for the adoption of national asylum legislation. However, Tunisia still has no
legislation on asylum or asylum demands processing system, although it acceded to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1957 (and the 2014 Constitution
provides that “the right to political asylum shall be guaranteed as prescribed by law”).
Therefore, UNHCR continues to carry out refugee status determination and to search for
solutions for refugees, but has no access to detention centres or border areas. In April
2015, a new Regional Development and Protection Programme for North Africa was
launched under the leadership of Italy and with the participation of 12 Member States. It
covers all North African countries, from Morocco to Egypt, plus Niger and Mauritania, and
brings together funds from the AMIF (EUR 10 million, DG HOME) and ENI (EUR 3 million,
DG NEAR).
91 See, for instance, and Red Cross EU office (2013), Shifting borders, Externalizing Migrant Vulnerabilities and
Rights?, or Amnesty International (2014), The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights Violations Against
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders,
www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/EUR_050012014__Fortress_Europe_complete_web_EN.pdf.
92 Support to UNHCR activities in North Africa in the context of Regional Protection Programmes in Egypt, Libya
and Tunisia, DCI-MIGR/2011/270-894, TPMA.93 Papadopoulou, 2015, op. cit.
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ANNEX II. INVENTORY OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS ON
MIGRATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES
This inventory comprises all international agreements, both bilateral and multilateral,
concluded by the EU with third countries in the field of migration. Political and
operational instruments are excluded.
I.- Short-term Visas
I.1.- Visa Waiver Agreements
(i) Agreement between the European Community and Antigua and Barbuda on the
short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169, 30.6.2009, p. 3-8
(p.a. 28.5.2009; e.f. pending).
(ii) Agreement between the European Community and Barbados on the short-stay visa
waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169, 30.6.2009, p. 10-15 (p.a.
28.5.2009; e.f. 1.3.2010).
(iii) Agreement between the European community and the Republic of Mauritius on the
short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169, 30.6.2009, p. 17-
22 (p.a. 28.5.2009; e.f. 1.3.2010).
(iv) Agreement between the European Community and the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas on the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169,
30.6.2009, p. 24-29 (p.a. 28.5.2009; e.f. 1.4.2010).
(v) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Seychelles on the
short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169, 30.6.2009, p. 31-
36 (p.a. 28.5.2009; e.f. 1.1.2010).
(vi) Agreement between the European Community and the Federation of Saint Kitts and
Nevis on the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2009, OJ L 169,
30.6.2009, p. 38-43 (p.a. 28.5.2009; e.f. 1.8.2015).
(vii) Agreement between the European Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil on
short-stay visa waiver for holders of diplomatic, service or official passports, done at
Brussels on 8 November 2010, OJ L 66, 12.3.2011, p. 2-6 (e.f. 1.4.2011).
(viii) Agreement between the European Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil on
short-stay visa waiver for holders of ordinary passports, done at Brussels on 8
November 2010, OJ L 255, 21.9.2012, p. 4-9 (e.f. 1.10.2012).
(ix) Agreement between the European Union and the United Arab Emirates on the
short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 6 May 2015, OJ L 125, 21.5.2015, p. 3–9
(p.a. 6.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(x) Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste on the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173,
3.7.2015, p. 3–9 (p.a. 28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xi) Agreement between the European Union and Saint Lucia on the short-stay visa
waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p. 12-18 (p.a.
28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xii) Agreement between the European Union and the Commonwealth of Dominica on
the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p.
21-27 (p.a. 28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
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(xiii) Agreement between the European Union and Grenada on the short-stay visa
waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p. 30-36 (p.a.
28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xiv) Agreement between the European Union and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on
the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p.
39-45 (p.a. 28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xv) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Vanuatu on the short-
stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p. 48–54 (p.a.
28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xvi) Agreement between the European Union and the Independent State of Samoa on
the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p.
57–63 (p.a. 28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
(xvii) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
on the short-stay visa waiver, done at Brussels on 28 May 2015, OJ L 173, 3.7.2015, p.
66–72 (p.a. 28.5.2015; e.f. pending).
I.2.- Visa Facilitation Agreements
(i) Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the National
Tourism Administration of the People's Republic of China, on visa and related issues
concerning tourist groups from the People's Republic of China (ADS), done at Beijing on
12 February 2004, OJ L 83, 20.3.2004, p. 14-21 (e.f. 1.5.2004).
(ii) Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the
Russian Federation, done at Sochi on 25 May 2006, OJ L 129, 17.5.2007, p. 27-34 (e.f.
1.6.2007)
(iii) Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the facilitation of the
issuance of visas, done at Luxembourg on 18 June 2007, OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 68-
76 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(iv) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 18 September 2007, OJ L 334,
19.12.2007, p. 85-95 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(v) Agreement between the European Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 18 September 2007, OJ L 334,
19.12.2007, p. 97-107 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(vi) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Montenegro on
the facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 18 September 2007, OJ L
334, 19.12.2007, p. 109-119 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(vii) Agreement between the European Community and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia on the facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 18 September
2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 125-135 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(viii) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Serbia on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 18 September 2007,OJ L 334,
19.12.2007, p. 137-147 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(ix) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 10 October 2007, OJ L 334,
19.12.2007, p. 169-179 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
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(x) Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the facilitation of the
issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 17 June 2010, OJ L 52, 25.2.2011, p. 34-44 (e.f.
1.3.2011).
(xi) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova amending the
Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 27 June 2012, OJ L 168,
20.6.2013, p. 3-9 (e.f. 1. 7.2013).
(xii) Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine amending the Agreement
between the European Community and Ukraine on the facilitation of the issuance of
visas, done at Brussels on 23 July 2012, OJ L 168, 20.6.2013, p. 11-17 (e.f. 1. 7.2013).
(xiii) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on
facilitating the issue of short-stay visas to citizens of the Republic of Cape Verde and of
the European Union, done at Praia on 26 October 2012, OJ L 282, 24.10.2013, p. 3-12
(e.f. 1.12.2014).
(xiv) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Brussels on 17 December 2012, OJ L 289,
31.10.2013, p. 2-11 (e.f. 1.1.2014).
(xv) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas, done at Vilnius on 29 November 2013, OJ L 128,
30.4.2014, p. 49-60 (e.f. 1.9.2014).
I.3.- Others
(i) Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention of the International Labour Organisation
(Convention 185) (Council Decision 2005/367/EC of 14 April 2005 authorising Member
States to ratify it, in the interests of the EC, OJ L 136, 30.5.2005, p. 1-2).
II. Irregular immigration and Return
II.1.- Fight Against Irregular Immigration
(i) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in human beings, especially
women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000 (Council Decision 2006/619/EC of
24 July 2006 on its conclusion on behalf of the EC, OJ L 262 of 22.9.2006, p. 51).
(ii) Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 November 2000
(Council Decision 2006/617/EC of 24 July 2006 on its conclusion on behalf of the EC, OJ
L 262 of 22 .9.2006, p. 34).
II.2.- Readmission Agreements
(i) Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China on the readmission
of persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on 27 November 2002, OJ L
17, 24.1.2004, p. 25-39 (e.f. 1.03.2004).
(ii) Agreement between the European Community and the Macao Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China on the readmission of persons residing without
authorisation, done at Luxembourg on 13 October 2003, OJ L 143, 30.4.2004, p. 99-
115 (e.f. 1.6.2004).
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(iii) Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the National
Tourism Administration of the People's Republic of China, on visa and related issues
concerning tourist groups from the People's Republic of China (ADS), done at Beijing on
12 February 2004, OJ L 83, 20.3.2004, p. 14-21: article 5 (e.f. 12.2.2004).
(iv) Agreement between the European Community and the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation,
done at Colombo on 4 June 2004, OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, p. 43-60 (e.f. 1.5.2005).
(v) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the
readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done at Luxembourg on 14 April
2005, OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, p. 22-40 (e.f. 1.5.2006).
(vi) Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on
readmission, done at Sochi on 25 May 2006, OJ L 129, 17.5.2007, p. 40-60 (e.f.
1.6.2007).
(vii) Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the readmission of
persons, done at Luxembourg on 18 June 2007, OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 48-65 (e.f.
1.1.2008).
(viii) Agreement between the European Community and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done by
exchange of letters on 18 September 2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 7-24 (e.f.
1.1.2008).
(ix) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Montenegro on
the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on 18
September 2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 26-44 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(x) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Serbia on the
readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on 18
September 2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 46-64 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(xi) Agreement between the European Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on the 18
September 2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 66-83 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(xii) Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova on the
readmission of persons residing without authorization, done at Brussels on 10 October
2007, OJ L 334, 19.12.2007, p. 149-167 (e.f. 1.1.2008).
(xiii) Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on 26
October 2009, OJ L 287, 4.11.2010, p. 52-67 (e.f. 1.12.2010).
(xiv) Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of
persons residing without authorisation, done at Brussels on 22 November 2010, OJ L
52, 25.2.2011, p. 47-65 (e.f. 1.3.2011).
(xv) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde on the
readmission of persons residing without authorization, done at Brussels on 18 April
2013, OJ L 282, 24.10.2013, p. 15-34 (e.f. 1.12.2014).
(xvi) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia on the
readmission of persons residing without authorization, done at Brussels on 19 April
2013,OJ L 289, 31.10.2013, p. 13-29 (e.f. 1.1.2014).
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(xvii) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the
readmission of persons residing without authorization, done at Brussels on 28 February
2014, OJ L 128, 30.4.2014, p. 17–42 (e.f. 1.9.2014).
(xviii) Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the
readmission of persons residing without authorization, done at Ankara on 16 December
2013, OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3–27 (e.f. 1.10.2014).
III.- Association and Cooperation Agreements containing migration clauses
(i) Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community
and Turkey, done at Ankara on 12.9.1963, JO 217 du 29.12.1964, p. 3687-3697 (e.f.
1.12.1964). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970,
annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic
Community and Turkey and on measures to be taken for their entry into force, OJ L
293, 29.12.1972, p. 3-56. Decision 1/80 of the EEC- Turkey Association Council,
19.9.1980; Decision nº 3/80 of the EEC- Turkey Association Council, 19.9.1980 (OJ
1983, C 110).
Council Decision of 6 December 2012 on the position to be taken on behalf of the
European Union within the Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an
association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, with regard to the
adoption of provisions on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 340,
13.12.2012, p. 19–25.
(ii) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and
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ANNEX III. LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Brussels:
 International Coordination Unit, DG HOME, European Commission
 External Relations, Asylum and Migration Unit, Council of the EU
 European External Action Service
 DG DEVCO – B3
 Brussels Mission, ICMPD
 Regional Office for the EEA, the EU and NATO, International Organization for
Migration, Brussels
Member States:
 Subdirection General of International Relations and Immigration, Ministry of
Interior, Spain
Moldova:
 Bureau for Migration and Asylum, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of
Moldova
 International Cooperation Directorate, Border Police Department, Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova
 National Office UNHCR Republic of Moldova
 The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova (Justice and
Home Affairs)
 The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova (Political
Affairs)
Morocco:
 Ministère chargé des marocains résidant à l’étranger et des affaires de la
migration (MCMREAM). Direction de la coopération, des études et de la
prospective.
 The Delegation of the European Union to the Kingdom of Morocco (Human Rights
and Migration)
 Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme, Président.
Tunisia:
 Ministry of Social Affairs – Secretariat of State for Migration
 International Organization for Migration (Office in Tunisia)
 The Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Tunisia (Migration)
 Academic expert

